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Title: The Background and Development of the 1871 Korean-American 
Incident: A Case Study in Cultural Conflict 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Berm::rd V. Burke 
'.Basu Dmytrys~"lyn 
This study is an attempt to combine the disciplines of Asian history and 
United States diplomatic history in analyzing the 1871 Korean-American Incident. 
The Incident revolves around the Low-Hodgers eA.-pedition to Korea, and the sub-
sequent breakdown of peaceful negotiations into a military dash of arms. 
To describe the Incident as merely another example of American "im-
perialism, '' or as a result of narrow-mindad Korean isolationism, is to over-
simplify its causes and miss the larger implications that can be learned from it. 
A basic premise of this paper is th2t the 1871 Incident is an example of East-
West cultural conflict. As such, the forces that helped to determine the attitudes 
and behavior of both the Americans and Koreans were of a broad nature reflect-
ing their respective cultural differences. At times, these differences were so 
basic and general that the specialist in history can easily overlook them. 
To better understand this conflict of cultures, Chapters II and III dis-
cuss elements of Korean and American diplomacy before the 1860' s, and how 
their unique experiences led to widely different attitudes toward fo:reign rela-
tions. Chapter II concentrates on traditional Chinese-Korean relations, and their 
effect upon Korea's approach to diplomacy; Chapter III emphasizes the nature of 
America's first contacts with East Asia~ and the important influence of the activ-
ities of the United States in the Mediterranean region. 
Chapters IV and V deal with domestic politics in Korea and the United 
States, and how these internal conditions affected each nation's attitude toward 
the other. Chapter VI is a detailed description of tha immediate events that cul-
minated in the 1871 Incident. Chapters I and v1I are the introduction and con-
clusion. 
In researching this paper, government documents, memoirs, diaries, 
personal accounts, contemporary newspapers, books, and articles were all used. 
When writing the chapters that deal primarily with Korea, Korean sources have 
been used as much as possible. 
The Korean and American officials, though communicating in the same 
language (Chinese characters), were negotiating from completely different cul-
tural norms. Both sides felt that their positions and actions were morally justi-
fied. In studying the official documents concerning the Incident, the reader is 
indeed impressed by the sincerity and honesty of all parties involved. In this 
sense, it is difficult to label one group "guilty" and the other group "innocent." 
It must be remembered, however, that the Americans were carrying out naval 
activities in Korean waters, and not the Koreans in American waters. 
The student of history is reminded that American-East Asian relations, 
unlike most American-European relations, must constantly confront and over-
come wide cultural differences. To ignore these differences, or to impose one's 
own cultural views on another society, is to invite misunderstanding, raise sus-
picions, and increase the possibility of conflict. 
THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE 1871 KOREAN-AMERICAN INCIDENT: 
A CASE STUDY IN CULTURAL CONFLICT 
by 
ROBERT RAY SWARTOUT, JR. 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in 
HISTORY 
Portland State University 
1974 
TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH: 
The members of the Committee approve the thesis of 
Robert Ray Swartout, Jr. presented May 17, 197 4. 
_..,.,, v I 
Morris K. Webb, Cha irman 
Bernard V. Burke 
APPROVED: 
David T. Clark, Dean of Graduate Studies and Research 
May 17, 1974 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to two professors at Portland State 
University, Dr. Morris K. Webb and Dr. Bernard V. Burke. Their advice and 
encouragement have aided this project immeasurably. I also wish to thank 
Professor Kim Won-mo of Tan-guk University in Seoul, Korea, and Mr. He Chan 
Rhee of Sin-gu Publishing Company, also in Seoul, for their help in obtaining 
Korean source material. 
I must express my appreciation to Mr. Maurice Hodge of the Oregon 
Historical Society for processing the pages of photographs, Ms. Ellen Lewis for 
typing the manuscript, and to Ms. Corinna Cioeta for drawing up the maps. 
Special thanks are due my parents for various forms of aid. 
My greatest indebtedness is to my wife, Kyung-ok, whose continued 
patience and support have made this study possible. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii 
LIST OF FIGURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . vi 
CHAPTER 
I INTRODUCTION ........................•........... 1 
II TRADITIONAL CHINESE-KOREAN RELATIONS 
AND THEIR EFFECT UPON KOREA .............. . 9 
The Korean Tribal League Period. • . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
China and the Three Kingdoms Period.......... 15 
T'ang China and the Kingdom of Silla........... 21 
Koryo and the Turmoil in East Asia. . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
The Yi Dynasty Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . 33 
Conclusions. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • • . . . • • . 44 
III EARLY AMERICAN RELATIONS \V1TH EAST ASIA: 
THE MEDITERRANEAN INFLUENCE AND 
THE ROLE OF GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY ..........•. 50 
A Summary of Early American Relations 
in East Asia. . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • • • 50 
The Precedence of the Mediterranean Region. . . . 60 
Matthew Galbraith Perry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 
John Rodgers.. . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
v 
CHAPTER PAGE 
IV KOREAN DOMESTIC POLITICS ON THE 
EVE OF THE 1871 INCIDENT .................... . 81 
v FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SEWARD AND FISH ....... . 96 
William H. Seward. . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
Hamilton Fish. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 
VI THE IMMEDIATE EVENTS LEADING TO 
THE 1871 INCIDENT ............................ . 108 
Earliest Western Contacts With Korea. . . . . . . . 108 
The Case of the General Sherman............. 113 
The French Invasion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 
The Oppert Affair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 
American Diplomacy, 1866-1870............. 125 
The American Expedition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 
Reactions to the 1871 Incident. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 
VII CONCLUSION ..................................... . 155 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................ 161 
APPENDICES.................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1 The Early Three Kingdoms, fifth century.................. 17 
2 The Later Three Kingdoms, seventh century............... 20 
3 The United Silla Period, eighth century... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
4 The Koryo Period, eleven-fourteenth century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
5 Yi Ha-ting, the Taewon-gun... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
6 William Henry Seward. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
7 Frederick F. Low and E. B. Drew. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 
8 The frigate Colorado. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
9 Strategy meeting aboard the Colorado. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 142 
10 Kanghwa Island and west Kyonggi Province................ 147 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies to date involving the 1871 Korean-American Incident have con-
tained two major drawbacks. Firstly, those that have dealt specifically with the 
Incident, though doing an excellent service of chronicling the immediate events, 
have for the most part not delved into the larger national and international fac-
1 
tors that ultimately led to the 1871 events. The general lack of interpretive 
themes is one of the results of this narrow concentration. 
Secondly, studies that have dealt with a larger scope of history have 
too often represented a particular national point of view. Though these may be 
basically objective works, their national or regional focus has limited their use-
fulness. Books about American diplomatic history have described in detail the 
American involvement in East Asia, and in pre-treaty Korea, but they lack any 
2 
deep analysis of Asian motives and reactions. Books about Korean history 
1For example, E. M. Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 1866-
1871," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Ro.val Asiatic Society, XXVIII 
(1938), 1-230; Albert Castel and Andrew C. Nahm, "'Our.Little War with the 
Heathen'," American Heritage, XIX, No. 3 (April, 1968), 19-23, 72-75; Choi 
Soo-bock, "Korea's Response to America and France in the Decade of the 
Taewon'gun, 1864-1873," in Korea's Response to the West, ed. by Jo Yung-
hwan (Kalamazoo, Mich. : The Korea Hesearch and Publications, Inc. , 1971), 
pp. 109-140. 
2For example, John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient 
likewise have commented on the coming of the Western !la.tions and its affect 
upon Korea, but have paid little attention to Western motivations, other than 
3 
making some broad generalizations. Too frequently the Westerners seem to 
appear out of nowhere, play their role in Korea, and then once again disappear 
from the scene. Criticism of these works is not intended; a book about Korean 
history cannot possibly present a detailed background discussion of American 
history. Such limitations are inherent in any national historical work. 
This study then is an attempt to bridge the gap between American-
2 
oriented and Korean-oriented studies. At the same time, the 1871 Incident will 
be viewed, not as an isolated case, but as a representative study contrasting the 
basic differences between American and Korean diplomatic positions and methods 
in the early and mid nineteenth century. 
Works that concentrate solely on the immediate events of a particular 
incident often overlook some of the larger historical implications. This has 
been especially true in the study of American-East Asian relations. Many of 
the case studies in this area have ignored perhaps the most essential element of 
all: East-West cultural conflict. That there was (and still is) a conflict of cul-
tures has long been evident. Possibly its obviousness has led people to overlook 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1903); Tyler Dennett, Americans in East Asia 
(3rd printing; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1963); Thomas A. Bailey, A Dip-
lomatic History of the American People (8th edition; New York: Appleton-Cen-
tury-Crofts, 1969). 
3For example, Sin Sok-ho, et al., ed., Han'guk IIyondae Sa (The His-
tory of Modern Korea) 8 vols. (Seoul: Sin-gu Pulishing Co., 1969); Han Woo 
Keun, The History of Korea (Seoul: The Eul-Yoo Publishing Co. , 1970); Sohn 
the conflict's pervasive importance. At any rate, Western historians have 
tended to analyze American-East Asian relations in terms of Western methods 
and models. Using such techniques, the international relationships in Asia are 
often described simply in traditional political-economic terms. 
Contrary to this approach, Edward D. Graham declares that 
the notion of a confrontation between radically dissimilar cultures 
in which the incidents may differ in time but in which the funda-
mental configurations of assumption and attitude remain much the 
same may in the end be the most fruitful way of understanding the 
whole course of American-East Asian relations. 4 
John K. Fairbank, in his article "'American China Policy' to 1898: A Miscon-
5 
ception, fl states essentially the same idea. 
Beginning with the early nineteenth century, the Europeans and 
Americans saw the Asian cultures as different from and inferior to their 
3 
own. Since Western culture and systems were superior, it was the hope of most 
that the East Asian nations would eventually adopt them as their new way of life. 
In 1842 President John Tyler told the United States Senate and House of Repre-
Pow-key, Kim Chol-choon, and Hong Yi-sup, The Historv of Korea (Seoul: 
Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 1970); Choe Ching Young, The Rule 
of the Taewon-gun, 1864-1873 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); 
M. Fredrick Nelson, Korea and the Old Order in East Asia (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1945). 
4Edward D. Graham, "Early American-East Asian Relations, fl in 
American-East Asian Relations: A Survey, ed. by Ernest R. May and James C. 
Thomson, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 5. 
5 
John K. Fairbank, "'American China Policy' to 1898: A Misconcep-
tion," Pacific Historical Review, XXXIX, No. 4 (November, 1970), 409-420. 
4 
sentatives that "events appear likely ... to bring China ere long into the relations 
6 
which usually subsist between civilized states." And in 1853, while attempting 
to open Japan, Matthew C. Perry echoed these same ideals when he stated that 
his aim was "to bring a singular and isolated people into the family of civilized 
7 
nations .... " 
G. J. Wolseley, a British military officer in the 1860 Anglo-French 
expedition against China, maintained that "before the Asiatic world can be led 
to believe in the justice of our polity, or before it will be applicable to Eastern 
. nations, it will be necessary first to raise them up to our standard of knowledge, 
8 
and enable the.tn to reason in the same logical manner with ourselves." 
The early misunderstanding of Asian cultures was demonstrated in 
President Tyler's letter to the Emperor, carried to China by Caleb Cushing, 
and written by Daniel Webster .. Parallels with the language used in the Indian 
treaties of the times are striking. 
The Chinese love to trade with our people, and to send them tea 
and silk, for which our people pay silver, and sometimes other 
6 James D. Richardson, ed. , A Compilation of the Messages and Papers 
of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 20 vols. ( New York: Bureau of National Litera-
ture, 1897), V, 2066-67. 
7 Samuel Eliot Morison, "Old Bruin": Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 
1794-1858 (Boston; Little Brown, 1968), p. 324. 
8 . Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds., Imperial China: The De-
cline of the Last Dynasty and the Origins of Modern China (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1967), p. 158. 
articles. But if the Chinese and Americans will trade, there should 
be rules, so that they shall not break your laws or our laws. Our 
minister, Caleb Cushing, is authorized to make a treaty to regulate 
trade. Let it be just .... We shall not take the i:nrt of evil doers .... 
Let the treaty be signed by your imperial hand. It shall be signed 
by mine by the authority of our great council, the Senate .... 
Your good friend, 
9 John Tyler 
5 
The Americans, and the Westerners in general, had characteristics and 
attitudes just as unique as the Asian notions of hierarchy, humility, filial piety, 
and social obligation. The American emphasis on aggressiveness and confronta-
tions to solve problems was reflected in George F. Seward's remarks: "I con-
fess that I should think less of Western civilization and of Western manhood if it 
were not pushing and aggressive in China. ,,lO Seward, the nephew of Secretary 
of State William H. Seward, was the same person \\ho strongly recommended 
sending an American expedition to Korea as early as 1868, when he was Consul-
General at Shanghai. As will be shown later, George Seward's original call for 
action was based upon faulty information. However, such demands for an 
· aggressive policy before all the facts were known often characterized American 
politics of the period. 
The nationalism that swept much of Europe and America after the 
French and American revolutions was reflected in a very strong sense of nation-
9
naniel Webster, Writings and Speeches of Daniel \Vebster, 18 vols. 
(National edition; Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1903), XII, 150-151. 
1
°Kwang-Ching Liu, "America and China: The Late Nineteenth Century," 
in May and Thomson, American-East Asian Relations. pp. 84-85. 
6 
al honor, especially among naval officers. This meant that minor incidents 
were often interpreted as insults to the flag, and had to be avenged or the 
nation's honor would be disgraced. 
In a letter to Congressman Aaron Ward written December 27, 1842, 
Matthew Perry declared that nno man is fit for the Navy if he is not ready at all 
times to interpose his life in the preservation of the integrity of the American 
flag ... 1111 Such an attitude is naturally necessary to build patriotism and disci-
pline aboard a shipt but when applied to delicate diplomatic negotiations, the re-
. suits can often be less than satisfactory, and sometimes even disastrous. 
Before opening negotiations with the Japanese, Perry had already 
decided upon a definite course of action. His plan was 
to demand as a right and not to solicit as a favor those acts of 
courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another; to allow 
none of those petty annoyances which have unsparingly visited upon 
those who preceded me; and to disregard the acts as well as the 
threats of the authorities if they in the least conflicted with my own 
sense of what was due to the dignity of the American flag. 12 
For a number of reasons, which will be discussed in Chapter III, 
Perry's position did not prevent him from successfully concluding the negotia-
tions. But generally speaking, Perry succeeded in spite of the dangers his 
position created, not because of it. 
11Morison, "Old Bruin": Commodore lVlatthew C. Perry, p. 159. 
12Roger Pineau, ed., The Japan Expedition, 1852-1854: The Personal 
Journal of Commodore :Matthew C. Perry (Washington: Smithsonian Institute 
Press, 1968), p. 92. Emphasis added. 
7 
The same emphasis upon the honor of the flag succeeded only in bring-
ing about the final disruption of the attempted American-Korean negotiations of 
1871. Although material presented later in this study will show that the Koreans 
probably would not have signed a formal treaty under any circumstances, an 
American position based more on cultural understanding and less on national 
honor would have prevented hundreds of needless deaths. 
This conflict of cultures then is the essence of the Korean-American 
Incident of 1871. In order to better comprehend these cultural differences, this 
. study opens with two chapters concerninl$ the development of Korea's attitude 
toward foreign relations and the corresponding American attitude with respect to 
East Asia. These chapters are followed by two others organized around the 
theme of domestic politics, Korean and American respectively, and the influence 
it had on the course of foreign affairs that ultimately led to the 1871 Incident. 
This study owes a deep debt. to E. M. Cable's "United States-Korean Relations, 
1866-1871." I first became interested in Korean-United States relations in 
general, and the 1871 Incident in particular, while reading Cable's study two 
years ago in Korea. It is by far the most thorough work to be published on this 
affair, and is due much more credit and recognition than it usually receives by 
specialists in the area. 
Although the organization of material in Cable's study may at first be 
confusing to the reader, the appendices still offer the best collection of original 
source material available in one volume. I am especially grateful for chapters 
8 
from the Yi Dynasty Annals ( t ~A f' ~ ), 13 which would otherwise have 
been unavailable to me. 
It was also the absence in Cable of any detailed description of the 
national and international scenes that raised certain questions in my mind and 
led to the present study. For the reader who is interested in a day-to-day 
chronicle of the 1871 Incident, Cable's work is highly recommended. 
13For a somewhat dated, but still interesting description of the contents 
and value of the Yi Dynasty Annals, see George M. McCune, "The Yi Dynasty 
Annals of Korea," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
XXIX (1939), 57-82. 
CHAPTER II 
TRADITIONAL CIDNESE-KOREAN RELATIONS 
AND THEIR EFFECT UPON KOREA 
A western journalist residing in the Far East about the turn of the last 
century once reported: 
Late in the seventies, when Peking was still the city of mystery, 
one annual event never failed to arrest the attention of Europeans 
there. During the winter months a large party of strangers would 
arrive, men of odd dress and unfamiliar speech. Their long, 
thickly padded robes were tied with short strings, not buttoned like 
the Chinese, and their outer garment was parted in the middle, in-
stead of the Chinese style, on the right hand .... They wore extra-
ordinary hats, often of gigantic size, made of horse-hair or of bam-
boo, and their hair was tied in a knot on the top of their heads .... 
The visitors, who never exceeded two hundred in number, were 
the ambassadors, tribute-bearers, and traders from Chosen, the 
Hermit Kingdom .... [They] entered into the very heart of the For-
bidden City, paid their dues to the Emperor, kow-towed, and were 
entertained at the official dinner. The traders sold their ginseng 
... , brassware, and their rolls of oiled paper. Europeans often 
tried to hold intercourse with thern, but without much success. At 
the end of the forty days, the embassy and its followers returned, 
back over the great Peking road ... and through the dreaded bandit 
belt of the Yalu. Then they were swallowed up again in the dark-
ness and mystery of their own land. 1 
This mysterious and often romantic impression of a vassal nation come 
to pay formal homage to its superior touches only the surface of a very real and 
historic cultural and political relationship between China and Korea. Contrary 
1F. A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1908)' pp. 1-2. 
10 
to the beliefs of some of the first Europeans in the Far East, Korea had tradi-
tionally been a country independent of China, with its own domestic and foreign 
policies. This was in part a reflection of the very distinctive Korean culture. 
Not only clothes, but also food, architecture, language and even the personality 
2 
of the Korean people differ greatly from that of the Chinese. 
But at the same time, China's immense size, wealth, and political 
power could not be ignored. China had its greatest influence on Korea in the 
area of cultural and social attitudes. This certainly oo uld not have taken place 
. if China had been a small, weak nation on Korea's periphery. Needless to say, 
China's cultural influence is a corollary therefore of her national power. 
This power relationship was reflected in the titles commonly used for 
the two nations. China was referred to as Tae-guk ( ;i:: ~ ) the Great 
Country, or Chung-guk (if \~ ) the Middle Country or Middle Kingdom lying 
half-way between heaven and earth. Contrastingly, Korea, although possessing 
a specific proper name noting the respective dynasty, was usually referred to as 
Tong-guk ( *-
3 
l~ ) the Eastern Country, since it lay to the east of Chung-guk. 
However, none of these titles were used until after both nations had be-
2George A. McGrane, Korea's Tragic Hours: The Closing Years of the 
Yi Dynasty, ed. by Harold F. Cook and A Ian M. MacDougall (Seoul: Taewon 
Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 21-23; Edwin 0. Reischauer and John T<:. Fairbank, 
East Asia: The Great Tradition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), pp. 396-
398; Richard Rutt, ''The Chinese Learning and Pleasures of a Country Scholar," 
Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXXVI (April, 
1960)' 3. 
3 James S. Gale, "China's Influence Upon Korea," Transactions of the 
Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, I (1900), 1. 
11 
come securely established. Nevertheless, there were widespread and extreme-
ly important contacts between the area of the Korean peninsula and the Chinese 
region dating back to pre-national times. 
I. THE KOREAN TRIBAL LEAGUE PERIOD 
Up to roughly 200 A. D., the Korean peninsula contained not a nation, 
or nations, but rather loose tribal societies. In the fourth century B. C., some 
of these tribes unified into various leagues, the forerunners of the earliest 
Korean states. One of the largest and most significant of these tribal leagues 
was Ko Chos~n, ( "t *B if, ) or Ancient Choson. It was centered around the 
Taedong River valley in northwestern Korea and at its greatest height spread all 
the way to the Liao River basin located in present-day Manchuria. Thus it be-
came a rival to many of the "Warring States" in north and northeastern China. 
(At this time I am using the terms "Korea" and "China" to describe geographic 
areas rather than political units.) 
Ko Choson held its own for some time, but finally during the period of 
King Chao of Yen (312-279 B. C. ), the Liao River area fell to the invading Yen 
armies. 4 This brought a marked decline in the influence of Ko Choson, although 
5 
it maintained control of most of the area lying east of the Liao. 
With this action a pattern was set for later Chinese-Korean relations. 
When China would enter a period of instability and chaos, which often succeeded 
4Han Woo Keun, The History of Korea, p. 13. 
5
sohn Pow-key, The History of Korea, p. 15. 
12 
the fall of an old dynasty, Korea's territory, power, influence and independence 
often expanded. Then when the Chinese nation or states again became unified 
and strong, Korea was forced to play a much more subservient role, although 
still independent, and not unusually lost some territory in the process. 
As the Han state began to unify China at the end of the third century 
B. C., many rebellions occurred in the northern states of Yen, Ch'i, and Chao. 
These were successfully put down by the Han, and as a result many of the rebels 
.... 6 
chose to flee eastward. In this way many of them entered Ko Choson. One of 
7 
· these rebels was Wiman <1flr ;.~ ), a subordinate of the Yen leader, Lu Kuan. 
As Professor Han Woo Keun states, "He was evidently a person of some impor-
8 
tance, and is said to have brought about a thousand followers with him." 
Chun ( ~ ) , the king of Ko Choson, decided to use Wiman, and so 
appointed him military commander of the western frontier along the Yalu River. 
Wiman then turned the tables in 190 B. C. Using his new military base to attack 
the capital of P'yongyang, he drove out Chun, who was forced to flee to the 
southern part of the peninsula. Wiman solidified his control of Ko Choson and 
even expanded its territory by bringing surrounding tribes into the existing or-
ganization. 9 At the same time, the Han dynasty's efforts to unify all of China 
precluded any interference in Ko Choson matters. In fact, the Han government 
6Han, The History of Korea, p. 15. 
7 Sohn, The History of Korea, p. 25. 
8 Han, The History of Korea, p. 15. 
9 Sohn, The History of Korea, pp. 25-26. 
was grateful for any help it could receive from Ko Choson in controlling the 
Hsiung-nu nomads along the northern frontier. lO 
13 
Ko Chosen experienced peace and prosperity for the next eighty years. 
But then events in Chinese affairs again came into play. The Han dynasty was 
now securely established, with all internal rebellions suppressed. It was now 
time to deal with the Hsiung-nu barbarians threatening the north. Wu Ti, the 
emperor of China, decided that the most successful tactic would be to out flank 
· the Hsiung-nu on the east. This called for control of Ko Choson' s territory. To 
bring this about, Chinese forces invaded the area twice, first in 109 B. C., and 
again in 108 B. C. In the first year an army of sixty thousand and a navy of 
seven thousand were repelled by the Koreans at Wanggomsong ( :£ 
11 But the following year the Chinese were not to be denied. 
With the defeat of Ko Choson, Han China divided the area into four prov-
inces; Lolang, Chenfan, Lintun, and Hsuant'u. (Nangnang, Chinbon, Imdun, and 
Hyont'o in Korean.) Although the exact location of these provinces is not today 
known, they were probably situated in the northwest corner of Korea, the Liao-
tung peninsula, and the Liao River valley. Except for Lolang, which lasted un-
til 313 A. D., none of the other provinces were successful. They were con-
stantly harassed and attacked by the surrounding native population and had soon 
10 Han, The History of Korea, p. 16 
11Ib'd 17 18 
_1_.' pp. - . 
14 
to be given up by China. 12 
Another major tribal league that came into contact with the Chinese 
was Koguryo ( ~ "i) ~ ), located near the watershed of the Yalu River and 
as such lying north of Ko Choson. The Koguryo league was often at war with 
China, but unlike Ko Choson, it was never subdued. These people soon gained a 
reputation for being "skilled horsemen and courageous fighters." It was largely 
their constant attacks that forced the Chinese to abandon the province of 
13 
Hsuant'u in 75 B. C. 
Thus even before the founding of a Korean nation, the people of the pen-
insula had had major contact with the Chinese. But despite such contact there 
seems to have been little influence on the culture and social institutions of the 
Korean society. Such impact was to come later. However, the metal-working 
techniques of the Chinese did have a major effect. As these techniques spread 
through the peninsula, they generally strengthened the tribal communities. This 
was especially true in the north. As their technical skills increased, some of 
14 
these tribal groups gradually began to develop into integrated political units. 
12Sohn, The Hf.story of Korea, p. 26. 
13Han, The ffistory of Korea, pp. 26-27. 
14Ibid., p. 22. Although I have presented the traditional interpretation 
of this period, a recent study supports the thesis that Ko Choson and some of 
the other n1eagues" were already political states, rather than still tribal soci-
eties. See Kim Jung-bae, "Hanguk Kotae Kukga Kiwon-ron (On the Origins of 
Ancient States in Korea)," The Paek San Hakpo, XIV (June, 1973), 65-67. 
15 
II. CHINA AND THE THREE KINGDOMS PERIOD 
As previously mentioned, the tribal league called Koguryo played a 
major role in the fall of the Chinese province Hsuant'u in 75 B. C. From this 
time on, Koguryo grew increasingly stronger, so that by the end of the second 
century a true nation was firmly established. 
In China the Han dynasty~ followed by the three kingdoms of Shu, Wu, 
and Wei, had collapsed. Beginning in 311 and lasting until 349, the "Sixteen 
15 
. States" of the "Five Barbarian Tribes" s,truggled for control in north China. 
Capitalizing on this, Koguryo attacked Lolang and in 314 captured the last of the 
Chinese provinces near northeastern Korea. During the later part of the cen-
tury, the new Korean kingdom was able to extend its control as far west as the 
Liao River, including all of the Liaotung Peninsula. At the same time, its other 
16 
borders eA.-panded up to northern Manchuria. From this point until the sixth 
century, Koguryo remained a dominant power in northeast Asia, rivaling many 
of the small kingdoms within China. Above all, Koguryo was certainly not a 
"vassal" state of any other nation. 
Despite the fact that China's political role was negligible during this 
time, her cultural influence in the peninsula was definitely growing. In 372, 
during the reign of King Sosurim (1J1 ~ ;f:f ), Buddhism was first introduced 
15Sohn, The History cf Korea, p. 39 
16Han, The History of Korea, pp. 45-47 
from Ch'ien Ch'in China, and with the support of the government rapidly grew 
17 
and spread. It became one of the ma in vehicles for the transportation of 
16 
Chinese ideas and culture. In the same year King Sosurim established a school 
called T'aehak (};.. ~ , Great Learning} to teach the Chinese language and 
Confucian classics. Its purpose was to train future government officials. Pri-
vate schools called Kyongdang (~ j:,_ ) were also set up where the youth of 
the aristocracy were taught Chinese and archery. 
Another important Chinese practice adopted by Koguryo was the writing 
18 
· and collection of historical records. This, above ail else, helps to demon-
strate that these northern Koreans had created a nation of their own. The his-
tory they wrote, though based on the Chinese model, described the unique 
foundation and development of the Koguryo state. 
Koguryo was not the only nation to arise at this time on the peninsula. 
Just a few years after its establishment, the kingdom of Paekje (a qf 
gradually developed. An exact date for its beginning is unknown, but it was 
19 
most likely a nation by the reign of King Koi ( a :i~ ) , 234-285. Paekje 
covered the southwestern part of present-day Korea, and during its early period 
extended up to the Han River. For much of its existence Paekje was the rival of 
Koguryo, and the two powers were often at war. It was during one of these 
17 Richard Rutt, James Scarth Gale and His History of the Korean 
People (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1972), pp. 139-140. 
18- f 4 Han, The Historv o Korea, pp. 63-6 . 
19Sohn, The History of Korea, pp. 39-40. 
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Figure 1. The Early Three Kingdoms, fifth century. After Han 
Woo-keun, The History of Korea (Seoul: The Eul-Yoo Publishing 
Company, 1970), p. 46. 
17 
18 
earlier wars that Koguryo gained control of the south bank of the Han. Paekje 
was never again able to reconquer that area. 
Paekje's strength and vitality as a nation are attested to by the fact that 
her army at times controlled parts of southwestern Manchuria. And there is 
some historical evidence that she even controlled territory lying along the pres-
20 
ent North China coast. This Korean expansion was again largely due to the 
fact that China was in a period of constant turmoil. Paekje generally was not 
taking territory away from an established Chinese kingdom. In fact, she was 
. usually on very good terms with the various Chinese states. This was in sharp 
contrast to Koguryo, which seemed to be involved in never-ending warfare along 
21 
her western border with the Chinese. As a result, friendly Chinese contact 
with Paekje was much greater than that with Koguryo. Paekje had especially 
close relations with the Chinese states of Sung, Ch'i, Liang and Chin. 
As in Koguryo, Buddhism imported from China became very important 
in Paekje, arriving in 384. With it came many other elements of Chinese cul-
ture, including the Chinese language, Chinese history, art, the Confucian 
classics, and even the philosophical theory of "yin" ( pf2. ) and "yang" 
22 ) . The people of Paekje not only knew of these things, but also be-
came well versed in them. 
20Pang Sun-jc>o, 11 Paekje Kun iii Hwabuk Chinchul gwa Ku Paekyong 
(The Advance of the Paekje Army to the Coast of North China)," The Paek-San 
Hakpo, XI (December, 1971), 4. 
21Sohn, The History of Korea, p. 40. 
22 
Han, The History of Korea, pp. 66-67. 
19 
Of the three kingdoms existing in Korea at this time, Paekje had by far 
the greatest contact with and influence on Japan. It was largely through Paekje 
that the Japanese received their introduction to Chinese Buddhism and the Chi-
nese culture in general. Many Paekje craftsmen were sent to Japan to teach, 
. 23 
while several Japanese monks came to Paekje to study. 
Silla ( ~ff fi£ ) was the last of the three kingdoms to be established. 
Originally located in the further most southeast corner of the peninsula, the 
technological and cultural influences from China were slow to arrive. The area 
. finally formed into a nation, although it maintained strong tribal overtones, in 
the latter half of the fourth century. But once Silla was established, she grew 
quickly. In the last half of the 500' s, the Yellow Sea was reached by conquering 
the area north and south of the Han River between Koguryo and Paekje. This 
not only increased the political power of Silla, it also brought her into direct 
24 
contact with China by way of the Han and the Yellow Sea. From this time on, 
her power expanded until finally in the 660's she defeated first Paekje and then 
Koguryo with the help of T'ang China to become the sole master of the peninsula. 
The sixth century brought dramatic changes in Silla. In addition to her 
new power, internal political and cultural changes were taking place. It was 
during this century that the name Saro, a purely Korean word, was replaced by 
Silla, a name taken from Chinese characters. Also at this time the title 
"Maripkan" ( J$J:. -fr. t ), meaning "great chieftain" and thus an expression of 
23 Sohn, p. 58 and Han, p. 48. 
24 Han, The Historv of Korea, pp. 49-50. 
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Figure 2. The Later Three Kingdoms, seventh century. After Han 
Woo-keun, The History of Korea, p. 79. 
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the tribal league period, was replaced by "Wang" ( :E ) , the Chinese for 
25 
"King." Pobhi:ing ( * ~ ) , 514-539, was the first Silla king to use this title . 
.... , /' 
Buddhism became the ''official" religion of Silla much later than in the 
other two kingdoms, about 528. This was in part due to the conservatism of the 
area. They were not quick to accept new ideas. 26 But once Buddhism was 
accepted, it became highly influential.. Some of the most beautiful Buddhist te·m-
ples existing in Korea today are those that were built during the Silla period. 
III. T'ANG CHINA AND THE KINGDOM OF SILLA 
) China played an essential role in the unification of the 
peninsula under Silla control. . As already noted, Korean states were completely 
independent, as well as expansionistic, during periods of Chinese division and 
weakness. However they were much more confined during periods of Chinese 
strength. The last such period had ended in 220 A. D. with the fall of the Han 
dynasty. But in 589, China was again unified by the Sui ( )7~ ) dynasty. 
Although it only lasted for about thirty years, it was immediately replaced by 
the T'ang, which was to last for almost three hundred years. 
Things were changing in Korea at the same time. Just as the power of 
Koguryo and Paekje were declining, the power of Silla was rising. Thus the 
ancient alliance between Silla and Paekje to keep Koguryo in check was outdated. 
A new alliance between Koguryo and Paekje against Silla was formed. 
25Ibid. , p. 57. 
26Ib.d 
_1_., p. 69. 
22 
Figure 3. The United Silla Period, eighth century. After Han Woo-
keun, The History of Korea, p. 87. 
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Silla decided to ally with T'ang China in an effort to defeat and elimin-
ate Koguryo. Since T'ang was involved in securing her northern border, and 
probably desired the return of the ''Chinese" Ilaotung peninsula, she agreed. 
Finding a direct assault on KoguryC5's western borders too difficult, the Chinese 
and Silla forces decided to secure a southern f:rc.mt by first defeating Paekje and 
taking over her territory. Paekje was no match for the two powers, and was 
completely defeated in 660. Except for a few rebellions later on, this was the 
end of the state of Paekje. 
The two powerful belligerents then turned their attention to Koguryo. 
They began the last assault in 661, and though the Koguryo soldiers fought ex-
pertly and bravely, the northern Korean state was finally defeated in 668. Like 
the fate of Paekje, this was the historical end of Kogury6. 
Once the alliance of convenience with Silla served its purpose, the T'ang 
leaders had hopes of assimilating all the Korean peninsula into their empire. 
However, the long distance from China proper and the power of Silla made this 
impossible. After a few clashes between the two countries, the occupation arm-
ies of China were forced to retreat north of the Taedong River. They finally 
recognized Silla sovereignty to all 1and south of this point in 735. Silla thus con-
trolled all of the peninsula. For a time China ruled most of the northern terri-
tory formally occupied by Koguryo, but they eventually were driven out by "bar-
27 
barian" rebels about 700 A .. D. 
Once Silla had unified the peninsula, there 11 entered a great period of 
27Ib.d 
_1_., pp. 75-89. 
24 
28 
peace, prosperity, and cultural development." The next three hundred years 
of Silla rule paralleled that of T'ang China. This was the period when relations 
between Korea and China became truly regularized. There began a frequent ex-
change of embassies between the two nations. Foreign trade, though small, be-
came important. Common commodities were gold, silver, silk, Silla ginseng 
29 
and Chinese tea. 
This era is popularly referred to as the time of greatest Chinese in-
fluence. 30 The greatness of the T'ang dynasty left its mark upon the Koreans . 
. Even as late as 1900, T'ang represented the highest level of Chinese culture. 
At that time the Korean word for a Chinese person was T'ang-in ( ~ ).._ ); 
for Chinese cotton, Trang-mok ( ~ ·_;f ); for Chinese medicine, T'ang-jae 
( f # ) ; and for Chinese paper, T' ang-j i ( ~ ~~~ ) . The substitution of 
"T'ang" for "China" to such a degree is striking. Census taking throughout the 
Koryo and Yi dynasties that were to follow was based primarily on the T'ang 
model. The histories Korean students studied at the d<Ee of the Yi dynasty were 
31 
of course Chinese, and these always ended with the T'ang dynasty. 
The T'ang dynasty strongly effected the political structure of Silla. 
Many government offices were redesigned to match those of China. But much cf 
28 
Ibid. , p. 99. 
29Ib'd 97 _1_.,. p. . 
30
aale,. "The Influence of China," p. 5 and Han, The History of Korea, 
p. 99. 
31 Gale, "The Influence of China," p. 12; Lee Kwang-rin, "Census Tak-
ing under the Yi Dynasty," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal 
25 
this was for appearances only. The power of the aristocracy dating back to 
tribal times remained largely untouched. So, while the government bureaucracy 
maintained the appearance of a Chinese system, the rationality and efficiency 
that lay at the root of the Chinese model were usually lacking. The Chinese 
model was designed to help centralize a giant government ruling a sprawling na-
tion. Such a system was needed to control the local aristocracies and maintain 
the power of the emporer' s government. But when that type of model was super-
imposed on a country as small as Korea, where power already rested with the 
aristocracy, it could easily lead to overcentralization and increased power in 
the hands of the land-owning elite. Korea's problem was often just the opposite 
32 
of China's; that is, she needed more de-centralization. 
Buddhism naturally had an important role in this cultural development. 
The golden era of Korean Buddhism began in this period, extending into the 
following Koryo dynasty. Numerous Korean monks traveled to China for study, 
33 
and some even ventured as far as India in tracing the sources of Buddhism. 
The following memorial written in 784 for the great monk Sodang is an example 
of this intellectua 1 and religious development. 
The religion of the buddha goes not, comes not, loves not, hates 
not. Like a shadow it follows in silence. Its influence lies in the 
mind only. How great its power! Such was the master Sodang: a 
Asiatic Society, XXXV (1959), 67. 
32 
For a most thorough and scholarly discussion of this problem up to 
the present period, see Gregory Henderson, Korea: Politics of the Vortex (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
33 . Han, The History of Korea, p. 99. 
man who cast the world aside that he might give his whole soul to 
34 the onward march of the buddha. 
26 
But it was not the cultural aspects of religion alone that came to Silla. 
The development of the natural sciences was also a result of Chinese influence. 
And Geomancy, which has remained in use up to present times, was introduced 
by the monk Doson. The Korean name for Geomancy was "Pungsujiri-sol" 
. 35 ( fil 7~ :tl!l. £~ ~Jt ) , the theory of water, wmd, and earth. 
Perhaps the Chinese influence was nowhere as great as in education. 
As stated earlier, Koguryo had recognized the importance of the Chinese 
language and established a few schools to teach it. But Silla expanded and 
formalized the system far beyond that. A special government school was es-
tablished in 682 called "Kukhak" ( ~ !fi national school) to train future gov-
ernment officials. The students had to study the various Confucian classics just 
as their Chinese counterparts did. The course generally lasted for nine years 
and ended, as in China, with examinations that determined the candidates' 
eligibility for office. 
But at this point the Korean social system took effect just as it did in 
the political sphere. In China the education and examination were theoretically 
open to all youths. But in Korea it was limited to just the aristocracy, and even 
within the aristocracy there were limitations between ranks. The social elite 
were determined to preserve their special interests. Thus the Chinese system 
34Rutt, Gale and His History of the Korean People, p. 166. 
35 Han, The History of Korea, p. 106. 
27 
was corrupted, or shall we say modified, to fit the society. As such the purpose 
of the examination system, to staff the government exclusively on the basis of 
. 36 
merit, was defeated. 
IV. KORYO AND THE TURMOIL IN EAST ASIA 
In 936 Silla was overthrown and replaced by a new kingdom, Koryo 
( $ ;r ) . This was not an outside invasion as were many of the Chinese dy-
nastic_ changes. It was an internal rebellion led by Wang Kon ( .£ ~ ), who 
. later became the first king of Koryo. The reasons for the rebellion are com-
plex, but to simplify matters, there were two basic points. First, the aristoc-
racy of the north and central regions were dissatisfied with Silla rule and decided 
to take matters into their own hands. Secondly, the corruption and heavy tax-
ation ,that marked the last days of Silla had driven many farmers to poverty, 
loss of land, and even slavery. When the rebellion broke out, they were more 
than willing to serve its cause, hoping that a change in government would better 
their own prospects. 
The new dynasty was not too dissimilar from the previous one. The 
most basic change was the restructuring of land holdings. Many of Wang Kon' s 
relatives, close friends, advisors, and supporters were given large tracts of 
land at the expense of the old Silla aristocracy. And, in the beginning at least, 
37 
taxes were reduced in order to create more content and prosperous farmers. 
36Ibid., pp. 102-105. 
37 Sohn, The History of Korea, pp. 102-105. 
28 
But the goverrml.ent system, national culture, and relations with foreign 
countries remained generally the same. To give the new government legitimacy, 
its leaders claimed historic ties with Koguryo. Even the name of the dynasty re-
fleets this, Kory5 being: .a contraction of Koguryo. 
Although Buddkism had been strong in the Silla period, it reached its 
apex of power with the c:r.oming of Koryo. Various temples became some of the 
largest landholding institutions in the realm. Many monks held tremendous po-
litical as well as religious power. An example of this was Uich' on ( ~ J;.. ) , 
. the son of King Munjong { ):. ~ 1046-1083) and the brother of King Son.jong 
1083-1094). Over the years the workings of the government and the 
Buddhist hierarchy became inseparable, so much so that when the former fell, 
38 
the latter was irreversibly effected. 
Just as Buddhism was a carry-over from the Silla period, so was the 
educational system. The school system was expanded to include the "Kukchahak" 
( Jia 1-- ~ ), "T'aebak'' ( }.( .fe_p ), and "Samunhak" ( lliJ j:" ~ ). These 
dealt strictly with the Confucian classics and Chinese literature. Unlike the 
effect in Silla, where this type of education reached only the top aristocracy, 
during Koryo times it gradually permeated the entire society. From the eleventh 
century on, numerous private institutions were founded to educate aspiring 
youths of the country~ These private schools became so important that many of 
39 
them eventually grew more prestigious than even the government schools. 
38 Sohn, pp. 99'-100 and Han, p. 147. 
39
sohn, pp. 9'8-'99 and Rutt, pp. 181-182. 
29 
We can recall that the theoretical equality that lay behind the Chinese 
examination system was largely negated by Silla adaptations. Such was also the 
case with Kory~. As early as 958, the Chinese examination system was official-
ly adopted. But then special considerations were made. In order to maintain 
the aristocracy's privileged position, sons of the highest ranking bureaucrats 
were exempted from having to take the examinations. This guaranteed the aris-
tocratic families' continued role in the government, which was by far the most 
important activity in society. Furthermore, entrance into the government 
. schools was based partly upon aristocratic rank. Thus once again a govern-
mental system supposedly reflecting an institution of China was strongly Korean-
ized in its operational aspects. Likewise, the military units of Koryo were 
originally based upon the T'ang system, but in reality they had little in common 
40 
with their Chinese counterparts. 
Foreign trade continued to be an important factor during the Koryo 
period. And as in the past, an overwhelming percentage of it was with China. 
Major Korean exports were gold, silver, copper, ginseng, pine nuts, hides, 
silk coth, hemp cloth, paper, metalwares, knives, and stationery. The most 
important imports were silk textiles, porcelain, books, drugs and musical in-
41 
struments. 
In the diplomatic sphere, relations during this period were quite active. 
40 Han, The History of Korea, pp. 132-133; William B. Henthorn, 
"Some Notes on Koryo Military Units," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the 
Royal Asiatic Society, XXA\T (1959), 67. 
41 Sohn, pp. 97-98 and Han 144-145. 
Figure 4. The Koryo Period, eleven-fourteenth century. After Han 
Woo-keun, The History of Korea, p. 184. 
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After another period of turmoil following the fall of T'ang China, the Sung 
;R ) dynasty gTadually emerged. By the late 900' s, it had unified most 
of southern China and was pressing the Khitans in the north. In 985, the Sung 
court requested military aid from KorylS to help in their campaign against the 
Khitans. Not wanting to get involved in such a war (the Khitan and Korean 
forces were almost equal, with neither side having an advantage), the Koreans 
turned down the Chinese request. As in other instances, the foreign policy of 
Korea seems to have been almost totally independent. Although she was an 
"ally" of China, there was no requirement in their relationship that she must 
obey Chinese demands. In fact, it is important to notice that the Chinese sent a 
"request" to Kory<:s, rather than a demand. 
The Khitans remained strong in southern Manchuria and northern China 
for more than a century. But by 1115, they were being replaced by the Juchens, 
or so-called Chin dynasty, originating out of eastern Manchuria. This new force 
became so powerful that by 1126 they were able to drive the Sung armies, whom 
they had earlier allied with against the Khitans, completely out of northern China. 
Sung was able to retain only the area within and south of the Yangtze valley. 
While this campaign was going on, the Sung rulers once again asked for Koryo 
aid, and again it was refused. The Koreans reasoned that they were under no 
obligation to risk the very possible destruction of their country, Chin power be-
42 
ing what it was. 
42 Han, pp. 137-138, 153-154 and Sohn, pp. 103-104. 
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The next major development in foreign affairs came with the Mongol 
attack and domination of Koryo during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
But this can hardly be termed diplomatic relations, as the Mongols were pri-
marily concerned with Kory~ subjugation, and would use force to achieve their 
43 
goals where diplomacy failed. The Koreans themselves, aside from a small 
number of government officials, were definitely not interested in attempting to 
appease the Mongols. 
When a new group of barbarians, the Mongols, apparently less civil-
ized than either the Kitans or the Nuchen, became masters of China, 
they too were rejected. An area which centuries before had been 
termed the "gentleman's country" could not admit voluntarily the 
superior position of a people obviously uncouth. The Mongols, on 
the other hand, failed to comprehend the mutually acceptable rela-
tions which former [Chinese] dynasties had maintained with the Ko-
rean peninsula. Thus, with ill will on both sides, Koryo was to 
suffer constant invasion, control, exploitation, and virtual annexa-
tion by the Mongol dynasty. 44 
China was the direct cause in ending Mongol domination of Koryo. The 
Mongol empire in East Asia had been weakening rapidly in the 1300' s. In the 
middle of that century a massive Chinese rebellion broke out south of the Yang-
tze. By the late 1360's the rebel forces had driven the Mongols completely out 
of China proper. In 1368 the victorious Chinese established the Ming ( Sij 
dynasty, which was to rule for almost three hundred years. With no base posi-
tions in China, the Mongol "outposts" in the Korean peninsula were no longer 
43See Koh Pyong-ik, "Mongol-Koryo iii Hyongje Mengyak ui SonggyOk 
(On the Nature of the Brotherly Alliance Between the Mongols and Koryo in 1219)11 
The Paek-San Hakpo, VI (June, 1969), 73-74; Rutt, Gale and His History of the 
Korean People, pp. 200-202. 
44M. Fredrick Nelson, Korea and the Old Order in East Asia, pp. 56-57. 
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tenable. The Ming armies spreading into Manchuria could easily cut them off 
from the main Mongol strongholds in Central Asia. With this in mind, the Mon-
gols quickly left the ravaged country. But the destruction and killing they left 
behind were important factors in the creation of a suspicious, isolationist Ko-
rean foreign policy that would develop over the next 450 years. 
V. THE YI DYNASTY PERIOD 
Although the general population of Koryo was fervently anti-Mongol, a 
small but important minority of the ruling class had served the Mongols in order 
to increase their own power and property. When the Ming dynasty was first es-
tablished, there were still many Mongols in northern Manchuria and related 
areas. Some of the Koryo officials just mentioned attempted to play these Mon-
gols and the Ming rulers against each other, hoping to achieve benefits from 
both. To the Ming group, such "un-brotherly" action seemed both an insult and 
a threat to their tenuous northern border. They thus sent a military expedition 
to Koryo' s northeast boundry on the Yalu, believing that this would help their 
traditional allies to see the light. 
These events brought about one of the great moments in Korean history. 
The foolish government leader, Ch'oe Yong ( ~ T ), decided in 1388 to send 
an army under Yi Song-gye ( '! f.l}c -t"t ) to attach the Chinese. Upon approach-
ing the Yalu, General Yi realized that such an attack would be disasterous, ow-
ing to the Mings' proven military power and, at this time, Koryo's lack of the 
same. Under these circumstances, the General chose the alternative to an 
34 
attack on the Chinese. Leading his troops back to the capital of KaesCS'ng, he 
overthrew the government and created one of his own. Although it was not for-
mally recognized until 1392, this was the actual beginning of the Yi ( $ 
dynasty. Yi Song-gye became its founder and first king, T' aejo ( i\ jfJl ). 
These were the immediate factors leading to the establishment of the 
new dynasty. But the Ming action, and Ch'oe Yong's reaction, only helped in 
the culmination of a process long overdue. Just as the corruption and excessive 
privileges of an elite Silla aristocracy led to the foundation of Koryo, so Koryo' s 
decadence called for its replacement by Yi. The power of the landlords had 
made the government helpless in times of national emergency. And since their 
massive landholdings were non-taxable, the government was constantly short of 
revenue. This in turn helped to spread corruption and demoralize the state 
bureaucratic officials, since they could not receive adequate salaries through 
proper channels. Because of all this, land reform was essential if the new dy-
nasty was to succeed. The lines of battle were drawn between the conservative 
officials, powerful landowners, and many Buddhists on the one side and the mil-
itary leaders and the youthful, reform-minded Confucian lower level scholar-
bureaucrats on the other. It was to the benefit of the early Yi dynasty that the 
45 
latter achieved victory .. 
Since the troubled affair with Ming China was an important cause of 
Koryo's fall, King T'aejo realized that relations with China had to be normalized. 
This was done by asking the Ming emperor to "approve" the new dynasty. The 
45Han, The History of Korea, pp. 185-191. 
35 
Korean report to the Chinese cited "the corruptness of the Wang [KoryO) dynasty, 
its lack of an able heir, and the refusal of Yi Song-gye to advance to the border 
against the Ming armies." This report also stated that such a dynastic change 
46 
was the will of the people. 
The Ming emperor replied: 
[Korea] is a small region in the far east, and it is not under the 
rule of the Middle Kingdom. Let the Board of Rites inform it that 
so long as its rule is in conformity with the will of Heaven and in 
harmony with the hearts of men, and so long as it creates no strife 
on our borders, so will its people be allowed to go and come and 
the Kingdom will enjoy happiness; ... we have ~~investigation to 
make in the matter [of the change of dynasty]. 
The emperor was also given the right to select the dynasty's new title, a choice 
between "Choson" ( f R ~r ) and "Hwanyong" ( to ·~ ), T'aejo's birthplace. 
-r 
He selected "Chos~n," in honor of the ancient tribal state that had existed cen-
turies before. 
It is my opinion that most of this exchange was principally political man-
euvering on T'aejo's part. Korea did not need China's permission or blessing 
to begin a new dynasty. For the past 800 years China had not interfered in a 
tributary state's internal affairs. But with respect to China's political and mil-
itary power at this time, T'aejo was being practical in securing her friendship. 
And since both countries' cultures were by now based largely upon Confucian 
. ethics, Korea's request for "approval" fitted into their theoretical "father-son" 
relationship. 
46 Nelson, Korea and the Old Order, p. 70. 
47 Quoted in Nelson, p. 71. 
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The idea that Korea was by and large independent is supported by other 
evidence about this same time. With the northward march of the Ming armies, 
many people from Manchuria had fled to Korea. Because the Chinese were 
short of manpower, they demanded that Korea repatriate these people. Rather 
than do this, the Koreans instead furnished the Manchurians with land in the 
southern part of the peninsula and further extended and fortified their northern 
border. Although making "conciliatory gestures" from time to time in order to 
stave off any direct clash with Ming China, Korea's actual position remained 
firm. Such behavior hardly represents an obedient, dependent vassal state. By 
the middle of the fifteenth century China again had her hands full in the north and 
48 
had to drop any further protests to their eastern neighbor. 
I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this chapter that China's 
greatest influence on Korea has been in the cultural, rather than the political, 
sphere. A nation is generally aware of its political behavior, and sensitive to 
any foreign manipulation or influence, even if they are of the same "Confucian 
state-family." But with regard to cultural attitudes, the influence is usually 
more gradual and subtle. As generations are reared in a cultural atmosphere 
that has taken on new values, their attitudes, opinions, and even thought pro-
cesses begin to reflect these new values. Most of our present-day societies 
. demonstrate this learning function. To sum up this notion in a phrase: people 
are products of their environment, and as the environment changes, so must 
the people. 
48Han, The History of Korea, pp. 221-222. 
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Up to 1392, the Korean peninsula had gradually been adopting Confucian 
values (although purely Korean values have remained very strong up to this day.) 
At any rate, a dramatic speed-up in this adopting process took place with the 
coming of the Yi dynasty. Hahm Pyong-Choon describes the essence of this 
change: 
Confucianism .•. during the Yi dynasty ... was established as the 
official ideology of the state .... It is one of the earliest instances 
in the world history where non-religious ideology was consciously 
employed as an instrument of dynastic policy. It was used to dis-
credit Buddhism which had been the state religion of the preceding 
dynasty. It was used to consolidate the power base of the new rul-
ing elite who were mostly young reform-minded Confucian scholars. 
It was used to secure a highly centralized authoritarian form of 
government and was mobilized to bring the underlying social struc-
ture and mores into line with the political philosophy of the ruling 
class. It is amazing how effectively it was utilized by the Yi dy-
nasty rulers to accomplish their ends. 49 
This reformist, efficient, dedicated government was in sharp contrast 
to that of later Koryc'.S. And as a result the next one hundred years were perhaps 
the greatest in Korean history. Progress was made "in governmental adminis-
tratlon, science, agriculture, and military preparedness, and during the reign 
of Sejong ( tit $ 1418-1450) remarkable technological advances were made, 
/J' 
particularly in astronomy, printing, and climatology, in some respects surpass-
50 
ing the contemporary achievements in Europe." 
But already by the reign of Yonsangun ( ~-; LJ...i lit 1490-1509), 
49Hahm Pyong-Choon, The Korean Political Tradition and Law (Seoul: 
Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1967), pp. 8-9. 
50 Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1965), p. 4. 
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things had begun to change. Ming China had generally adopted the Neo-Con-
fucianism of Chu Hsi ( * %, ) , the most important Confucist in the last 
,, ... , 
51 
thousand years, that developed during the Sung dynasty. "Korea followed suit 
with the enthusiasm of the convert. Far more, even, than in Ming China, the 
word of Chu Hsi in Korea was law; one could criticize Confucius if necessary, 
52 
but Chu Hsi was beyond cavil or doubt." Such a doctrinaire approach naturally 
conflicted with the pragmatism of the early regime. People began to lose inter-
est in new ideas. They might possibly run counter to the words of Chu Hsi. It 
became easy to purge rival factions within the government; a person could al-
1 ways charge his enemy with tre crime of revisionism. 
To better understand this problem it is necessary to discuss the basics 
of Chu Hsi's interpretations. "Confucius ... had warned against overemphasizing 
either study or thought. 'Study without thought,' he said, 'is a waste of time. 
But thought without study is dangerous.' He reported that he had tried meditation 
as a means of seeking the truth, but found it to be useless. Instead, he recom-
mended broad inquiry and experience, supplemented by a rational testing and 
. . 53 
arrangement of the facts that experience yields." But Chu Hsi was not inter-
ested in these practical aspects of Confucianism. 
Since the later Han dynasty, Buddhism had grown tremendously in 
51H. G. Creel, Chinese Thought: from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung 
(New York: The New American Library, 1953), p. 168. 
52 ' 
Gregory Henderson, "Chong Ta-san: A Study in Korea's Intellectual 
History," Journal of Asian Studies, XVI No. 3 (May, 1957), 383. 
53 -Creel, Chinese Thought, p. 171. 
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China, threatening to become the center of Chinese philosophy. Chu-Hsi's in-
terpretations were in large part a response to this challenge. 
Nee-Confucianism sought to show that Confucianism could offer every-
thing desirable that Buddhism could, and more. Specifically it under-
took, first, to match the Buddhist cosmology; second, to explain the 
world and Confucian ethics metaphysically, and finally, while doing 
these things, to justify social and political activity and to vindicate 
men'if4right to final happiness in the ordinary pursuits of the normal life. 
Chu Hsi's Confucianism practically became a religion itself. Its cen-
tral conception was "li" ( £f. ) , roughly translated as "principle." Li, 
according to Chu Hsi, was the metaphysical non-substance that all things had in 
common. It is "without birth and indestructible, ... part of ... the Supreme Ul-
55 
timate, ... pure, empty, vast, without form .... " When this concept was 
applied to politics, it was felt that Ii ''establishes the ideal type of political con-
duct. This is the 'Tao,' the Way. When actual government corresponds to this 
56 
ideal government, it is good; when it differs from it, it is bad. " This abstract, 
dogmatic interpretation of politics was a major departure from original Confu-
cianism. Such a departure was not without its serious political effects. 
Instead of discussing the practical solutions to problems, politicians 
and scholars argued abstract philosophical points. And political decisions came 
to be made on the merit of these arguments. One noted Korean political scientist 
has this to say about Chu Hsi-ism: 
54 
Ibid., p. 166. 
55Ibid., p. 169. 
56 
Ibid., p. 170. 
Its captions and self-righteousness and preoccupation with the short-
comings and foibles of others could not fail to place the ruling elite 
of Yi Korea under the same curse of factionalism that had plagued 
the literati-bureaucrats, including Chu Hsi himself, of Sung China 
The sanguinary factional struggles that were to torment Korea ... 
to the end of the Yi dynasty were descended from the factional politics 
that had come into definite shape in the time of jen Tsung (1023-1063) 
of Sung. The alliance of scholarship and politics that had character-
ized the Sung monarchy also characterized Yi politics. Rigid ortho-
doxy with its relentless persecution of any deviation or opposition 
came to typify; the Yi Confucianism .... No adaptation of alien ideas 
was possible. 57 
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When the Ming dynasty was replaced by the Ch' ing ( ;.{ ) in 1664, 
Chu Hsi's philosophy came under strong attack. Its rigidity and mysticism fell 
in favor of a more practical and critical approach. Many scholars once again 
returned to the study of ancient original texts. But the Koreans had no dynastic 
break or political upheaval that would have served to discredit Neo-Confucian-
ism. Instead, it continued, causing increased intellectual stagnation and polit-
58 
ical factionalism. 
Although factionalism had broken out by 1500, Korea was still a strong, 
prosperous country, thanks to her more than one hundred years of growth and 
stability. The stifling effect of Neo-Confucianism was a gradual process. It did 
not result in Korea's decline overnight. By far the greatest disaster to strike 
Yi Korea, before the Japanese takeover of 1905, was the Hideyoshi invasion of 
the 1590's. 
57Hahm, Korea's Political Tradition, pp. 9-10. Also see Henderson's 
"Chong Ta-san" for an example of this factionalism. 
58 Henderson, "Chong Ta-san," p. 383. 
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The Koreans had already experienced limited attacks from the Japan-· 
ese during the Wak5 ( ~ ~ ) piratical expeditions of the thirteenth and four-
59 
teenth centuries. 
Hideyoshi had decided to increase and solidify his power in Japan by 
attacking China. And in order to do that, he planned to go through Korea. But 
he never got as far as China. The Koreans, with some help from the Chinese, 
were able to repel the invaders from their peninsula after six years of constant, 
terrible fighting. 
Although victorious, the cost to Korea was enormous. Thousands of 
Korean civilians were killed or kidnapped, and their property and others' de- -
stroyed. Cultivated land after the fighting ended was only one-third of the pre-
war level, and only one-sixth in the rice-producing province of Kyong-sang. 
Control by the central government lay shattered; records, especially those of 
landholding and census, were destroyed. Tax revenue was almost non-existent. 
Many people who survived the fight-ing died of starvation. With regard to struc-
tures, "there is hardly a building left in Korea today, except those made of 
60 
stone, which antedates the Hideyoshi invasion." 
Korea never completely recovered from this mass destruction. The 
next fifty years saw one crisis follow another. By the late 1600's, a degree of 
stability had returned and few people were starving, but the country remained 
59For a detailed description of these events, see Benjamin H. Hazard, 
"The Creation of the Korean Navy during the Koryo Period," Transactions of the 
Korean Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XLVIII (1973), 10-28. 
60 Han, The History of Korea, pp. 270-275. 
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remarkably poor. And here Neo-Confucianism had an adverse effect. Had a 
dynamic, progressive, pragmatic ruling group existed, perhaps Korea could 
have recovered its pre-war prosperity. But the factionalism and stagnation in 
government continued. 
Chinese involvemenf in the Hideyoshi invasion had weakened the Ming 
dynasty, while at the same time a new power was rising in Manchuria. The 
Manchus, as they are called today, had united and proclaimed their own nation 
by 1616, and were determined to conquer and control all of China. But before 
doing that, they wanted to secure their southeastern flank. They evidently felt 
that Korea's alliance with the Ming posed too great a danger. 
In 1636 the Manchus demanded that Korea recognize them as their su-
perior and renounce allegiance to the Ming dynasty. This the Koreans refused 
to do. As a result, the Manchu armies swiftly overran Korea and carried out 
their demands by force. Officials who opposed the Manchus were imprisoned 
and later killed, while the Crown Prince Sohyon ( ~~ M, ) and his brother 
Pongrim ( !$1 t~ ) were held by the Manchus as hostages to make certain that 
the Koreans did not have a change of heart. 
After the Manchus conquered all of China in 1644 and established the 
Ch'ing dynasty in Peking, the hostages were returned and Korean-Chinese rela-
tions reverted back to the traditional pattern. But despite the formal observance 
of all customs and ceremonies, the Korean attitude had changed. They still 
greatly respected Chinese culture, but they did not forget how the Manchus 
43 
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came to power. They viewed the original Manchu relationship as little more 
than extortion. Such overt aggression, added to the Mongol and Hideyoshi 
disasters, only helped to confirm Korean suspicions of all foreigners and drive 
62 
them deeper into willful isolationism. 
Although there were -many problems in the latter part of the Yi dynasty, 
Ch'ing ascendancy in China brought peace and diplomatic stability to Korea that 
was to last for over two hundred years. China's size alone caused her presence 
to be felt. Koreans certainly would not go out of their way to offend her. But 
as long as Korean policy did not threaten China, the Eastern Country was free 
63 
to do as she pleased. China neither advised nor interfered. 
Trade had become both important and largely unregulated during the 
Sung and Ming dynasties. The Ch'ing government put a stop to that, and the 
64 
Korean government was more than willing to go along. In these last two hun-
dred years when conservative regimes were in power in both countries, it was 
thought that the less contact with the outside, the better. And this meant con-
tact with the other oriental nations as well. 
611bid., pp. 275-278; Yu Bang-yeong, "Wangjo Sillok e nat'anan Yijo 
Chon-gi ui Ya-in (The Jurchens in the Early Period of the Yi Dynasty as Re-
corded in the Yi Dynasty Annals)," The Paek San Hakpo, XIV (June, 1973), 156-
63; Edward Harper Parker, "The Manchu Relations with Korea," Transactions 
of the Asian Society of Japan, XV (1887), 96-98. 
62 Gari Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea (Seoul: Royal Asiatic 
Society, Korea Branch, 1971), p. 101. 
63Mary C. Wright, "The Adaptation of Ch'ing Diplomacy: The Case of 
Korea," Journal of Asian Studies, XVII No. 3 (May, 1958), 364-365. 
64Ibid., p. 366. 
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The only legal trade was that accompanying the yearly tribute missions, 
65 
and this was highly restricted as to who could sell what to whom. These mis-
sions from Korea to China, and vice-versa, were extremely important and pre-
cise. From 1662 to 1872, there were only three years in which Korea did not 
send a mission; 1722, 1752, and 1865. The number of embassies per year 
66 
varied from one to twenty-three, but as a rule there were twelve. 
The trade carried out during the early missions was usually in the 
hands of official Korean interpreters, called puyonyOkgwan (JEl: ~ ~, ~ 67 ) . 
These men did not often have permanent salaries, and as a result had to depend 
largely upon their profits made from trading. But as the years passed, illegal 
trade carried out by private merchants began to grow and rival the trade of the 
interpreters. Unable to stand up to this competition, these "official traders" 
had to sell their "trading rights" to the private merchants, who controlled all 
. . 68 Korean-Chmese trade by the mid-18th century. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In a purely political sense, Korea was for the most part an independent 
65 Nelson, Korea and the Old Order, pp. 95-96. 
66 John K. Fairbank and Ssu-Yu Teng, Ch'ing Administrations: Three 
Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 193-198. 
67 Liu Seung-ju, "ChosD'n Hugi Taech<!ng-Muyok iii Chon-gae-Kwajong 
(Development of Trading with Ch'ing in the Latter Yi Dynasty Period)," The 
Paek San Hakpo, VIII (June, 1970), 327-328. 
68 
Ibid. ' pp. 400-401. 
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nation. She had her own king and government officials who proclaimed domestic 
and foreign policies without interference from others. The only times when this 
was not so were during periods of foreign domination by force, such as the Mon-
69 
gol experience. 
However, many of the first Westerners who came to East Asia had a 
difficult time understanding the exact relationship between Korea and China. 
They viewed diplomatic relationships solely from the Western point of view, in 
which nations were all theoretically equal, and their conduct was based upon a 
specific set of laws. Such a concept had largely been derived from their com-
70 
mon Christian principles and the West's legalistic background, dating back at 
least to the Greek era. And if by chance a nation was not considered the equal of 
others, then it was assumed that that area was under or would fall under the con-
trol of some stronger, neighboring country. 
Contrastingly, both Chinese and Korean societies were based upon Con-
fucian ethics, as we have already seen. Accordingly, all action and behavior 
were dominated by "li" ( ifl ) , the rules of proper conduct (and vastly dif-
ferent from the "li" proposed by Chu Hsi). This li was concerned primarily with 
the motives and will causing behavior. It was thought that by teaching man to 
act morally, laws would become unnecessary. Confucius is said to have made 
69Even Li Hung Chang, who designed the attempted Chinese domination 
of Korea in the 1880's and the 1890's, admitted that Korea "has ever been inde-
pendent and even resentful of our influence or interest .... " William F. Man-
nix, ed., Memoirs of Li Hung Chang (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913), pp. 
249-250. 
70 Nelson, Korea and the Old Order, pp. 97, 100. 
this distinction between li and law: 
If people are led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by 
punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no 
sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to 
be given them by the rules of propriety, tf1ey will have the sense of 
shame, and moreover will become good. . 
46 
When western nations came to East Asia and demanded treaties because 
"international la\v" required it, the oriental nations were of course at first mys-
tified. To them, relations between nations were but an extention of their social 
relationships. Li not only dictated the actions of individuals, it also set the 
standards for family, community, and international relations. They reasoned 
that if a nation did not recognize li in its social relations, how could it expect to 
carry out international relationships? The alternative such a nation, one ignor-
ant of the proper rules of conduct, might choose was force, as the Mongols had 
demonstrated. 
There is no denying that Korea was strongly affected by China in both 
72 
diplomatic and social affairs. A Korean writer during the Yi dynasty de-
clared: 
Our ceremonies, our enjoyments, our laws, our usages, our lit-
erature, our goods have all followed after the morals of China. The 
[five] great relationships shine forth from those above and the teach-
ings pass down to those below, making the grace of our customs like 
that of the Flowering Land, so that Chinese themselves praise us by 
71 Analects in The Chinese Classics, I, 10, as cited in Nelson, Korea 
and the Old Order, p. 101. 
72Ko Byong-ik, "Weguk e taehan Yijo Han'gukin ui Kwannyom (The 
Korean Concept of Foreign Countries During the Yi Dynasty)," The Paek San 
Hakpo, VIII (June, 1970), 238-243. 
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saying "Korea is little China." 
47 
Although this particular individual considerably over did it, such adula-
tion did not come out of thin air. Under the impact of China, Korea often did 
not fit the western classification of either an independent nation or a dependent 
"vassal," or province. (Using today's phraseology, it possibly could be said 
that Korea was within China's "sphere of influence, 11 and thus acted according-
ly. And this is partly true. But most importantly, this label does not take into 
consideration the cultural phenomenon.) 
This ambiguity concerning Korea's position existed largely because the 
Confucian ethic was based not upon equality, as in the West, but rather inequality. 
It was the basis of the "five relationships," and to this day is still the dominant 
characteristic of Korean society. China was truly the center of political power 
and cultural greatness, and this naturally tended to support the philosophical 
attitudes. 
Inequality ... was necessary to preserve the natural order, for equal-
ity in any relationship bred conflict and disorder and caused dishar-
mony in the natural order of things .... Equality would violate the re-
lation between the position of superior and the degree of virtue that 
varied with that status. Equality of countries would mean an equal-
ity of virtue, an assumption no one would maintain against China and 
her emperor. Conversely, virtue denoted superiority, and the size 
of one's domain varied in direct proportion to one's virtue. 74 
The practical aspects implied in that last sentence help to explain why the Man-
chus, after gaining power in 1644, were so readily accepted, at least on the 
73 Quoted in Nelson, Korea and the Old Order, p. 85. 
74 Ibid., pp. 103-104. 
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surface, as the legitimate rulers of the Middle Kingdom. 
So while Korea was China's "inferior," she was not necessarily her de-
pendent. Such a distinction was not drawn in the West. This type of inferiority 
was based upon cultural ideals, while dependence would have been based upon 
political boundaries. 
Since this chapter has been primarily concerned with the effect of the 
Chinese Confucian systems upon Korea, Korean-Japanese relations have for the 
most part been ignored. The numerous piratical and military attacks from 
Japan of course had a strong political and economic influence on Korea, but in 
a cultural sense, the Japanese role was marginal. This is even reflected in the 
terminology used in Korean-Japanese relations. Both the Chinese and the Ko-
reans viewed the latter's culture as superior to that of Japan, the Koreans thus 
75 
having little desire to borrow anything from the island nation. 
One last statement must be added when discussing Chinese influence on 
Korea. It helps to balance and put into perspective the excessive pro-Chinese 
quotation by the contemporary literary scholar on page 46. "Under the veneer 
of this adopted Chinese culture, the common people, and not infrequently even 
the ruling class itself, continued with their indigenous way of life. Moreover, 
as soon as a Chinese element left its habitat, a great deal of its content was 
75 George M. McCune, "The Exchange of Envoys Between Korea and 
Japan during the Tokugawa Period," The Far Eastern Quarterly, III (May, 1946), 
308-309, 314-315. For a Japanese view of this period, see Yamagata Isoh, 
"Japanese-Korean Relations After the Japanese Invasion of Korea in the XVIth 
Century," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, IV, 
Part 2 (1913), 1-11. 
lost, and when it finally established itself in the Korean culture, it underwent 
76 
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drastic changes." Korea, despite the coming and going of the Chinese, Mon-
gols, Japanese, Russians, and Americans, has remained uniquely Korean. 
76Hahm, The Korean Political Tradition and Law, p. 8. 
CHAPTER III 
EARLY AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH EAST ASIA: 
THE MEDITERRANEAN INFLUENCE 
AND THE ROLE OF GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 
We now turn to the American scene, and to the early experiences in 
foreign relations, especially those in the Mediterranean region, which helped to 
shape the attitudes and policies of the United States in East Asia. To begin this 
chapter, a brief resume of the development of American commercial, diploma-
tic, and military involvement in the Far East will be presented. 
I. A SUMMARY OF EARLY AMERICAN RELATIONS IN EAST ASIA 
America's earliest contacts with East Asia were of a strictly commer-
cial nature, a result of the new republic's growing interest in foreign trade. 
Such Chinese products as tea, silk, and porcelain made up the bulk of imports 
from Asia, while the United States in turn began to carry furs and sealskins 
from the northwest coast of North America to Canton, the only Chinese port open 
1 
to foreign traders. From 1784, when the 370-ton merchantman Empress of 
1Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 30; Tong Te-Kong, 
United States Diplomacy in China, 1844-1860 (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1964), p. 18 
2 China became the first American vessel to arrive at Canton, to 1800, this 
3 
trade grew slowly but steadily. 
From 1800 to 1807, when President Jefferson's Embargo went into 
51 
effect, the trade was considerable. From twenty-three to forty American ships 
called on Canton each year, while the combined value of exported and imported 
goods reached $10, 400, 000, the exported portion amounting to five percent of 
4 
America's total exports. But the Embargo of 1807-1809, and then the War of 
1812, severely retarded this growing trade. "The total commerce from 1812 to 
5 
1815 was barely half that of the years before the war." 
However, with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent, prosperity began to 
return. By the 1840's the East Asia trade had become one of the principal ele-
ments of American overseas commerce. The character of the goods exported 
to China began to shift after the War of 1812. The furs and sealskins were re-
placed largely by specie, with copper, cotton, rice, lead, steel, ginseng, rat-
tans, pepper, nutmeg, tin, cochineal, corals, British manufactures, and opium 
(which will be discussed later) also becoming important. Tea and silk continued 
2
charles 0. Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval 
Officers (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1912), pp. 160-161; 
Keinp Tolley, Yangtze Patrol: United States Navy in China (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1971), p. 2. 
3Foster, American Diplomacy, p. 36. 
4Ibid.; Tong, U. S. Diplomacy in China, p. 18. 
5 Tong, U. S. Diplomacy in China, p. 18. 
6 
to be the major exports from China. 
As already mentioned, the Empress of China became the first United 
states ship to visit East Asia. In 1786 the Grand Turk, out of Salem, Massa-
52 
chusetts, called at Canton. The same year, eight other vessels left for Asian 
ports. 7 Meanwhile, Japan was not being completely ignored. In 1791 the Lady 
Washington, under the command of John Kendrick, anchored in a Japanese har-
bor, the first American vessel to do so. Efforts were made to trade, but the 
8 
Japanese officials forbade any such activities. 
However, the Napoleonic Wars in Europe soon afforded the Americans 
a chance to trade indirectly with the Japanese. Dutch ships had been swept 
from the seas by the British Navy, so in an effort to continue their trade at 
Nagasaki, the Hollanders commissioned American vessels to carry their goods 
under the Dutch flag, the Japanese agreeing to this procedure. Thus from 1797 
to 1809, many American ships, such as the enterprizing Eliza, were able to call 
at Nagasaki. Unfortunately for the Americans, the embargo, followed by the 
War of 1812, put an end to this new-found carrying trade. And with peace com-
ing toE:urope in 1815, the Dutch were once again able to furnish their own ships. 
The total amount of this trade was insignificant when compared with 
overall American trade, but it did introduce for the first time Japanese goods to 
6 
Ibid.' p. 19. 
7 Paullin~ .Diplomatic Negotiations, p. 161. 
8F. W. Howay, "John Kendrick and His Sons," Oregon Historical 
Quarterly, XXIII, No. 4 (December, 1922), 286. 
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American markets, and whetted the appetites of several United States mer-
chants. Although Americans were not successful in trading with Japan again 
until the 1850's, that country continued to be of some interest, thanks mainly to 
9 
the frequency of American whalers being shipwreaked on her shores. 
During the early stages of American trade with China, the United States 
government played a passive role. The first American residents of Canton had 
to rely on either the Chinese government or British force for protection and re-
10 dress of grievances. But as the volume of trade and number of American 
merchants residing in Canton increased, the likelihood of problems and con-
flicts also increased. This in turn forced the American government to become 
involved in Asian matters to a certain degree, regardless of whether or not the 
State Department and various Administrations favored an expansionist policy in 
the area. 
In 1818 the naval frigate Congress was sent to Asian waters, arriving 
off China in November, 1819. Sent "to protect our merchantmen from the 
pirates that frequented the East Indies," the vessel was the first United States 
11 
ship of war to appear in East Asia. The second American naval vessel to 
visit China was the Vincennes, arriving in January, 1830. 
9
wnliam L. Neumann, America Encounters Japan: From Perry to 
Mac Arthur (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1969), pp. 7-10. 
10Dennett, Americans In East Asia, p. 83; Fairbank, "'American 
China Policy' to 1898: A Misconception, n 412-413. 
11 
Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations, pp. 167-181; Dennett, Americans 
in East Asia, p. 79. 
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After learning that the American merchantman Friendship had been 
attacked in the East Indies, and had three of her crew killed, President Jackson 
in 1831 dispatched the frigate Potomac "with orders to require immediate satis-
12 
faction for the injury and indemnity to the sufferers." In 1832 the Potomac 
succeeded in destroying the town of the offending attackers, and in killing and 
13 
wounding about one hundred and fifty of the natives. 
1832 was also the year that the Edmond Roberts mission, sent by the 
Department of State, visited Manila, Canton, Cochin China, Siam, and Muscat; 
signing treaties with the latter two. Roberts was also given the authority to sign 
14 
a treaty with Japan, but he was not able to visit that nation. Concerning Japan, 
an American naval captain, David Porter, had proposed an expedition to that 
country in 1815 in order to open up commerce between the two nations, but Pres-
15 
ident Madison chose to ignore the suggestion. 
With the outbreak of the Opium War between China and England in 1839, 
American diplomacy in China became much more active. And, as suggested 
earlier, commerce and the United States merchants played a major role. Rela-
tions had become so strained between China and the foreigners over the opium 
12 Richardson, ed. , A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents, 1789-1897, III, 1114. 
13Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations, pp. 347-348. 
14 Dennett, Americans in East Asia, pp. 128-132. 
15Allen Cole, ed., "Captain David Porter's Proposed Expedition to the 
Pacific and Japan, 1815," Pacific Historical Review, IX, No. 1 (March, 1940), 
63-65. 
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problem that on May 25, 1839, "a number of American merchants [eight, to be 
exact] ... memorialized the Congress of the United States, setting forth their need 
for protection, commenting on the nature of their commerce activities, and 
16 
suggesting lines of policy .... " 
This petition, quickly followed by the outbreak of the war, convinced 
Washington that American interests and citizens in Canton needed protection. 
On November 2, 1840, the Constellation and the Boston, under Commodore 
Lawrence Kearney, were told to depart for Asia. As well as offering protection, 
the ships were ordered to "prevent and punish the smuggling of opium into China 
17 
either by Americans or by other nations under cover of the American flag." 
There was no serious trouble between the Americans and Chinese while 
Kearny was in Asian waters, the latter among other things having their hands 
full with the British. In 1842 Kearny was able to get unofficial Chinese recog-
nition for the United States of the most-favored-nation principle. This has 
sometimes been noted as a great diplomatic achievement by Kearny, but in 
reality the Chinese were simply acknowledging the privileges already won by 
Great Britain for all Western powers, the Chinese seeing no significant distinc-
18 
tion between the foreigners. 
16 Paul H. Clyde, United States Policy Toward China: Diplomatic and 
Public Documents, 1839-1939 (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964), 
pp. 3-6. 
17 Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations, p. 191. 
18Ibid., pp. 191-204; Dennett, Americans in East Asia, pp. 108-111; 
Clyde, U. S. Policy Toward China, pp. 7-8; Earl Swisher, China's Management 
of the Western Barbarians: A study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, 
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In late 1842 President Tyler recommended that a commissioner be sent 
to China to help protect American interests, and to regularize relations between 
19 
the United States and China. There was strong opposition by some members of 
Congress to this recommendation. People such as Senator Thomas Benton, be-
ing preoccupied with Mexico, California, and Oregon, viewed a mission to China 
20 
as irrelevant to American affairs and a waste of taxpayers' money. However, 
there was enough support at home, including that from John Quincy Adams, that 
21 
Caleb Cushing was able to depart for China in May, 1843. The Cushing mis-
22 
sion resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Wanghia on July 3, 1844. The 
Sino-British Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842 following the conclusion of the 
Opium War, had actually paved the way for Cushing's success. The Chinese 
saw no need to withhold rights already granted to one set of foreigners, the same 
line of reasoning they had used when dealing with Kearny. 
The Treaty of Wanghia and the privileges granted the United States 
were enlarged upon and superceded by the Treaties of Tientsin in 1858 following 
the Arrow War. 
with Documents (New Haven: Far Eastern Association, 1951), pp. 93-94. 
19Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 2067. 
20 Tong, U. S. Diplomacy in China, pp. 29-30. 
21 Charles Francis Adams, ed. , Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Free-
port, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), vol. XI, p. 167. 
22
clyde, U. S. Policy Toward China, pp. 9-12; David Hunter Miller, 
ed. , Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, · 7 
vols., (Washington: United States Government Printing office, 1942), IV, 559-
662. 
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Early American government relations with Japan, when compared with 
China, were far simpler, since no trade was allowed prior to 1858. In fact, 
only one government attempt to open negotiations with Japan preceded the Perry 
Expedition of 1853-54. That was in 1846. Commodore James Biddle of the 
U. S. S. Columbus, who had temporarily replaced the ailing first Commissioner 
to China Alexander Everett and exchanged the ratified Wanghia Treaty with the 
23 
Chinese in 1845, was given the power to negotiate with Japan. Arriving in 
Tokyo Bay in July of 1846, Biddle had no luck at all with the Japanese and was 
24 
forced to return to China. This set the stage for Perry's expedition, which 
will be discussed at length later. 
Just as growing commercial relations, or the desire for commercial 
relations as in the case of Japan, led to increased government involvement and 
the formation of treaties~ so also government action in Asia all too frequently 
involved diplomacy by force, or the threat of force, as a means to achieve 
specific ends. American, and European, "gunboat" tactics did not begin with 
the Yangtze River Patrol of the early 1900's, or even the Korean Incident of 
1871. 
Technically speaking, our treaties of 1844 and 1858 
... were not forced upon China, but they did come out of weakness 
23Richardson, Messages and Papers, V, 2251-52; Swisher, China's 
Management, p. 185; John Bassett Moore, ed., The Works of James Buchanan 
(New York: Antiquarian Press, Ltd., 1960), vol. VI, pp. 139-144. 
24 Neumann, America Encounters Japan, p. 27. 
rather than out of equality, ... following a British or international 
military victory, and ... carrying the most-favored-nation clause 
which gave us the fruits of victory whether we participated or 
not. 25 
In this way the United States was using "gunboat" tactics, even if the 
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"boats" themselves were not necessarily American. The Nanking Treaty of 1842 
was forced upon the Chinese, and this opened the way for the subsequent Ameri-
can treaties. 
But although British power was the dominant factor in Asia for most of 
the nineteenth century, Americans did not refrain from using force at times 
when it was available and seemed handy. In March of 1853 the U. S. S. 
Plymouth under the command of Captain John Kelly, decided that the American 
flag had been insulted and used force against a Chinese vessel to obtain satisfac-
tion. Fortunately no deaths were recorded, but the next month the same captain 
and a number of his crew, working with the British, were involved in a conflict 
with Chinese soldiers over the occupation of a "foreign race course," resulting 
in several deaths. 26 
During the spring of 1854, the steam frigate Susquehanna, one of the 
ships used by Perry to open Japan, traveled fifty miles up the Yangtze River as 
a show of American force. This act was soon followed by similar ones by the 
25 E. Mowbray Tate, "U. S. Gunboats on the Yangtze: History and Po-
litical Aspects, 1842-1922," Studies on Asia, VII (1966), 121. 
26Tolley, Yangtze Patrol, pp. 12-13; Samuel Eliot Morison, "Old 
Bruin": Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 1796-1858 (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1968), pp. 408-409. 
27 
British and French. 
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In 1867 direct force was used when the Navy Department, with Secre-
tary of State Seward's approval, authorized the Hartford and the Wyoming, 
under Rear Admiral Bell, to land forces on Taiwan and punish the aborigines 
28 
who had murdered the captain and crew of the American bark Rover. 
And in 1870, just a year before the Korean-American Incident, the 
heavily armed U. S. S. Alaska traveled all the way up the Yangtze to Hankow. 
Rear Admiral John Rodgers, who would command the Korean expedition, noted 
that the Alaska's visit "was important as showing to the Chinese that their cities 
29 
are at· the mercy of the foreign navies." 
Remarking on American gunboat tactics in China, and he might easily 
have included the expedition to Japan in 1853-54 and the one to Korea in 1871, 
E. Mowbray Tate maintains: 
From the cruise of the Susquehanna in 1854 ... to the sinking of 
the Panay in 1937, the Navy often acted first and was questioned after-
ward, but ... the State Department usually agreed by authorizing the 
protection of what Secretary of the Navy Dobbins had called in 1855 
"the immense property belonging to the citizens of the United States 
of America." The principle that Americans legally resident by treaty 
[and later even those not covered by treaties] were entitled to protec-
tion has spread to other parts of the world. It may not even have be-
. Ch" 30 gun m ma .... 
Tate's concluding sentence introduces us to the next section of this paper. 
27 Tate, "U. S. Gunboats on the Yangtze," 125. 
28Dennett, Americans in East Asia, p. 411. 
29 Tolley, Yangtze Patrol, p. 33. 
30 Tate, "U. S. Gunboats on the Yangtze," 131. 
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II. THE PRECEDENCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 
The willingness of the United States Navy and government to use force 
to back up commercial, treaty, and "God-given" rights did not begin in East 
Asia, just as this nation's commercial trade and overseas missionary movement 
did not originate in East Asia. One of the most crucial areas for setting such 
precedents was in the Mediterranean area, a fact that has been widely over-
31 
looked by many American-East Asian historians. 
The Mediterranean had been one of the principal areas of expanding 
commerce in the American colonial period, years before any thoughts of Asia 
entered the American mind. When independence was achieved, British naval 
protection from the Barbary corsairs was lost to United States merchant ves-
sels. This loss of British protection was the central cause for America's first 
attempts at signing treaties with tre North African nations. When the price of 
these treaties became too high (tribute was demanded), the war with Tripoli and 
32 
the use of force against all the Barbary states resulted. 
Up to the 1840's, commercial interests in the Mediterranean region 
31John K. Fairbank, "America and China: The Mid Nineteenth Century," 
in American-East Asian Relations: A Survey, ed. by Ernest R. May and James 
C. Thomson, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 21; 
James A. Field, Jr., America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Prince-
ton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 443. 
32 
R. W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the 
Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1931), pp. 20-21, 101; Field, The Mediterranean World, pp. 38-49, 
62-67. 
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were of prime importance to American shippers. Cotton, worked metal, and 
rum were some of the most common American exports. Figs and raisins were 
two of the major imports from the area. But one product picked up in the Medi-
33 
terranean, principally in Turkey, soon surpassed all others. This was opium. 
Opium not only played a major role in the Mediterranean trade, it was 
also one of the first products to really open up American commerce with China. 
In this way the Mediterranean region served as a valuable point of departure for 
the Far East. The Americans had been shut out of the India-China opium trade 
by tb,e British East India Company's monopoly in that area. However, that same 
company inadvertently gave the United States an almost complete monopoly over 
the trade of Turkish opium. 
Two policies of the East India Company combined to facilitate 
American exploitation of the opium in the Levant. In the first place, 
the East India Company excluded private English shipping from trade 
between Europe and China. In the second place, the East India Com-
pany did not permit carriage of opium on Company ships. The two 
general policies of the East India Company converged, in the partic-
ular question of trade in Turkish opium, to produce a situation in 
which private English shipping could not, and the Company's vessels 
could not, carry the drug to China. As a resul~, Americans were 
assured freedom from English competition. . . . "1 
American ships were definitely hauling opium to China by 1805. In 
that year the brig Pennsylvania departed from Smyrna with, among other things, 
forty-nine chests of opium. In the same year the brig Entan left for Canton with 
33 Field, The Mediterranean World, pp. 114. 438. 
34
charles C. Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China, Prior to 
1820," Pacific Historical Review, IX, No. 4 (December, 1940) 429-430. 
35 
forty-six chests and fifty-three boxes of opium. 
For the years 1805, 1806, and 1807, British records listed Turkish 
opium imports by American vessels at Canton as being 102, 180, and 150 
62 
piculs. (One picul equaled 133-1/2 pounds of opium, or one chest.) If the Brit-
ish records are accurate, such amounts would have been only about five to ten 
percent in value of the goods shipped into Canton by Americans, excluding the 
remittances of specie. However, even ten percent was quite a large amount for 
such a new item. The volume gradually increased until by 1818 opium accounted 
by value for anywhere from thirty to fifty percent of the commodities which 
36 
Americans used for the purchase of Chinese goods. 
This traffic in Turkish opium continued to grow so that during the years 
from 1824 to 1830, the American consignment of Turkish opium averaged be-
37 
tween 1, 000 and 1, 500 chests annually. The major American commercial 
firms in Canton, such as Perkins and Company, and Russell and Company, be-
came dominate carriers in the trade. As a point of interest, the merchantman 
Emily, which became well known in 1821 because of the "Terranova Incident" 
38 
and the question of extraterritoriality, had previously departed from Turkey 
35 
Ibid., 430. 
36Ib"d 
_1_., 432-433, 442. 
37 Stelle, "American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-1839," Pacific 
Historical Review, X, No. 1 (March, 1941), 57, 68. 
38 Dennett, Americans in East Asia, pp. 86-88. 
39 
with a load of opium. 
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By the mid-1830's, the Turkey-Canton trade in opium began slowly to 
die out. 'The peculiar conditions under which American traffic in Turkish 
opium developed: freedom from competition in carriage, freedom from com-
petition in storage, monopoly of the market---all these were gone. The gloss 
40 
was off the trade." Nevertheless, the opium trade from the Mediterranean 
had played a vital role in the growth and prosperity of America's trade with 
China, and helped to establish commercial companies and interests that were to 
continue. 
A subject of major concern in American-East Asian history is the role 
of missionaries. Although much has been written about such activities in East 
Asia, missionary work, like commerce, got its first start in the Mediterranean, 
an area that dominated the movement for years and had a strong influence on the 
missions in the Far East. In fact, the dominance of the missions in the Near 
East over their counterparts in the Far East lasted far longer than the respective 
commercial relationships between the two areas. As late as 1850 the budget for 
China missions was only one-fifth that of the Near East missions' budget. In the 
1870's the combined budget of missions in Japan and China was still only one-
half of that allocated to the Levant. It was not until the last thirty years of the 
39 
Stelle, "American Trade, 1821-1839," 57-59. 
40 Ibid. , 73; for a description of the psychological and social rationali-
zations supporting the American opium trade, see Jacques M. Downs, "Fair 
Game: Exploitive Role-Myths and the American Opium Trade," Pacific Histor-
ical Review, XLI, No. 2 (May, 1972), 133-150. 
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nineteenth century that missions in the Far East began playing the major role in 
41 
missionary activities. 
Generally speaking, in the first half of the nineteenth century Mediter-
ranean affairs overshadowed those of the Far East in the public eye. The wide 
public interest in the Greek revolution of the 1820' s serves as an example. No-
where can the researcher find similar enthusiasm and support for any East Asian 
42 
"cause" or topic of the period. An inspection of popular reading material of 
the 1840's suggests the same conclusion. For instance, '1 Littell's Living Age in 
the year 1845-46 selected newsworthy topics concerning the Near and Middle 
East over the Far East at a rate of four or five to one. In 1860 the preponder-
43 
ance is still roughly two to one. 11 
Just as American commerce in the Mediterranean generally preceded 
that in East Asia, so too this nation's first non-European treaties were with 
Mediterranean states. In 1787 our first treaty with Morocco was signed, follow-
ed by one with Algiers in 1795, another with Tripoli in 1796, and a fourth with 
44 
Tunis in 1797. All of these treaties contained varying demands for tribute, 
and when Tripoli insisted on increasing the tribute, war broke out. After five 
years of intermittent warfare, a new treaty was signed iii 1805. 
41 Field, The Mediterranean World, pp. 176-77, 262-63, 436-37. 
42 Ibid., pp. 121-133. 
43 
Fairbank, "America and China: The Mid Nineteenth Century," in 
May and Thomson, American-East Asian Relations, p. 25. 
44Miller, ed., Treaties and Other Acts, II, 185-227, 275-317, 349-
385, 386-426. 
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The situation along the North African coast remained unstable until 
1815, when two large American squadrons under Commodores William Bain-
bridge and Stephen Decatur arrived in that region. Decatur demanded that a new 
treaty disclaiming any tribute be signed by Algiers, the country then causing the 
Americans the most trouble. The Algerians, although naturally detesting the 
new terms (they made their living from tribute, privateering and piracy), agreed 
to sign when faced with such a strong naval force. Decatur, soon followed by 
Bainbridge, then sailed on to Tunis and Tripoli to make it clear that no more 
tribute would be forthcoming. Even though it took some years to get the Alger-
ian treaty ratified, this effort ended the armed conflict with the Barbary states, 
45 
as well as any further tribute. 
A treaty with Turkey was signed in 1830 and ratified in 1831 under much 
more amicable circumstances. Like other treaties in the Mediterranean, it was 
46 
originally motivated by commercial considerations. The principles of most-
favored-nation and extraterritoriality that were to become so controversial in 
47 
Western-Asian relations were first designated in this treaty. 
The commissioners that were appointed following the signing of the 
first treaties with East Asian nations, as well as their assigned duties, were 
also influenced by Mediterranean precedents. Upon receiving the Wanghia 
451rwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the U. S. with the Barbary Pow-
ers, pp. 161-186. 
46Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations, pp. 122-153. 
47 Kwang-Ching Liu, "America and China: The Late Nineteenth Cen-
tury," in American-East Asian Relations, p. 46. 
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Treaty, President Tyler recommended that "a permanent minister or commis-
sioner with diplomatic functions, as in the case of certain Mohammedan States, 11 
48 
should be dispatched to China. Commenting on the possibility of establishing 
a representative in China, John Quincy Adams on January 9, 1843 remarked: 
"Mr. Webster thought a salaried consul, like those maintained at the Barbary 
49 States, would require about $3, 000 .... " The Mediterranean was an early 
measuring stick for diplomatic, as well as commercial and missionary, stan-
dards. 
The use of naval force to carry out government policy actually began 
with the Barbary Wars. 
Intended as a police force to keep the oceans clear for legitimate com-
merce, the Navy was projected for use against Algiers [in 1794], was 
employed against the French [in the Quasi War], was sent against 
Tripoli. ... After 1814 there was projected a systematic program of 
naval expansion, paralleling the growth of commercial opportunity, 
but a police force the Navy remained until late in the century. 50 
The 1815 naval force sent to Algiers was a perfect example of gunboat diplo-
macy. Not a short was fired, but the immediate threat of using the impressive 
armament available had the desired effect on the reluctant Algerians. 
Whereas the American Pacific Squadron was formed in 1822 (renamed 
the East India Squadron in 1835, and the Asiatic Squadron in 1865), the Mediter-
48 Tong, Diplomacy in China, pp. 8-9. 
49 Adams, Memoirs, vol. XI, p. 290. 
5
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51 
ranean Squadron appeared as early as 1801. And although the naval forces in 
the Western Hemisphere and the Far East began to outnumber those in the Med-
iterranean by the late 1850's, the "Mediterranean remained a focus of world 
diplomacy and the show window of the world's navies .... " To command its 
52 
squadron was the most prestigous assignment in the active Navy. As a case 
in point, when first offered the command of the Japan Expedition in 1851, Perry 
refused, desiring rather to command the Mediterranean Squadron. It was only 
after this was refused him and he was ordered to command the Japan Expedition 
53 
that Perry gave up attempts to receive the treasured assignment. 
Service in the Mediterranean Squadron trained many naval personalities 
who later left their mark in East Asian waters. David Porter (1780-1843), who 
54 
James A. Field calls "America's first naval expansionist" for his 1813 activi-
55 
ties in the Marquesas Islands and his 1815 suggestion of a Japan expedition, 
had earlier experiences in the Mediterranean. He became a hero in the 1803 
Tripoli campaign when, as a lieutenant, he led an attack party ashore against 
heavy fire and was twice wounded. Later the same year he was among the crew 
of the Philadelphia that became prisoners of Tripoli when their vessel was cap-
51 G. W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (Hamden, Conn.: 
Archon Books, 1965), p. 323. 
52Field, The Mediterranean World, p. 238. 
53 Morison, 'Old Bruin," pp. 272-274. 
54 Field, The Mediterranean World, p. 151. 
55 Dictionary of American Biography, ed. by Dumas Malone (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), vol. IX-X, p. 84. 
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tured. He remained in captivity for almost two years, until a treaty was finally 
signed in June, 1805. After his release he remained with the Mediterranean 
56 
Squadron for another year. 
James Biddle (1783-1848), who as Commander of the East India Squad-
ron from 1845 to 1848 exchanged the ratified copy of the Wanghia Treaty with 
China, as well as attempting to negotiate with Japan, had served in the Mediter-
ranean from 1802 to 1805, and again from 1826 to 1832. During the first period 
he served two tours as a midshipman, the second tour on the fateful Philadel-
phia, and like Porter thus became a prisoner for twenty-one months in Tripoli. 
His second major period of duty in the Mediterranean was undoubtably more en-
joyable. As commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, he held the most envi-
able position in the Navy. It was during this period that he was one of the three 
57 
commissioners charged with negotiating and signing the 1830 treaty with Turkey. 
Lawrence Kearny (1789-1868), who as we noted earlier commanded the 
East India Squadron from 1841 to 1843, served in the Mediterranean from 1825 
to 1829. During this time he was to aid in the suppression of piracy, and from 
1827 to 1829 convoyed American ships to Smyrna and patrolled the waters 
around the Cyclades. It was reported that "in little over two months after his 
arrival, he had taken seven boats belonging to the pirates and recovered much 
56 
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Negotiations, pp. 144-149. 
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58 
stolen property." It was probably largely due to his successful service in the 
Mediterranean that he was promoted to captain on December 27, 1832. 
Robert Shufeldt (1822-1895), who made his first visit to Korea in 1867 
while commanding the U. S. S. Wachusett and later climaxed his career by nego-
tiating the first Korean treaty with a Western nation in 1882, had served in the 
59 
Mediterranean region from 1845 to 1848, and again in the early 1870's. It 
should also be remembered that his voyage in the Ticonderoga, which eventually 
resulted in the Korean treaty, had first begun in the Mediterranean-African area. 
After rounding Cape Verde, 
· ... Shufeldt attempted the Liberian arbitration, gained the right to 
establish an American coaling station on Madagascar, and negotiated 
a commercial treaty with the Sultan of Johanna, in the Comoro Is-
lands; continuing on his wai>b he visited Zanzibar, Muscat, the Persian 
Gulf and the Euphrates .... 
Furthermore, in his negotiations with Korea Shufeldt was influenced by Perry, 
61 
who himself was greatly influenced by his own experiences in the Mediterranean. 
This brings us to two of the most important figures in this limited study 
of Mediterranean influences on naval attitudes. Matthew Perry and John Rodgers 
the younger played two of the central roles in early American-East Asian rela-
tions. I will therefore discuss both in separate sections of this paper. 
58Dictionary of American Biography, vol. IX-X, p. 270. 
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III. MATTHEW GALBRAITH PERRY 
Although Commodore Perry (1794-1858) is best known for his activities 
in Japan, a proper understanding of his role there is not possible without first 
studying his personal background, and especially his experiences in the Mediter-
ranean. 
In many ways Perry was a protege of Commodore John Rodgers the 
elder. His first significant sea duty began on the U. S. S. President in 1810, 
commanded by Rodgers. The Commodore "seems at once to have sensed Cal-
braith' s outstanding qualities, since he appointed him his personal aide, with the 
62 
duty of keeping the official sea journal." This was as a midshipman. Perry 
later was to learn most of his seamanship and attitudes toward discipline from 
Rodgers, and maintained those attitudes the rest of his life. Rodgers gradually 
gave the then youthful Perry more and more responsibility, especially during 
63 
their cruise together in the Mediterranean in the 1820's. 
Perry served three important tours of duty in the Mediterranean area. 
The first was in 1815, when, as a lieutenant, he participated in the Decatur-
Bainbridge expedition to the Barbary coast. He was second in command of the 
man-o'-war brig Chippewa, under George C. Read. (Read later served in East 
Asia waters from 1838 to 1840.) The nineteen year old lieutenant noted the in-
fluence that both Decatur's and Bainbridge's squadrons had on the Dey of 
62Morison, 'Old Bruin", p. 27. 
63 . Ibid.' pp. 36, 75, 101. 
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Algiers, ''and-it proved a precedent for what the younger Perry did ... in Japan 
64 
in 1853-54." Perry returned from this cruise on November 15, 1815. 
His second cruise to the Mediterranean was from April, 1825, to July, 
1827. By now a lieutenant commandant, he was assigned as "First Lieutenant" 
(or, second in command) of the U. S. S. North Carolina. The North Carolina 
was the pride of the American Navy, its largest ship of the line, mounting 102 
guns and carrying 832 men. To be appointed First Lieutenant of such a ship was 
a great honor for any young naval officer. She was the flagship_· of the Mediter-
ranean Squadron, and the commander of _that Squadron was Perry's mentor, 
Commodore John Rodgers, by then the senior officer in the American Navy. 
The Squadron's principal duty during this period was to once again protect 
American commerce, this time threatened by developments in the Greek war 
65 
for independence. 
By now Commodore Rodgers was getting along in years, and left many 
of the daily tasks up to Perry, including those of a diplomatic nature. Perry 
conferred with the highest officials of the Turkish Navy, "which doubtless gave 
66 [him] a few hints about dealing with Orientals." There is possibly little simi-
larity between Turks and Japanese, but Perry's notions of how to treat non-
Western people were probably further cemented. His attitude could be summed 
up as: be firm in your position and demonstrate an impressive, disciplined 
64 
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show of force. 
Perry's third cruise in the Mediterranean was from November, 1830, 
to November, 1832. This time, as Master Commandant, Perry was command-
ing his own ship, the 127 feet long sloop-of-war Concord. Perry and the Con-
cord had just finished transporting John Randolph first to St. Petersburg and, 
since that city was not to the temperamental politician's liking, then to London. 
The ship's assignment in the Mediterranean, like the North Carolina, was to 
protect American commerce, which was now being threatened by pirates from 
the Cyclades. As well as serving convoy duty, Perry actually landed troops 
ashore in search of pirates. Due to the local population's unofficial support of 
the pirates, Perry's action had little concrete affect. But it shows that he was 
67 
not opposed to the use of force in foreign waters to make his point. 
In the summer and fall of 1832 occurred an experience profoundly im-
portant in Perry's development as a diplomat and naval officer. The United 
States had claims against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies for spoliations on 
American commerce during the Napoleonic Wars. France had agreed to pay a 
similar claim in 1831, but the government officials in Naples had repeatedly 
balked at the idea. It was decided that the Mediterranean Squadron would be 
used to help persuade these officials t'o see the error of their ways. Perry was 
chosen to carry out the plan of operation, a plan 
which probably suggested his strategy in the Japan mission. It con-
sisted in making a cumulative impression by sending the squadron 
67 . Ibid., pp. 104, 114-115, 120. 
into the Bay of Naples in echelons. First to arrive, on 23 July 
1832, were Brandvwine and Constellation .... Ferdinand [the King 
of Naples] happened to be away when the two frigates arrived, but 
was immediately sent for. "Great uneasiness was felt upon the 
occasion," wrote Minister Nelson [U. S. charge d 1affaires at Na-
ples], "and vigorous preparations were made for the defense of 
the City .... " 
Brandywine and Constellation sailed back to Port Mahon in 
August, and Naples drew a long breath. But Perry, after deliver-
ing Commodore Biddle to Marseilles in Concord, sailed directly 
to Naples, arriving 17 September. John Adams, already there, 
did not create much alarm, but the arrival of Concord did the trick. 
Prince Cassaro, minister of foreign affairs, now condescended to 
negotiate with Nelson, and Perry assisted the negotiation by enter-
taining members of the Neapolitan aristocracy on board. 68 
73 
A treaty was signed on October 14, 1832, in which the Kingdom of the Two Sicil-
ies agreed to pay 2, 100, 000 ducats to the United States within nine years. Perry 
and the Concord sailed for home the next day, carrying Nelson and the treaty 
69 
with them. Thus ended Perry's third and final cruise in the Mediterranean. 
As noted earlier, Perry later in his life strongly desired the command of the 
Mediterranean Squadron, but he was never to receive it. 
Perry acknowledged the lessons he had learned, though not naming 
specific cases, when he later sailed to Japan . 
. . . I have found it profitable to bring to my aid the experience 
gained in former and by no means limited intercourse with the in-
habitants of strange lands---civilized and barbarian---and this ex-
perience has admonished me that with people of forms it is necess-
ary either to set all ceremony aside, or to out-Herod Herod in 
assumed personal consequence and ostentation. 70 . 
68 
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_1_., p. 122. 
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Perry's principal biographer, Samuel Eliot Morison, feels that the 
Commodore was not an imperialist in the modern sense of the term, as he was 
a person "eschewing forcible annexation, punitive expeditions, or forcing re-
71 
ligion and trade on people who desire neither." However, to find absolutely 
no fault in Perry's behavior, as Morison does, one must ignore several activi-
ties that were a direct affront to Japanese sovereignty. Morison seems to think 
that since Perry's success was, in the long run, a benefit to Japan (that is, it 
helped her to enter international affairs and introduced the period of moderniza-
tion), then all the Commodore's actions are commendable. 
But whether the overall effects of the Expedition were good or bad is 
beside the point. Several specific incidents demonstrate that Perry was a 
skilled tactician in the use of gunboat diplomacy. 
From the beginning Perry made it clear that he would consider using 
72 
force, if not a "punitive expedition," when circumstances called for it. When 
the squadron first anchored in Tokyo Bay and was met by a group of small Jap-
anese boats, Perry used the threat of force to drive most of them off. When a 
few still remained, "an armed boat from the ship was sent to motion them away, 
at the same time showing their arms, which had the desired effect." Later 
when Perry insisted on meeting with a high Japanese official in order to present 
his government documents addressed to the Emperor, and was met with objec-
tions, he threatened to 11 go on shore with a sufficient force and deliver them, 
71Morison, "Old Bruin", p. 429. 
72 
Pineau, The Japan Expedition, p. 92. 
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whatever the consequences might be." 
Although desiring to bring Japan into the 11 family of nations," where 
75 
she could be guided and controlled by the rules of international law, Perry was 
not above making his own law to achieve his goals. Throughout his visit to Jap-
an, he sent out armed boats to survey that country's coastal waters, a question-
able activity that later was to get John Rodgers into trouble. On one such occas-
sion, Perry reported in his journal that 
the governor enquired what these boats were doing, and on being 
told that they were surveying the harbor, he said it was against the 
Japanese laws to allow of such examinations [sic]. He was replied 
to that though the Japanese laws forbade such surveys, the Ameri-
can laws· command them, and that we were ~~ much bound to obey 
the American as he was the Japanese laws. 
Perry's rebuttal may have carried little legal weight, but backed up by the guns 
of the squadron, the surveys continued. 75 
Matthew Calbraith Perry's sharp judgment of personalities and under-
standing of dissimilar cultural attitudes were major reasons for his successful 
use of gunboat diplomacy, skills which set him apart from many other naval 
diplomats of the nineteenth century. This ability, along with specific internal 
changes then being experienced by Japan, combined to bring about the first Jap-
anese treaty with a Western power. The effect these changes had on the negotia-
tions, and how this contrasted with the Korean situation, will be discussed 
73 Ibid., pp. 93, 94; see also pp. 100-101 for a similar episode. 
74 
Ibid. , pp. 94-95. 
75 
Morison, "Old Bruin", p. 326. 
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further in the conclusions of the thesis. 
IV. JOHN RODGERS 
John Rodgers the younger (1812-1882) was the son of Commodore John 
Rodgers (1773-1838). He served two tours of duty in the Mediterranean, the 
first in 1828 when as a midshipman he saw his first active service on board the 
Constellation and Concord, and the second from 1846 to 1848. During the later 
period he cruised in African as well as Mediterranean waters protecting Ameri-
76 
can commerce as Perry had done off and, on from the 1820's to 1845. 
Rodgers was undoubtedly influenced by both his father and Perry. He 
was aware of his father's exploits along the Barbary coast from 1802 to 1806, 
where the then captain was "so much a fighter that he offered to raise the ran-
som money from the officers of the squadron [for the captured crew of the Phila-
77 
delphia] if only the war could go on .... " Rodgers the elder played one of the 
leading roles during the subsequent negotiations, and as we have already seen, 
78 
continued his Mediterranean experiences into the 1820's. 
Matthew Perry's influence on the younger Rodgers did not stem solely 
from his naval experience. There had been close personal relations between 
Commodore Rodgers and Perry dating back to 1810, and the ties between the 
76
nictionary of American Biography, vol. XV-XVI, p. 77; Morison, 
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two families became even closer when Perry's daughter, Sarah, married the 
Commodore's son, Robert, in January of 1842. "Sarah's marriage was a de-
light to both parents; and young Rodgers ... looked to Captain Perry for guidance, 
79 
since his father ... had died." The Rodgers and Perry families became one 
large clan after this, and Robert's brother John was certain to have become well 
acquainted with Matthew Perry. In fact, it seems entirely possible that they 
might have discussed naval tactics and the role of the American Navy in diplo-
80 
matic affairs. 
At any rate, Rodgers' activities in East Asia were certainly based upon 
Perry's e:Xperiences. Just six months after Perry had left the Ryukyu Islands 
for the last time in February, 1854, Rodgers called there and, a la Perry, 
81 
threatened the use of force to gain treaty privileges. 
But the major incident which demonstrates the pervasive influence of 
82 
Perry was the e:Xpedition to Korea in 1871, led by then Rear Admiral Rodgers. 
The Incident of course will be reviewed thoroughly in Chapter VI. Here I mere-
ly wish to show the relationship between the attitudes and behavior of Rodgers 
and those of Perry. 
The mission as a whole bore striking similarities to Perry's e:Xpedition, 
79 
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except for the fact that Rodgers shared the diplomatic responsibilities with Min-
ister to China Frederick F. Low. Once again it was decided that a show of 
force would have the greatest effect on a reluctant Asian kingdom. Thus five 
heavily armed warships were dispatched under Rodgers' command. 
Upon reaching Korean waters, Rodgers decided there was a need to sur-
vey the surrounding coastline, just as Perry had done in Tokyo Bay and the 
immediate area in 1853-54. The activities of the surveying party, especially in 
such heavily armed ships, were a violation of Korean law and territorial sover-
eignty. The Koreans, already wary of such foreign movements following their 
clash with the French in 1866, were determined to protect their coastline and 
harbors. When the surveying party penetrated their fortified zone, the Korean 
shore batteries opened fire. Fortunately no Americans were killed in this ex-
change and only two were wounded. But the Americans, Rodgers and Low, not 
realizing that they had been in error, ordered an attack on the Korean forts. 
This much larger engagment ended any possibility of treaty negotiations between 
83 
the two countries. 
Rodgers had followed in the best Perry tradition, but he unfortunately 
was not familiar with the domestic Korean situation. Perry had used force, and 
surveying parties, and had gotten away with it because the Japanese had already 
decided they did not want a military clash with the foreigners, and would there-
83John Rodgers, "Partial Report on the Military Expedition to Qorea. 11 
appended in E. M. Cable's "United States Korean Relations 1866-1871," Trans-
actions of the Korean Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXVIII (1938), 189-
191. 
79 
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fore sign a limited treaty. The Koreans did not share this attitude. For 
numerous reasons, which will be covered later, they opposed any treaty with a 
foreign power, and the violation of their territorial rights by Rodgers' forces 
confirmed this position. 
I have not meant to imply in this paper that all American activity in East 
Asia was preceded by events in the Mediterranean, or that all United States naval 
officers insisted on using force to facilitate diplomatic negotiations. The cautious 
and responsible behavior in Asian waters of Lawrence Kearny and James Biddle, 
to name only two men, deny the latter suggestion. 
However, America's early activities in East Asia were not born in a 
vacuum. Many of the naval officers who served in East Asian waters had pre-
viously been stationed in the Mediterranean during formative periods of their 
careers. And as fate would have it, the years from the 1790's to the 1850's 
were often a time of conflict and political instability in the Mediterranean. This 
meant that naval squadrons in the area were called upon to use force in many in-
stances in order to counteract conditions that seemed to threaten the United 
States politically and commercially. When these same officers later appeared 
in East Asia, these experiences may have strongly influenced their interpreta-
tion of and reaction to Asian events. 
Just as important as this factor, service in the Mediterranean was often 
an American's first contact with non-Western people and cultures. It became an 
84 Neumann, America Encounters Japan, p. 41; Morison, 110ld Bruin", 
pp. 357-358. 
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accepted notion that these people, being inferior to those of the West, should be 
treated differently. It was assumed that their word was unreliable in diplomatic 
negotiations, and that force was the only method they really respected. From 
this period on, AmeriCans began to use two diplomatic standards; one for "civil-
ized" Western nations, and one for "uncivilized" non-Western nations. When 
the United States finally began to come into serious contact with the Asian 
countries, these non-Western "principles" were often applied. This study is too 
limited to determine the exact degree of this Mediterranean influence, but that 
there was such an influence, and that in some individual cases it may have play-
ed a predominant role, should not be ignored by historians of American-East 
Asian relations. 
CHAPTER IV 
KOREAN DOMESI'IC POLITICS 
ON THE EVE OF THE 1871 INCIDENT 
The period leading up to 1871 was one of domestic turmoil and social 
upheaval for Korea. The country had never truly recovered from the Hideyoshi 
invasions of the late sixteenth century. The poverty of the nation made the 
peasants' life hard enough, but in addition, the continued decay of the govern-
ment helped to bring about the "first major popular uprisings in the entire his-
1 
tory of the Yi dyansty. " 
Although the answer to what brought on these social uprisings is an ex-
tremely complex one, for our purposes there were three immediate problems: 
land ownership, military service and taxes, and the grain-loan system. A 
larger and more general problem that was related to all of these causes was the 
favoritism, inefficiency, and corruption rampant in the government. 
As the last three centuries of the Yi dynasty unfolded, the cultivable 
land fell more and more under the control of powerful government officials, rel-
atives of the royal family, and the wealthy "yangban" ( ~ ~1!£ ) , the highest 
level of the Korean aristocracy. The results of this process were twofold. 
Since most of these holdings were tax-exempt, the state's tax revenues steadily 
1
choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, p. 24. 
decreased. At the same time the number of peasants bought out or forced off 
2 
their land conversely increased. 
82 
The military system in theory called for universal service of all males 
between the ages of sixteen and sixty, but since in reality the yangban and the 
lowest classes were exempt, the peasants had to shoulder the entire load. By 
the late stages of the Yi dynasty, "men of military age were not assigned to 
actual military service, but to pay taxes [instead] .... With this new development, 
the military tax, which was popularly known as yangyok [ ~ ~-£ 
3 
duty], became literally the 'evil of evils'." 
, commoners 
The peasants who paid the military tax were driven deeper into poverty; 
many others became slaves, servants, monks, and outlaws to escape such heavy 
payments. Those who were successful in evading the tax only made the position 
of the people left behind in the villages that much worse. Before the uprisings 
of the 1860's occurred, the military exemption tax was partially modified, but it 
still remained very much a burden to the peasants. 
The grain-loan system, which in principle was designed to help relieve 
the plight of farmers in times of famine, became in practice a tool used to raise 
government revenues and line the pockets of bureaucratic officials. The inter-
est for loans and the penalties for overdue payments became excessive, and 
special fees were charged for carriage, storage, and wastage. "Many farmers 
were ruined by these loans and deserted their land in despair, taking to banditry 
2
rbid., pp. 1-6; Sohn, The History of Korea, p. 187. 
3 Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, pp. 8-9. 
or eking out a precarious living by farming hillsides in remote, mountainous 
4 
areas. The financial structure of the Kingdom verged on collapse .... " 
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Social discontent, especially by the peasant and lower-level yangban ex-
eluded from government, began growing by the early nineteenth century. "Pos-
ters with anti-government slogans appeared mysteriously, and the popular cus-
tom of fortune-telling and divination was used to criticize the officials, some of 
5 
these going so far as to foretell the downfall of the dynasty." In 1812 there was 
a major peasant uprising in P'yongan Province led by Hong Kyong-nae (B':: ~ ;!~ 
a poor, lower-level yangban who had not received a government post. The 
social problems just summarized, as well as the government's discrimination 
against people from northern provinces like P'yb"ngan, were reason enough to en-
able Hong to gather a large following. Although eventually suppressed by govern-
ment troops, the revolt lasted for four months and warned of events to come. 
6 
Minor revolts also occurred in 1813 and 1816. 
At about this time nature also began working against the peasants. The 
early and mid nineteenth century was a period of widespread natural disasters 
in Korea, including floods, fires, and epidemic diseases. Homeless people 
"poured into the cities or fled to the mountains" as social unrest continued to 
. 7 
rise. 
4 Ibid., pp. 6-8; Han, The History of Korea, pp. 340-341. 
5 Han, The History of Korea, p. 341. 
61bid., pp. 341~343; Sohn, The History of Korea, pp. 188-189. 
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On March 18, 1862, one of the great peasant uprisings in modern 
Korean history history began in the Chinju ( ~ -tt-J ) area of southwest Kyong-
sang ( ~ ~ ) Province. Led by an intellectual, Yi Myong-yun ( $- ~ ~L.. 
the revolt was aimed in general at the oppressive government system. More 
precisely, the revolting farmers wanted to drive out the corrupt officials and 
wealthy landlords who were using their power and influence to bleed the peasants 
dry. Much of their anger was directed toward Paek Nak-sin ( 1~ ~ ~ ), the 
newly appointed military commander of Kyongsang, whose greed was even worse 
than the usual avaricious official. The uprising was so serious that Paek was 
dismissed by the central government and limited reforms were promised. But 
once the government forces were able to regain military control of the area, the 
leaders of the revolt were arrested and executed. The reforms were meaning-
less, after becoming bogged down in numerous government committee meetings. 
Nevertheless, the overall graveness of the peasants' situation was reflected in 
the fact that other uprisings at about this same time occurred in Cholla ( j: 
ft>, Ch'ungch'ong ( ~ ~ ), Hamgyong <;ix. ~ ), and P'yong-an Provinces, 
as well as on Che ju ( ~ *1 ) island. The dynasty was indeed in very serious 
8 
trouble. 
It is at this point that the famed Taewon-gun (j;: pt ~ ) comes into 
the picture. King Ch'oljong ( :ffi ~ , reign: 1849-1864) died on January 16, 
..... /h 
1864, without leaving a male heir or named successor. In this situation it was 
8
sohn, The History of Korea, pp. 188-190; Han, The History of Korea, 
pp. 344-345; Choe, The Rule of the Taewon ·gun, pp. 28-31. 
85 
the right of the widow of a deceased monarch to choose the new king. Although 
Ch'oljong's widow, ·~vho was a member of the Andong Kim ( 'f ~ i.) clan 
then controlling the crown, was still living, she was preceded by the earlier 
King Munjo' s ( 9 ) widow, Queen Sinjong ( ;f~ ~ ) . Queen Sinjong was 
from the Cho ( ) clan, which at that time was the predominant rival of 
the Andong Kims. She llSed this opportunity to replace the Kims and their allies 
with people who she thought would be friendly to the Cho clan. It should be noted 
that this continual in-fighting for control of the throne further increased the 
bitter factionalism _ and at the same time decreased the efficiency and respect 
of the government. To be the new king, Queen Sinjong selected 
.•• the son of an obscure descendant of King Yonjo ( ~ ~]_ , 
reign: 1724-1776) named Yi Ha-ling ( $ ~ !ft ) , who had man-
aged to survive the various political conflicts by having no affilia-
tion with any of the factions and by making himself appear of no 
account. The boy was only twelve, and so could not become a fac-
tor in politics for some time, while the father, the Cho clan felt, 
would easily be used as a tool for their domination of the court. 
They were in for a big surprise. lO 
The boy was Kojong ( ~ f ) , who was to reign until 1907. His 
father, Yi Ha-ling, became better known by his court title, Taewon-gun, which 
9King Munjo had never actually reigned. Although a Crown Prince, he 
died before his fathe:r, King Sunjo ( ~i\:' fj_, reigr~ 1sqo-1834), did. Sunjo 
was therefore succeeded by Munjo1 s son, Honjong ( ~ ;)\. , reign: 1834-
1849). However, Munjo was posthumously given the title nking", and his living 
wife Sinjong thus became a queen, with all the rights and privileges of that posi-
tion. From Choe, The Rule of the Taewon-gun, p. 194. 
10Han, The History of Korea, p. 361. See also Sin Sok-ho, et al, ed., 
Han-guk Hyondae Sa, I, 26-29; Kuksa Taesajon (Encyclopedia of Korean History) 
(Seoul: Chimun-gak Publishing Co., 1962), p. 1812. 
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can be translated as Prince Regent. Although there had been taewon-guns be-
fore, during the reigns of other minors, the title is always associated with Yi 
Ha-ling. For in reality, he ruled Korea from 1864 to 1873 ( and made several 
brief appearances thereafter), carrying out one of the most active domestic pro-
grams in later Yi dynasty history. 
He proved to be a capable and dedicated politician, and, despite the 
attempts of the Cho clan and the various other factions, was soon in complete 
control of the court and the government. He was not interested in petty factional 
fights; his goal was to restore Korea to the position she had held in the early 
years of the Yi dynasty, and to do so along purely Confucian lines. To a large 
degree he was a reformer, but in the traditional sense rather than in the Western 
sense. He looked to the past for the remedies of Korea's problems, not to the 
future. The Taewon-gun "was aiming at a new beginning for the dynasty, a re-
turn to the time of King T'aejo ( .t, i}f..8. ) and the golden age when true harmony 
11 
reigned between the sovereign and his subjects." 
His first move was to try to weed out the corrupt officials throughout 
the government. The campaign was carried out continuously and energetically 
to 1873, and while the overall successes were mixed, corruption for the first 
12 
time in decades was strongly checked. 
Steps were also taken to cut down on the size of tax-exempt landholdings 
largely in the hands of the royal family members and powerful officials. This 
11 Choe, The Rule of the Taewon-gun, p. 32. 
12 Ibid., pp. 33-34, 40. 
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spread the tax load more evenly, thus improving the lot of the peasants. The 
grain-loan system was also modified, so that the local areas and people began 
to have more control over the management, distribution, and payment of grain-
loans. This helped to cut down on the amount of extortion by government offici-
als. 
The military tax system, one of the chief causes for the social distur-
bances of the early sixties, was effectively reformed. For the first time, Yang-
ban was well as commoner househdlds were forced to fulfill their military obi.lga-
tions, either in services or in taxes. This equalization of payments, regardless 
of social class or number of sons in a household, greatly relieved the burden of 
13 
the farmers, and seemed to remain effective for years afterward. 
Thus, during the Taewon-gun's regime the government recovered 
from its economic decline and regained some of its financial vital-
ity despite unprecedented spending on military and public works. 
Yet the Taewon-gun did not significantly abandon the traditional 
economic policies and institutions. The economy remained basic-
ally agrarian with no steps taken toward commercialization or in-
dustrialization. 14 
The government was reorganized along more efficient lines. Favoritism 
and discrimination in granting posts were curtailed and in some cases even dis-
continued. "Talented clerks, illegitimate sons, and slaves were given official 
status." A new degree of equality among the social classes, although often lim-
ited, was beginning to develop. From 1866 on, government edicts were passed 
to eliminate the discrimination against men from the northwest, which we can re-
13 
Ibid.' pp. 35, 40. 
14 
Ibid. , p. 41. 
Figure 5. Yi Ha-Un.g, the Taewon-gun, de facto ruler of 
1 Korea from 1864 to 1873. 
(Courtesy of the Sin-gu Publishing Co.) 
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call was an important element in the P'yong-an revolt of 1812. Such edicts con-
tinued to be issued through 1872. "The Taewon-gun's policy of giving equal 
·opportunity to men of all social classes (and regional areas) was indeed momen-
tous in Yi history." Many of the men who played major roles in the late nine-
15 
teenth century were first brought into the government during this decade. 
In this spirit of revitalization and equality, the Taewon-gun even initi-
. ated new dress', codes, outlawing extravagant clothing commonly worn by wealthy 
aristocrats, and giving the commoners the right to wear certain articles pre-
. 16 
v10usly r~served just for the Yangban. 
During this period of domestic reform, the Taewon-gun was influenced 
both by the necessities of the situation and by his earlier contact with the 
Silhakp'a ( ~ Wi d1< ), or the School of Practical Learning. This school was 
.,_ '.+- .... Ii.: 
comprised of a group of reform-minded intellectuals, usually out of government 
power, who rejected the formalism and rigidity of Chu Hsi's doctrines. The 
movement existed in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. 
Naturally, in this period of strong Neo-Confucianism, such scholars had a dif-
ficult time obtaining government offices. However, because of their social and 
intellectual positions, they were often in contact with many government officials. 
Kim Chong-hiii ( t jE I , 1786-1856), a member of the Silhakp'a, 
"' 
taught the Taewon-gun calligraphy and painting; the latter also had close contact 
15Ibid., pp. 42-51, 52, 61-63; Sin, Han-guk Hyondae Sa, I, 30-32. 
16Sin, Han-guk: Hyondae Sa, I, 48-49; George H. Jones, "The TaiWon-
Kun," Korean Repository, V (1898), 245. 
with Pak Kyu-su ( ;f~ ~ x ) and Kim Yun-sik, students of Silhak. Yi Ik 
~ .. ,,. 
( i >-i ) and An Ch~ng-bok ( ~ .flfij. ffii ) , two of the movements greatest 
leaders in the eighteenth century, were posthumously honored by the Taewon-
gun in 1867. Such an exposure to the Silhak ideas probably influenced his own 
17 
90 
notions of social reform. It should be remembered that most of these people, 
. though reformers, were raised in, and believed in, the Confucian system. 
In addition to the needs for social reform and government reorganiza-
tion, one other area was a serious domestic problem for the Taew6n-gun. This 
was the growth of Catholicism. 
The first Christian literature had been introduced into Korea from 
China by Ho Kyun ( g-q:- ~ ) in 1610. This was followed by more material, in-
eluding items brought by Crown Prince Sohyon in 1645. The first Korean Catho-
lie was Yi Sung-hun ( f. 7J'< j ) , who was baptized in 1783. Other Koreans 
were converted, and though their numbers were small, they had an important 
impact on society since most of them were members of the aristocracy. The 
first priest to enter Korea as a missionary was a Chinese, Chou Wen-mo. This 
was in 1794. By 1837 three French priests had arrived, having been smuggled 
into the country in native costume. In 1845 Kim Tae-gon ( -i J;... ~ ) became 
the first Korean Catholic to be ordained. By 1863, there were twelve French 
18 
missionaries and approximately 20, 000 native Catholics in the nation. 
17 Han, The History of Korea, pp. 324-333; Choe, The Rule of the Tae-
won-gun, pp. 13-23. 
18L. George Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 1832-
1910, first printing: 1929 (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1970), pp. 30-39; 
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The spread of Catholicism posed a threat to the government in two 
ways: as a competing ideology and as a weapon for foreign invasion. 
If the Neo-Confucianists were fearful of the Silhakp'a, they were doubly 
so of the Christian teachings. In 1790 the bishop in Peking, Alexandre de Govea, 
instructed his Korean followers ''that the worship of ancestors was inconsistant 
with the doctrine of the church. " 
The result of Govea's prohibition of ancestral worship was disas-
trous .... Its neglect meant the abandonment of everything that a 
Korean held most sacred in the duty which he owed to his family, 
society, and state. But zealous Christian converts tore down their 
ancestral tablets and set them on fire. 19 
Thus the beginnings of an East-West cultural conflict preceded even the 
coming of individual Westerners. The position of the Korean Catholics was fur-
ther weakened by the fact that many of them belonged to a political faction known 
as the Sip'a ( ~ ~f£5._ ), then being driven out of the government by a stronger 
20 
faction, the Pyokp'a ( ffP;t Ut>.. ). 
The first major persecution of Catholics began in 1801, for reasons 
both of ideology and factional strife. Chou Wen-mo, the Chinese missionary, 
was executed, along with many prominent members of the Sip' s faction. It was 
at this time that the fear of a foreign threat was first introduced to those in pow-
er. A government agent discovered a secret letter, written by a convert named 
Joseph P. Gibbons "Catholicism," in Yi Kyu-tae's Modern Transformation of 
Korea (Seoul: Sejong Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 185-187; Sin, Han-guk Hyondae 
Sa, I, 63-67; Choe, The Rule of the TaewCfn-gun, pp. 91-94. 
19 Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, p. 33. 
20 
_ Choe, The Rule of the Taewon-gun, pp. 92-93. 
92 
Hwang Sa-yong ( ~ ~ii1 :}~ ) and addressed to the bishop of Peking, describ-;, 7f' 
ing the persecutions of 1801 and pleading for a European military intervention of 
several thousand to protect the Catholics in Korea. The letter also recommend-
ed that China annex Korea and appoint one of the emperor's sons to rule the 
country. Such a letter, being captured before it could be sent, only made the 
Catholics more suspect. If the letter had gone undetected and reached Peking, 
_it probably would have had little affect on either the Europeans or the Chinese; 
21 
but'the Korean government had no way of knowing that. 
In 1839 a second major persecution broke out. It was then that the first 
three French missionaries were killed. But still the movement survived and 
prospered. Its growth was in large part due to the severly depressed economic 
and social conditions that the country was experiencing in the early and mid nine-
teenth century. As people became disillusioned with the government and the 
present social system, they looked for new answers. Some turned to the 
Tonghak ( di ~ ) movement of Ch'oe Che-u ( 9'L }~ ~ ), which although ~ '..J-' ~ ~ 
generally anti-Western, was also suppressed by the government; others turned 
to Catholicism. The movement began to spread down to the peasant level. 
The government's reaction against the Tonghak movement of the 1860's 
sheds some light on the Taewon-gun' s possible motives for persecuting the Cath-
olics, a persecution that began in 1866. It was not simply the work of a "re-
21 Ibid., p. 93; Paik, The History of the Protestant Missions in Korea, 
pp. 35-36. 
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22 
actionary" determined to resist foreign "contamination." This notion contra-
diets the fact that the Taewon-gun1s wife inclined toward Catholicism, his son's 
nurse was Catholic, and so were many of his acquaintances. Such is usually not 
23 
the background of a confirmed, radical anti-Christian. As a dedicated Confu-
cian reformer, he was seriously attempting to cure the social ills that plagued 
the country. But as the leader of the government, it was also his duty to suppress 
. any movement that seemed to pose a threat to that government's survival and 
stability. He therefore opposed both the Tonghaks and the Catholics. 
The immediate cause of the persecutions of 1866 was the appearance of 
the Russians along the northern Korean border. To counter this new threat, 
two Catholics, Nam Chong-sam ( i$ ii ;:;.. ) and Hong Pong-ju ( ~ 00 1%J ) , 
proposed to the Taewon-gun that Korea form an alliance with France and England. 
The French priests then in Korea, it was thought, could be used as contacts. 
The Taewon-gun was at first interested, but the Frenchmen show little enthusi-
asm. Later the idea was dropped when the Russian threat seemed to diminish, 
and it was realized that such an alliance might make China suspicious. In the 
meantime, the Catholics, against the wishes of the Taewon-gun, made public the 
news of these events. It began to appear that the Catholics had unusual influence 
around the throne; and the existence of the foreign missionaries became known 
22 
Castel and Nahm, '"Our Little War with the Heathen'," 20. 
23 -Sin, Han-guk Hyondae Sa, I, 70; Paik, The History of the Protestant 
Missions in Korea, p. 40. 
24 
by those in government. 
Soon, increasing pressure was put on the Taewon-gun from the anti-
Christian elements in the government to sanction the arrest and 
trial of missionaries and heretics. Thus the Taewon-gun had to take 
a very strong stand against the religion of his friends and his son's 
nurse, when until that time he had appeared indifferent. 25 
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The Taew~n-gun was forced to act or possibly lose his position of pow-
er, a position, it should be remembered, that could not rely on the absolute 
_backing of any major factional group. The politician in him quickly understood 
the situation. However, contrary to common thought, no more than thirty to 
forty people were executed in the first wave of the persecutions. It was only 
with the attacks by the French and the Americans in 1866 and 1871 that the per-
secutions became widespread. 26 
By chance, Korea had her first direct contact with Western powers 
just as she was experiencing severe domestic trials. It has usually been true in 
history that when a nation is weak and in turmoil, she is least prepared to face 
a foreign challenge. Rather than strengthen the nation, such foreign encroach-
ments, whether they be political, technological, or simply cultural, tend to in-
crease the stability and confusion in the country. It was this instability that 
the Taewon-gun was trying to combat. Unfortunately, he lacked the time and 
24 -Sin, Han-guk Hyondae Sa, I, 70-71; Lee Sun-keun, "Some Lesser-
Known Facts About Taewon-gun and His Foreign Policy," Transactions of the 
Korea Branch of the Royal Society, XXXIX (1962), 26-32; Choe, The Rule of 
the Taewon'gun, p. 95. 
25 Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, p. 96. 
26 
Ibid. 
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the weapons to be successful. 
CHAPTER V 
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER SEWARD AND FISH 
William H. Seward and Hamilton Fish, the United States Secretaries of 
State during the 1860's and early 1870's, played key roles in determining the 
course of America's first contacts with Korea. 
· I. WILLIAM H. SEWARD 
Although the American public's desire for expansion, so common in the 
1840's, had largely died out by the late 1860's, William Seward was an exception. 
1 
He was an expansionist in the strongest sense of the word. It was his hope that 
the United States would one day occupy all of North America, and be one of the 
great world leaders. Seward himself based this vision of empire and domination 
on 
a political law--and when I say political law, I mean a higher law, 
a law of Providence--that empire has, for the last three thousand 
years ... made its way constantly westward, and that it must con-
tinue to move on westward until the tides of the renewed and of the 
decaying civhlizations of the world meet on the shores of the Pa-
cific Ocean. 
1Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (8th 
ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 360; Glyndon G. Van Deu-
sen, William H. Seward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 549. 
2
walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American 
Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 25-26. 
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Those "decaying civilizations" no doubt referred to the nations of Asia. In this 
statement, Seward was reflecting the cultural superiority felt by most Ameri-
cans and Europeans of the time toward non-Western peoples. 
It is very fmpartant to distinguish between Seward's policies for North 
America and those worldwide. Like the proponents of Manifest Destiny twenty 
years before, he believed that all of North America would ultimately fall under 
the control of the American government and system, for as he told a Boston 
audience in 1867, "Nature meant this whole continent to be sooner or later, part 
:3 
of the American Union. rn Canada and Mexico would not be colonies, but rather 
states, just as Texas, California, and Oregon had become. Seen in this light, 
the Alaska purchase was the first step in bringing about this new union. Of 
course, there were other factors involved in the purchase, which will be men-
tioned later, but Sewardws vision of a North American empire had already begun 
to develop. 
However, his attitude toward overseas territory was quite different. 
"He was not interested m the acquisition of colonies in distant parts of the world, 
since they would mean control over populations alien to the United States by lan-
4 
guage, custom, and idem.a. 11 Seward felt that American influence and domina-
tion would come about~ mot by the acquisition of colonies or military conquest, 
5 
but by the growth of 1rw:Qi"ld-wide foreign commerce." This would make the 
3van Deusen,., William H. Seward, pp. 548-549. 
4 
Ibid.' p. 514.. 
5 
Ibid., P. 512.. 
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United States truly powerful and a world leader. And to Seward, one of the 
greatest, if not the greatest, potential market areas of the world was East Asia. 
As early as 1853 he had declared to Americans: 
Open up a highway through your country from New York to San Fran-
cisco. Put your domain under cultivation, and your ten thousand 
wheels of manufacture in motion. Multiply your ships, and send 
them forth to the East. The nation that draws most materials and 
provisions from the earth, and fabricates the most, and sells the 
most of productions and fabrics to foreign nations, must be, and 
will be, the great power of the earth. 6 
It was this quest for widely scattered foreign markets, along with the 
need for naval stations pointed out by the Civil War, that led Seward to obtain 
Midway Island, and attempt to obtain the Hawaiian Islands, the Virgin Islands, 
rights to a canal through Colombia, and various ports in the Caribbean and Pa-
7 
cific. Although this may be labeled "economic imperialism," it was very dif-
ferent from the expansion Seward hoped for on the continent. Alaska was the ex-
ception, in that it added to the continental empire, and, because of its position, 
also served as a gateway to Asia and Asian markets. Seward's son, Frederick 
8 
W. Seward, commented on this, as did Nathaniel P. Banks, chairman of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1867, who called the Aleutians the "draw-
6 LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 26-27. 
7 
Van Deusen, William H Seward, pp. 526-534; Bailey, A Diplomatic 
History, pp. 360-363. 
8 
Tyler Dennett, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," American Historical 
Review, XXVIII (October, 1922), 61. 
9 bridge between America and Asia." 
99 
Just by coincidence, Seward had more time to deal with diplomacy and 
"territorial expansion" in the latter half of the 1860's. Although nominally a 
supporter of President Johnson, the personality clash between the two prevented 
a close working relationship, "Johnson was pugnacious and intolerant of opposi-
tion, while Seward could enjoy the friendly fellowship of his most active oppo-
nents. Seward was a master of compromise, but no compromise was possible 
in the quarrel between Johnson and his enemies in Congress. " So as Seward 
withdrew more and more from domestic politics, his attention and energy be-
10 
came more strongly focused on foreign affairs. 
The desire for large markets and growing commercial contacts in East 
Asia led to a very active foreign policy by Seward in that part of the world. Rep-
resenting the Secretary in China was the very able Anson Burlingame. One re-
11 
sult of Seward's activity was the Burlingame Treaty signed with China in 1868. 
"It could more properly be called the Seward Treaty, for ... Seward, who s bowed 
more interest in the Far East than any other Secretary since Webster, seems to 
9 Fred Harvey Harrington, Fighting Politician; Major-General N. P. 
Banks (Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 182-185, as cited in LaFeber, The New Em-
pire, p. 29. 
10Henry W. Temple, "William H. Seward," The ·American Secretaries 
of State and Their Diplomacy, edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York: Pag-
aent Book Company, 1959), VII, 111. 
11Frederick W. Seward, ed., Autobiography of William H. Seward, 3 
vols. (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), III, 379-382. 
12 
have desired it more than Burlingame." 
As was the case in China, Seward's chief concern in Japan was the 
13 
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"promotion of American commerce." However, his actions toward the Japan-
ese were influenced by his cultural, as well as economic attitudes. During 
Perry's expedition to Japan, Seward maintained: "Certainly no one expects the 
nations of Asia to be awakened by any other influence than our own from the leth-
14 
argy into which they sunk nearly three thousand years ago." Given such an 
attitude, it would be difficult to treat the people of such nations as equals, with 
equal rights and privileges. Seward seems to have been somewhat impressed by 
Chinese culture, or perhaps by Burlingame's explanations. At any rate, his 
15 
actions toward the Chinese were for the most part friendly and courteous. 
But not so with the Japanese. Seward thought that they were half-civilized, and 
told the United States Minister to Japan Robert H. Pruyn that "Japan was semi-
barbarous, the government being relatively enlightened, but the people and the 
16 
ruling classes not yet reconciled to the opening of the country. " 
12Bailey, A Diplomatic History, pp. 307-308. 
13 
Van Deusen, William H. Seward, p. 521. 
14 
G. E. Baker, ed., The Works of William H. Seward, 5 vols. (Bos-
ton, 1853-1883), I, 356, as cited in Dennett, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," 
47. 
15 Van Deusen, William H. Seward, p. 521. 
16Ibid., pp. 521, 519. There is a strong element of truth in the latter 
part of Seward's statement. However, it was the way in which Japan was "open-
ed" and the demands made upon her through the unequal treaties, as well as any 
native anti-forei.gnism, that aroused such anger. 
Figure 6. William Henry Seward, United States Secretary 
of State from 1861 to 1869. 
(Courtesy of the Oregon Historical Society) 
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When the American interpreter, Heusken, was killed in 1861, and it was 
feared that Japan would ignore the treaties of 1858, Seward proposed a joint 
naval expedition to the other Western powers against Japan. He suggested that 
"such hostilities be commenced and prosecuted as the naval commanders may 
17 
deem most likely to bring the Japanese to a sense of their obligations." Al-
though nothing came of this proposal, the American participation in the "gunboat" 
diplomacy of 1863, 1864, and 1866 was approval completely by Seward. 18 Se-
ward's desire to cooperate with the European powers in East Asia influenced 
these decisions, but there is no doubt that he "reacted vigorously [nationalistic-
19 
ally] to actions that jeopardized American lives .... " 
He reacted similarly when news arrived of the death in Korea of the 
French missionaries and the crew of the American merchant ship, General Sher-
man, in 1866. Seward's desire for the growth of an Asian market, coupled with 
this reaction, led him to propose a joint expedition with the French designed to 
avenge the murders and force a commercial treaty. This proposal was soon 
dropped, but Korea was not forgotten. In January, 1868 Seward wrote that the 
American wrongs in Korea were "unendurable," but that "the United States was 
eager to proceed with such moderation there as not to bring into question Amer-
ican dignity and liberality in relation to rude and unorganized Eastern communi-
17 Quoted in Dennett, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," 49. 
18
Ibid.' 49-50. 
19van Deusen, William H. Seward, p. 522. 
20 
ties." 
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This statement so aptly reflects the misunderstanding and cultural gap 
that lay between the United States and the Asian nations. It is true that Seward 
was jumping to conclusions because he still lacked the real facts of the incident, 
but it was the cultural attitude and feelings of superiority that actually allowed 
such conclusions to be drawn. 
Another "peaceful" expedition was recommended, and though not carried 
out until after Seward left office, it reflected the Secretary's interests and atti-
21 
tudes. 
II. HAMILTON FISH 
Hamilton Fish, although like Seward, a Republican, brought a much dif-
ferent background to the office of Secretary of State. Many people were sur-
prised, including Fish himself, when Grant nominated him for the position. This 
occurred only after Grant's first two choices, Elihu B. Washburne and James F. 
Wilson, had resigned and refused the post respectively. 
Fish did not seek or desire the office, and accepted Grant's nomination 
only out of loyalty to the party. He hoped to resign as soon as it was possible 
without causing the administration further embarrassment. In fact he did offer 
his resignation several times, but each time it was refused by Grant. In such a 
154. 
20 
Ibid. 
21For a detailed description of this entire episode, see below, pp. 125-
manner Fish ended up serving until the conclusion of Grant's second term in 
187'1. 22 
While Seward was a confirmed expansionist, Fish's 
policy was largely moulded in the long run by his inherent quali-
ties of caution and patience--the caution and patience bred of a 
lifetime spent in the management of a secure estate, in associa-
tion with conservative businessmen, and of a personal disinterest-
ednes.s in his tenure of office. His caution led him to distrust all 
adventurous undertakings, even while lending himself to their pur-
suit; his patience enabled him to wait the proper moment for discom-
fiting projects with which he did not sympathize, but which he did not 
feel able to defeat by open opposition at the outset. 23 
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Although he served in many political offices, Fish was in no way the profession-
al politician that Seward was. In fact, he had not held a political office since 
1857. He had "retired from the political arena and was not interested in reen-
24 
tering it." 
Interestingly enough, the historian Walter LaFeber sees this wealthy 
conservative as one of the principal figures in the growth of American economic 
25 
expansion and imperialism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Fish, 
along with Grant, "had made an important new addition to the Monroe Doctrine 
[the non-transfer principle], focused attention on the Caribbean, and established 
22 Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Admin-
istration, 2 vols. (New York: Ungar Publishing Co. , 1957), I, 107-117. 
23Joseph V. Fuller, "Hamilton Fish," The American Secretaries of 
State, edited by Bemis, VII, 131. 
24 Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State, a History of Its Organi-
zation, Procedure, and Personnel (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), 
p. 141; Nevins, Hamilton Fish, pp. 64-66. 
25 LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 32-39. 
' 
'· 
the first formal United States holds on Hawaii and Samoa,· thus contributing 
26 
"much to the eventual success of the new empire." 
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Attempting to support his thesis that the United States practiced econ-
omic imperialism from 1860 on, LaFeber seems to add undue emphasis to cer-
tain facts. To begin with,Grant' s statement of non-transfer was only echoing 
many earlier American attitudes. It was not a "new addition" to the Monroe 
Doctrine, since the principle had been used as early as Jefferson's administra-
27 
tion, and was implicit in the Doctrine itself. 
In addition, the "formal holds" on Hawaii and Samoa were not necess-
arily major examples of expanding imperialism. In 1872, Commander Richard 
W. Meade signed an agreement with the native chiefs of Samoa giving the United 
States rights to a coaling station at Pago Pago. In return, "the United States 
would employ its good offices to adjust any differences that should arise between 
Samoa and a foreign power." This agreement became a treaty in 1878. Given 
growth of steamships at this time, such a treaty was not necessarily imperialis-
tic. The Americans gained no political control over Samoa, and were not bur-
dened with any real responsibilities. "The Senate registered the stamp of its 
approval" only because the arrangement was not a protectorate, and thus did not 
seem to pose a threat to America's traditional policy of overseas non-entangle-
26Ib"d 
_1_., p. 39. 
27J. A. Logan, Jr., No Transfer (New Haven, Yale University Press1 
1961)' 95-96, 111-122, 166-172. 
\ 
28 
ment. 
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The commercial reciprocity treaty signed with Hawaii in 1875 reflected 
much more than just economic imperialism. The American cultural influence in 
Hawaii had by this time become predominant; and the sugar growers relied so 
heavily on exports to the United States that the new treaty meant a boom to that 
29 
troubled industry. The Hawaiina Islands' strategic position was noted by many 
foreign nations. Should she fall into the hands of any of these powers, it could 
pose a direct threat to the security of the west coast of the United States; Or at 
least, that is what many people thought at that time. To Fish, some degree of 
security seemed desirable, if not necessary. 
Because of the international situation, Fish was deeply involved in the 
Caribbean. But this had little to do with imperialistic aims on his part. With 
regard to Cubat Fish worked endlessly for non-interventicn, usually confronting 
30 Grant along the way. Concerning the possible annexation of Santo Domingo, 
the Secretary of State coldly opposed the idea when it was first brought up, and 
later went along with Grant only because it served to divert the latter's attention 
from the more important and delicate negotiations involving the Alabama claims 
31 
and recognition of Cuban belligerency. In ways such as thist Fish sought to 
28LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 35-36; Bailey; A Diplomatic History, 
pp. 422-423. 
29 Bailey, A Diplomatic History, pp. 428-429. 
30 . Ibid., pp. 380-381; LaFeber, The New Empire, p. 38. 
31 ' 
Nevins, Hamilton Fish, pp. 128, 273-275; Fuller, "Hamilton Fish," 
130. 
' ' 
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dampen many of his President's adventurous plans and schemes, rather than aid 
their development. 
Given this conservatism and disinterest in aggressive imperialism, why 
then did Fish sanction the 1871 Expedition to Korea? There seems to be two 
basic reasons. First of all, his general unfamiliarity with foreign affairs and 
the Department of state, especially in his first years in office, forced him to 
lean "heavily upon others more experienced than himself for advice and even for 
32 
the formulation of his policies .... " In this way George Seward, the principal 
proponent of an expedition to Korea, was invited back to Washington and had con-
sultations with the Department of State in early 1870. Seward's remarks appear 
to have been well taken, for Fish soon gave orders authorizing the mission. 
A second factor may have also influenced Fish's decision. Unlike Se-
ward's attitudes, which often stemmed from a political and even at times emo-
tional outlook, "his was a legal mind, well trained, careful in logic, and respect-
33 
ful of tradition. His devotion (was] to the supremacy of law .... " Such an out-
look would probably place a high value on the necessity for a legally binding 
treaty between the United States and Korea, especially when an increase of fu-
ture contacts seemed inevitable. The problem of shipwrecked sailors could thus 
be handled in an international, legal fashion. This idea unfortunately was to 
clash with the Korean view of diplomatic relations. 
32 
stuart, The Department of State, p. 141; Fuller, "Hamilton Fish," 
130. 
33 Marlene J. Mayo, "A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: The Japan-
ese and Hamilton Fish, 1872," Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI, No. 3 (May, 
196~, 396. 
' , 
' 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE IMMEDIATE EVENTS LEADING TO THE 
1871 INCIDENT 
Although Korea's first major contact directly with the West did not 
occur until the 1860's, there had been numerous Western visitors previous to 
that time. These people had little effect on Korea's impressions of the West, 
but they form a fascinating part of early Korean-Western relations. 
I. . EARLIEST WESTERN CONTACTS WITH KOREA 
Knowledge of pre-nineteenth century Korea was not limited strictly to 
the Chinese and Japanese. As early as the ninth century, Arab geographers 
1 
learned of the area, and referred to it in their works. The first Westerner to 
I 
visit Korea was a Jesuit priest born in Madrid, Gregorio de Cespedes. A mis-
sionary in Japan from 1577 to 1611, he was sent to Korea for a year and a half 
in the 1590's in order to administer services to the Japanese Catholics in 
Hideyoshi's army. However, though in Korea, he was so fully occupied with the 
Japanese troops "that no opportunity arose for evangelism among the Koreans. 
Moreover, his ignorance of the language and his attachment to the invading army 
1
chung Kei Won and George F. Hourani, "Arab Geographers on Korea," 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, LVIII (1938), 658-661. 
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would have prevented him from coming into any effective contact with Koreans 
2 
other than prisoners of war." This explains why he is not mentioned in any of 
the contemporary Korean records. 
The next Western visitors were Jan Janse Weltevree and two other Hol-
3 
landers, who were either shipwrecked or stranded on Korean shores in 1627. 
Since they were not permitted to leave Korea, they became soldiers in the Ko-
rean army. Weltevree's two companions died in the Manchu invasion of 1636, 
but Weltevree himself lived to be at least seventy, settling in Korea with a wife 
4 
and children while gaining distinction thr:ough government service. 
He held a government position of some responsibility when the next vis-
itors arrived from the West, the crew of the ill-fated Dutch ship Sparrow Hawk. 
Shipwrecked on Cheju Island in 1653, the survivors were transported to the 
mainland. Hendrik Hamel, the ship's secretary and one of the eight Dutchmen 
to escape to Japan in 1666, eventually wrote an account of their experiences. 
5 
This was the first book on Korea to appear in the West. Until that time, Wes-
2 
Ralph M. Cory, "Some Notes on Father Gregorio de Cespedes, Korea's 
First European Visitor;' Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, XXVIII (1937)' 10. 
3 
Gari Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea (Seoul: The Royal Asiatic 
Society, Korea Branch, 1971), pp. 26, 36. 
4 
Ibid., pp. 26-33. 
5 
See Hendrick Hamel, An Account of the Shipwreck of a Dutch Vessel on 
the Coast of the Isle of Quelpaert, Together with a Description of the Kingdom of 
Corea, translated by John Churchill (London, 1704). Appended in Ibid., pp. 169-
226. 
6 
tern maps had shown Korea as an island. Although Hamel's work was quite 
accurate and reliable, its description of a culture so foreign to the West led 
7 
many people to doubt its authenticity. 
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While the influence of Catholicism began to seep in across the northern 
border, the growth of European commerce in East Asia caused many more for-
eign vessels to appear off Korean coasts by the early nineteenth century. In 
1797, the British ship Providence, under the command of William Robert Brough-
ton, sailed near Tongnae ( ) on the southeastern coast during a mis-
s 
sion of exploration to the North Pacific. In 1816, two more British ships, the 
Alcest and the Ly~a, commanded by Captain Basil Hall, attempted to survey the 
Western coast of Korea as they traveled from the Gulf of Chilhi to Canton. Al-
though they were able to make contact with some Korean officials, the language 
9 
barrier prevented the British from learning any significant information. The 
first attempt to secure actual trade relations occurred in 1832, when the British 
East India Company sent a ship from Canton for that purpose. But it was re-
6 
Martina Deuchler, "The Opening of Korea, 1875-1884," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1967), p. 151. 
7 Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea, pp. 123-124. 
8 
Deuchler, "The Opening of Korea, 1875-1884, '' pp. 151-152; Sohn, 
The History of Korea, p. 184. 
9 
Basil Hall, "Captain Basil Hall's Account of His Voyage to the West 
Coast of Corea in 1816," edited in Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, IX (1920), 1-37; L. George Paik, ed., "The Korean Record on 
Captain Basil Hall's Voyage of Discovery to the West Coast of Korea," Trans-
actions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXIV (1935), 15-19. 
10 
buffed by the Koreans and had to return empty-handed. 
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The British were not alone in this area. Early American interest also 
rose from a desire to expand their trade in the Far East. When Edmond Roberts. 
returned from his first diplomatic mission to Asia in May, 1834, he reported to 
Secretary of State Louis McLane that "one advantage in opening trade to Japan 
11 
was the possibility that it could lead to trade with Korea." But no concrete 
efforts came of his ideas. 
On February 15, 1845, the first official proposal for the opening of 
Korea was made by Congressman Zadoc Pratt, Chairman of the Committee on 
Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives. He introduced a resolution call-
ing for a mission to Japan and Korea to establish trade relations. Pratt de-
clared: "The American people will be able to rejoice in the knowledge that the 
'star spangled banner' is recognized as ample passport and protection for all who, 
12 
of our enterprising countrymen, may be engaged in extending American commerce." 
However, the desire to establish trade relations was aimed mostly at 
Japan. Pratt explained that he was "desirous of a closer acquaintance" with 
Japan because she had "a population exceeding fifty millions [sic], about thrice 
as numerous as the whole population of the United States," while her industry 
could be "comparable with that of the Chinese." Likewise, her potential mar-
10 Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 308. 
11 
Harold F. Cook, "America Comes to Korea: The Early Contacts," 
Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, XXXIV (June, 1971), 53; Department 
of State, A Historical Summary of United States-Korean Relations (Washington, 
D. C., 1962), p. 3. 
12cook, "America Comes to Korea: The Early Contacts," 53. 
13 
kets for American goods could be comparable to those of China. 
On the other hand, the United States could not expect "anything like 
112 
equal advantages from intercourse with Corea," but it seemed to be "desirable 
to include that country along with Japan in the proposed mission, as negotiations 
with both countries may be dispatched with little additional expense by the same 
14 
ambassador." Despite Pratt's efforts, the resolution failed to pass. But it 
does help partially to explain why it was seventeen years after Perry opened 
Japan before the United States made a similar attempt in Korea. Once Japan 
was open, Korea by herself was not important enough to warrant a special mis-
sion. And only after the General Sherman episode produced a "cause" did the 
United States feel justified in dispatching an expedition. 
Meanwhile, indirect pressure from the West continued to grow, es-
pecially when China, and then Japan, were officially opened. In 1845 the crew 
of the British vessel Samarang, while surveying along Korea's southern and wes-
tern coasts, invaded a sea-side pasture on Cheju Island. At about the same time 
a Russian fleet was sighted off Hamgyong Province, while a French fleet appear-
ed off the southwest coast. In 1847 a French ship ran aground while attempting 
15 
to approach in Kogunsan ( iJ i ~ ) Islauds of Cholla province. 
The Americans aboard the General Sherman were not the first Ameri-
13Yong Suk Jung, 'The Rise of American National Interest in Korea: 
1845-1950," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School and 
University Center, 1970), pp. 8-9. 
14 
Ibid. 
15
sohn, The History of Korea, p. 184. 
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cans to reach Korea. In 1855 four American seamen, Melville Kelsey, Thomas 
McGuire, David Barnes, and Edward Brailey, of the whaler Two Brothers 
jumped ship off the coast of Korea. They reached the shore in a rowboat, and, 
as stated oy McGuire, "were hospitably received" by the Koreans, who "took us 
to their houses and treated us well, gave us clothes and food." Barnes added 
16 
that "tne Coreans treated us like men." After spending about thirty days in 
Korea, they were escorted to the Chinese border at the Yalu River, and from 
there they were taken by the Chinese first to Peking, and eventually to the United 
States Consulate in Shanghai. Shortly thereafter they returned to the United 
17 
States and disappeared from history. 
From the 1840's on, the appearance of foreign vessels became more and 
more common. As the Western powers continued to expand throughout all of 
East Asia, it would be only a matter of time before they would come into official 
direct contact with Korea. As fate would have it, an American merchant schoon-
er, the General Sherman, set into motion the events that were to lead to the 1871 
United States expedition. 
II. THE CASE OF THE GENERAL SHERlV!AN 
The personnel of the General Sherman consisted of three Americans, 
16Earl Swisher, "The Adventure of Four Americans in Korea and Pe-
king in 1855," Pacific Historical Review, XXI (Aug., 1952), 239. 
17 Ibid., 239-241; Swisher, China's Management of the American Barbar-
ians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents (New 
Haven: Far Eastern Association, 1951), pp. 308-309. 
114 
two Englishmen, sixteen Chinese and two Malayans. The principal persons 
were the owner, Mr. W. B. Preston, the master, Mr. Page, the chief mate, 
Mr. Wilson, all Americans, and Rev. Robert J. Thomas, an English mission-
ary. In many ways Thomas was the leading personality on board, and seems to 
18 
have played a major role in determining the ship's fate. 
The vessel was loaded with a "cargo of foreign merchandise" at 
Tientsin, and after stopping in Chefoo to pick up a passenger, it proceeded on to 
19 
Korea, arriving there in August, 1866. Although the main purpose of the 
cruise was to carry out trade with Korea, at least in the eyes of Preston and the 
crew, Thomas had much more in mind. 
Thomas had arrived in China in December, 1863, and soon became dis-
satisfied with his situation there. But his "gloomy thoughts" were soon replaced 
by new ideas of Korea. In China he met two Koreans, learned some of their lan-
20 
guage from them, and became curious about the country. From September 
through December, 1865, he traveled along the coast of Korea. In his own 
words: 
I have been four months away from European society, and travel-
led by sea and land nearly two thousand miles. I am well acquaint-
ed with the coast of the two western provinces of Corea and have 
made numerous vocabularies and dialogues in the colloquial of the 
captial, which will be useful in any future negotiations with that 
18 Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 1866-1871," 8-9. 
19 
Ibid. 
20 
M. W. Oh, "The Two Visits of the Rev. R. J. Thomas to Korea," 
Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXII (1933), 
100-101. 
21 
people. 
This first trip to Korea convinced him that the country was a good 
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choice for further missionary work. When he learned that the General Sherman 
was sailing to Korea hoping to open up trade, he jumped at the chance to return. 
The vessel, needing someone familiar with the language and geography, was glad 
22 
to have him aboard. By this time, the summer of 1866, news of the Catholic 
persecutions that had begun in Korea the previous winter had reached China. 
The London Mission at Peking, for whom Thomas worked, 
on account of the persecution in Korea, did not approve of his de-
cision to make the voyage at that time, and under those circum-
stances even his best friends tried to dissuade him from it. But 
he was determined to go ana did not consider the risks, thinking 
only of the chance thus offered to get an entrance for the Gospel 
into Korea. 23 
His exact aims were to learn more about the country and "perfect his knowledge 
[of the language] in order to preach the Gospel and establish a Protestant Mis-
24 
sion in [Korea]. " 
As soon as the ship arrived in Korean waters, its memoers made it 
known to Korean officials that they intended to enter the Taedong River and carry 
out trade with the city of P'y~S'ngyang, located far up the river. Upon hearing 
this, the Korean officials notified the foreigners that "it was alright for their 
21 Thomas letter to Dr. Tidman, January 12, 1866, quoted in Ibid., 
103-104. 
22 
Oh, "The Two Visits," 108. 
23 
Ibid. ' 113-114. 
24 
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ships to anchor in the seas off the coast but that the King of Korea had forbidden 
any foreign vessels to enter the inland waters of the country.'' To this Thomas, 
as spokesman for the ship, was quoted as saying, "Who can prevent us from going 
to P'yongyang ·? •••• We intend to sail as soon as a favorable west wind comes 
25 
up." 
To the Koreans, it appeared that the ship was not simply a trading ves-
sel. Why else wou1d the foreigners want to proceed to P'yongyang, the capital 
of P'yt>ng-an Province? The Koreans knew that the river was not safely navi-
gable up to that point for such a large ship. The Koreans had already noticed 
26 
that the vessel was heavily armed with guns, swords, and cannons. It would 
not only be illegal for such a ship to enter inland waters, it would also pose a 
serious threat to the nation's security. 
Nevertheless, the vessel soon got under weigh and succeeded in reach-
1ng a spot just below P'yongyang, thanks to the unusually heavy monsoon rains 
27 
that had swollen the river that year. 
25 Yijo Sillok (The Yi Dynasty Annals), chapter XXII, appended in Caole, 
"United States-Korean Relations, 1866-1871," 16; Sin, Han-guk Hyondae Sa, I, 
86-87. 
26 Yijo Sillock, chapter XXII, in Cable, "United States Korean Relations, 
1866-1871," 15. 
27 
In his discussion of this episode, Yong Suk Jung incorrectly states that 
the General Sherman was "burned and its crew murdered at the mouth of the Tae-
dong River." In fact, if the vessel only had proceeded to the mouth of the river, 
there would have most probably been no incident. It was when the ship travelled 
upstream, disobeying the laws and threatening the countryside, that retaliatory 
action was taken against it. See Jung, "The Rise of American National Interest 
in Korea: 1845-1950," p. 9. 
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When the deputy commander of the P'yongyang military headquarters, 
Yi Hyon-ik ( l t i: ) came out peacefully to question some of the foreign-
ers, he was taken prisoner by them instead. Despite the pleas from other of-
ficials and even the local populace, Yi was not released. At about this time the 
foreigners also began to fire randomly at the shore and at the Korean boats in 
28 
the river. 
The situation had now become so serious that the ministers of state, who 
had been receiving various local reports, were forced to convene in Seoul to dis-
cuss tne problem and advise the King. Thtiy were of course in reality advising 
the Taewon-gun, since he alone controlled the government at this time. They 
finally decided that: 
We must. . . deal very Stiverely with such men. There is no other 
way but to go into the particulars ot their case very carefully and 
deal with them sternly. The foundation and perpetuity of the nation 
is in its righteous principles. If the proper law is administered in 
such an emergency as this, such lawless tellows will naturally dis-
appear. If the acts of such vicious men as these take place within 
our borders, how can our country be considered a civilized nation? 
Therefore, in this crisis we must administer the proper law. 29 
Meanwhile, matters had gotten worse near P'yongyang. The sailors 
28Yijo Sillok, chapter XXII, in Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 
18tjij-l871," 18-20. What triggered this tirst tiring is not clear. The Korean 
sources do not yet furnish an answer, and sincti there \\ere ultimately no surviv-
ors trom the General Sherman, their side of the story will never be known. It 
can be speculated that the foreigners may have thought that a show of force would 
convince tht:: Koreans to open up trade, and that some spectators were accidental-
ly hit during gun "practice." Another possibility is Lhat the Chinese members of 
the crew allowed their cultural prejudices to overflow into hostile actions. Chin-
ese pirates were common in this area, and some of them may have made up the 
crew. 
29 
Ibid.' 21. 
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aboard the General Sherman began to fire indiscriminately at Korean soldiers 
and civilians. At the same time, they decided that they should head back down-
stream. But by now, the river had dropped greatly and the ship was soon 
grounded on a sandbar. In his report to the central government, the governor 
of the province, Pak Kyusu, declared: 
the foreign vessel. .. [has] plundered provisions from Korean ships, 
recklessly discharging its guns and killing seven and wounding five 
Koreans. There has never been such a thing as a foreign vessel en-
tering the inland waters of the country and remaining for a number of 
days. They say they are going to threaten the Koreans with violence 
in order to force them to trade with them. . . . However, since they 
had come from a far country we preferred to speak to them kindly, 
and have them depart with a sense of gratitude, rather than to force 
them to go by the means of applying the law so we treated them gen-
erously many times with food but they did not go and finally acted in 
[such] a barbarous way, ... so that nothing remained for us to but de-
stroy the vessel. 30 
The order was soon given to destroy the ship, which was finally done by 
setting it on fire with flaming junks that were floated down the river. Seeing 
that the drop in the river's level had cut off their escape, some members of the 
vessel, including Thomas, pleaded for mercy. But the earlier acts of violence 
and killing, especially those committed against civilians, had so angered the lo-
cal populace that every member of the ship was killed in return. The crew of 
the General Sherman had sealed its own fate by first disobeying the national 
31 laws, and secondly, by using force and violence against their hosts. 
30 
Ibid. t 22. 
31 
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III. THE FRENCH INVASION 
When the persecution~ of the Catholics broke out in early 1866, only 
three of the twelve French priests managed to escape arrest. They were Fathers 
Felix-Clair Ridel, Stanislas Feron, and Adolphe-Nicholas Calais. It was decid-
ed that one of them had to go for help, and Ridel, a newcomer was chosen. In 
June, 1866, with the aid of some Korean Catholics, he was able secretly to sail 
from Korea to Chefoo, China. 
Once in China, he pleaded with the commander of the French Asiatic 
Squadron, Admiral Pierre-Gustave Rose, to send ships to Korea to rescue their 
two fellow countrymen. Rose agreed to do so, but he had to wait until most of 
his squadron returned from a mission to Indochina. Meanwhile, Rose notified 
the French charg6 d'affairs, Henri di Bellonet, of the events taking place in Ko-
rea. The fiery Bellonet, who had taken over the French Mission when Minister 
Berthemy had left, reacted quickly without waiting for specific instructions from 
32 
Paris. 
On July 13, 1866, he sent the following note to Prince Kung, the head of 
the Chinese foreign. office, the Tsungli Yamen. 
I grieve to bring officially to the attention of Your Imperial High-
ness a horrible outrage committed in the small kingdom of Corea, 
which formerly assumed the bonds of vassalege to the Chinese 
empire, but [from] which this act of savage barbarity has forever 
32
choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, pp. 96-97; Wright, "The Adapta-
tion of Ch'ing Diplomacy: The Case of Korea," 376-377; Dennett, "Seward's Far 
Eastern Policy, " 51-52. 
separated it. . . . The same day on which the King of Corea laid his 
hands upon my unhappy countrymen was the last of his reign; he 
himself declared its end, which I, in my turn, solemnly declare 
today. In a few days our military forces are to march to the con-
quest of Corea, and the Emperor, my august sovereign, alone, has 
the right and the power to dispose, according to his good pleasure, 
of the country and of the vacant throne. 33 
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Hoping to avoid an armed clash between the French and the Koreans, 
Prince Kung replied to Bellonet on July 16: 
I may here observe that since Corea is an out-of-the-way coun-
try, lying in a secluded corner, and, as it is well known, has al-
ways strictly maintained its own relations, I am quite unaware what 
has led them to put these missionaries and Christians to death .... 
Seeing, however, that when two countries come to war it involves 
the lives of their people, as it wilf in this case--and, therefore, I 
cannot but endeavor to bring about a solution of the difficulty be-
tween them--as the Coreans have killed a number of the mission-
aries, it seems to me that it would be best to inquire beforehand 
into the proofs and merits of the affair, and ascertain what were 
the reasons for this step, so that, if possible, a resort to arms 
may be avoided. I ... suggest such a course for your excellency's 
consideration. 34 
However, this note had little effect on Bellonet and Rose, who continued 
with their plans. On September 18th Rose sailed to the Korean coast in his flag-
ship, the Primauguet, accompanied by two other vessels, the Deroulede and the 
Tardif, to make a preliminary survey of the area. From this reconnaissance, 
Rose decided that, when the remainder of his fleet returned from Indochina, he 
would use it to capture Kanghwa Island and then blockade the mouth of the Han 
3311 Bellonet to Prince Kung, enclosed in Burlingame to Seward, Decem-
ber 12, 1866," Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1867, I, 420. Hereafter cited as FRUS. 
3411Prince Kung to Bellonet, enclosed in Burlingame to Seward, Dec-
ember 12, 1866," FRUS, 1867, I, 421. 
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River, thus cutting off all shipments by sea into Seoul. 35 
On October 11, 1866, Admiral Rose returned with seven ships and about 
600 men to carry out his plan. The French were able quickly to take Kanghwa 
City, the major town on the island, and proceeded to blockade the Han River. 
Rose felt that such a show of strength would frighten the Koreans into agreeing 
to come to terms. But just the opposite occured. The blockade had little effect 
on Seoul, since most goods could be brought overland. The French were isolated 
on a single island, and the Koreans rapidly began to fortify and take up offensive 
positions on the mainland side of the channel facing Kanghwa Island. Within a 
month there were nearly 10, 500 troops stationed opposite the island, preparing 
36 
for an attack. 
ation. 
On October 22nd, the Taewon-gun issued his famous Four Point declar-
The Four Points were these: [l] Talking peace with the French 
is a betrayal to your motherland; [2] Establishing "intimate" rela-
tionships with the French is inviting the gradual destruction of your 
motherland; [3] Retreating in the face of the enemy is a cowardly 
act, and will encourage the French to endanger the survival of your 
motherland; and [4] attempting to drive the French away by means 
of superstitious exorcisms is playing into the hands of the enemy. 37 
The final blow to the French was when a Korean detachment of about 500 
men ambushed and defeated a French force of 160 marines on the south end of 
35
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Kanghwa Island. The French suffered nearly fifty casualties, while the Koreans 
had only one man killed and three wounded. Admiral Rose could now see that 
there was no way he could subdue, or negotiate with the Koreans. He feared 
that they would soon launch an attack from the mainland against his small num-
ber of troops isolated on Kanghwa. 
On November 18th, the French expedition sailed from Korean waters, 
but not before they transferred all their "war booty" to the ships and set fire to 
38 
all the government buildings in Kanghwa City. 
The Koreans rejoiced in the "defeat" of the foreigners, and were assur-
ed of the righteousness of their cause. Following the French invasion, the real 
persecution of Catholics began, as every Christian was considered a traitor to 
the nation. It has been estimated that in the next three years over eight thousand 
39 
Korean converts were slain. 
This clash with the French drove the Taewon-gun to introduce 
a more extreme anti-Western policy, which meant not only perse-
cution of Christians and rejection of relations with the outside, 
but also banning of all Western goods .... The invasion also gave 
rise to a sweeping reconstruction of the defense system. Finally, 
his victory over the French led the Taewon-gnn to misjudge the 
real strength of Western powers and their true motives in com-
ing to Korean shores. After 1866 he persistently viewed other 
Western nations as mere reflections of the hated French. 40 
These events were to effect America in two ways. First of all, Ameri-
38
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can diplomats became involved with the French over Korea, and secondly when 
the United States finally sent an expedition to Korea, the latter's reactions were 
strongly determined by the previous encounter with the French. 
IV. THE OPPERT AFFAIR 
Along with the General Sherman matter and the French attack must be 
added one more incident. As mentioned earlier, three French priests had es-
caped the persecutions. One of them, Father Feron, finally arrived in Shanghai 
and contacted one Ernest Oppert, a German merchant adventurer very much in-
terested in opening Korea to foreign trade. Oppert had made two previous trips 
to Korea in 1866 for that purpose, but had been rebuffed both times by the Ko-
41 
· reans. 
Feron, along with some Korean Catholic friends, devised a plan where-
by they would secretly travel to the tomb of the Taewon-gun's father, Prince 
Namyon ( if1 ~ ) , and steal some of the valued objects contained therein. 
At least that is what Oppert thought. Feron and the Korean Catholics who led 
them to the tomb were possibly contemplating taking the old gentlemen's body. 
. I 
Then they would hold either the valuable objects or the body for ransom until the 
Taewon-gun agreed to open up trade relations. Feron also wanted to avenge the 
42 
abortive Rose expedition and the deaths of his fellow priests. 
41 Ernest Oppert, Voyage to Corea: A Forbidden Land (New York: G. 
P. Putman's Sons, 1880), pp. 177-289. 
42 
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Two ships were hired for the expedition, the China and the Greta, a 
shallow-draft vessel suitable for river navigation. The expedition's company, 
in addition to Oppert, Feron, and the Koreans, included an American adventur-
er named Frederick Jenkins, who helped to finance the trip. There were also 
"ten or twelve European sailors, twenty-five Miliamen, and a number of Chin-
43 
ese sailors ... engaged to serve as escort." 
They left on their mission in May, 1868. But their guides had mis-
judged the distance from the seacoast to the tomb, and several extra hours were 
needed to reach the site. Due to a lack of time and the thickness of the tomb 
walls, they were unable to carry out their plan. In fact, they were just able to 
escape on the outgoing tide, as their ships were anchored in very shallow water 
that was turned into mud flats during low tide. During their march to the tomb, 
they had clashed with some Korean soldiers. If they had stayed overnight at the 
44 
tomb site, the Koreans might have retaliated with force. 
Instead, 
Once aboard their vessels, they did not immediately return to China. 
they traveled north to the island of Yongjong ( 7i< ·~ ,#.', \) where they 
again clashed with Korean soldiers. During the fighting, two of the Filipinos 
were killed. While at Y5ngjong, Oppert informed the Regent of what they had 
430ppert, Voyage to Corea, p. 303; 'Williams to Seward, August 1, 
1868," FRUS, 1868, I, 547-549; Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, pp. 
317-318. 
44oppert, Voyages to Corea, pp. 304-310; Sin, Han-guk Hyondae Sa, I, 
90-91. 
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45 
done and demanded that trade relations be opened. The Taew<1n-gun naturally 
refused. "The court and government reacted to the savagery of Oppert's party 
46 
with execration, indignation, and bitterness." Even without the armed clashes 
a worse crime could probably not have been committed in a nation so dominated 
by ancestor worship. The reputation of all foreigners fell further still and the 
persecution of Catholics was resumed, while the Regent's policy of total isola-
tionism got another boost. 
All three of these incidents, the General Sherman intrusion, the French 
attack, and the attempted tomb-robbing affair, were important in solidifying the 
Korean government's distrust of foreigners. This must be remembered when 
reviewing the American attempt at treaty negotiations in 1871. The Korean 
attitude was not simply the result of ethnocentricity or inherent isolationism. 
There had been important, and tragic contact with foreigners previous to that 
attempt. 
V. AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1866-1870 
Father Ridel, the French missionary, brought news of the General 
47 
Sherman to China when he fled Korea. The American Minister to China, 
45 
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feldt's Account of It," Korean Repository, I (1892). 57. When news of the Gener-
al Sherman and a copy of Bellonet's declaration to Prince Kung reached Wash-
ington in January and February of 1867, Secretary of State Seward proposed that 
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Anson Burlingame, requested the Chinese government to ask the Koreans the 
true facts concerning the case. The Chinese "disavowed all responsibility for 
the Koreans and stated that the only connection between the two countries was 
48 
om of ceremony." However, they agreed to look into the matter when the Ko-
rean envoy to Peking made his annual visit. They also sent a special note to 
49 
Seoul, asking the Koreans for clarification of the problem. 
In the meantime Burlingame decided to take more direct action to deter-
mine the fate of the General Sherman. He "suggested to Rear Admiral H. H. 
Bell, then acting commander of the United States Asiatic Squadron, that he send 
50 
a warship to Korea to inquire about the lost vessel." In January, 1867, Bell 
ordered the U. S. S. Wachusett, under the command of Robert W. Shufeldt, to 
carry out this mission. Arriving off the coast of Korea, Shufeldt "addressed a 
letter to the King of Korea, asking him the reasons for the destruction of the 
General Sherman and the murder of the crew, expressing my surprise at the 
the United States and France unite in a joint military action against Korea. 
Whether it was Seward's purpose to avenge the deaths of the General Sherman's 
crew, or to prevent the French from gaining sole control of Korea, is debatable. 
Possibly it was a combination of both. At any rate, when Seward learned of the 
French government's disavow of Bellonet' s rash statement and the failure of the 
Rose expedition, the whole idea was dropped. For more details, see Dennett, 
"Seward's Far Eastern Policy, 11 52-58; Van Deusen, William Henry Seward, p. 
522; and Jung, "The Rise of American National Interest in Korea," pp. 20-24. 
4811 Burlingame to Seward, December 15, 1866," FRUS, 1867, I, 426. 
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50 
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barbarism of the act .... " 
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While waiting for an official answer, Shufeldt heard from the local peo-
ple "that the General Sherman had willfully and under constant protest ascended 
to Taedong River; that finally, the crew landing and behaving in a lawless man-
ner, were attacked and murdered by an enraged mob, which was entirely beyond 
52 
the control of the authorities." Shufeldt mentioned that Chinese pirates had 
been coming to this part of Korea for centuries to rob and plunder, and since 
most of the crew of the General Sherman were Chinese, the conflict between 
53 
them and the local populace was understandable. 
Shufeldt hoped to wait for the reply from Seoul, but lack of provisions 
and the possibility of being frozen in until spring forced him to return to Shanghai 
before receiving it. 
The Koreans were confused by these requests from both the Chinese and 
Shufeldt concerning an American ship. They had no way of knowing that the offend-
ing vessel near P'y<~S'ngyang had been American. Koreans did not know the mean-
in.g of a national flag and had no way of telling American, French, and English 
54 
flags apart. They assumed the ship to be either British or French; the form-
er because the ship's apparent leader (Thomas) was known to be an Englishman, 
It," 58. 
51 
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and possibly the latter bacause of the recent French attack by Rose. 55 The de-
struction of the General Sherman occurred only three weeks before the appear-
ance of the first French reconnaissance, and communications being what they 
were; some connection could have been drawn. 
The only American ship that the Koreans positively knew of was the 
Surprise, a merchantman which had been wrecked on the Korean coast during a 
storm in June, 1866. As the Koreans stated: 
According to the laws of our realm a foreign ship adrift and in 
distress, although not wrecked, can be supplied, and aided to pro-
ceed on its way when the storm was subsided; but when a vessel 
is wrecked and unable to proceed tinder its own power, the crew 
may ask the officials to assist them in any manner they like. Such 
a crew will be protected on land and sent on to Peking as has al-
ready been done in several instances. This indicates that our peo-
ple have manifested their humane spirit toward neighbors in distress 
and thus kept the sanctions of the moral law. 56 
Such was the case concerning the crew of the Surprise. The American 
legation in Peking confirmed this statement, declaring that "the crew was very 
kindly treated by the [Korean] people and handed over to the officers in Man-
57 
churia .... " In fact, the friendliness and help offered by the Koreans was in 
sharp contrast to that denied them in Manchuria. 
The fate of the General Sherman and all its crew was still not complete-
ly resolved. Therefore S. Well Williams, the American Consul-General in Pe-
55 
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king and temporarily in charge following Burlingame's departure, requested the 
Asiatic Squadron commander, Commodore J. R Goldsborough, to send another 
fact-finding ship to Korea. Goldsborough ordered Captain John C. Febiger, 
commander of the U. S. S. Shenandoah, to carry out the mission. Arriving at 
the mouth of the Taedong River in April, 1868, Febiger received a copy of the 
letter originally intended for Shufeldt. Although not definitely stating whether 
the ship was American or if there were any survivors, both Shufeldt and Febiger 
"were convinced that the attack upon the General Sherman was made by an un-
58 
authorized mob under strong provocation. " 
On July 31, 1868, S. Wells Williams wrote to Secretary of State Seward 
that "there can be no reasonable doubt that the whole company on board the 
General Sherman was killed about September, 1866, and the evidence goes to up-
hold the presumption that they invoked their sad fate by some rash or violent 
59 
acts towards the natives." 
Although Williams seems to have felt that the issue was now concluded, 
another question arose that also involved Korea. On April 24, 1868, while the 
Shenandoah was still in Korean waters, Consul-General George F. Seward at 
58 
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Shanghai sent Secretary of State Seward, his uncle, the following note: 
Mr. Frederick Jenkins, a citizen of the United States, formerly 
interpreter to this office, gave me the following information: 
There are now in Shanghai fou- Coreans and a bishop for Corea, 
of the Roman Church. These persons have been sent by the Corean 
government. The purpose is to make inquiries concerning the state 
of feeling existing toward Corea in regard to the alleged murder of 
French priests and of the crew of the American schooner, General 
Sherman, with a v~ew to determine whether it wili be wise for the 
Corean government to send an embassy to America and Europe to 
explain these occurrences and to make desired treaties of amity 
and commerce. 60 
130 
The story, of course, was completely false. Jenkins, who a few months 
later was to take part in the Oppert expedition, evidently hoped to create a Ko-
61 
rean-American incident that would lead to the opening of Korea by force. 
Whatever the reason, George Seward and his uncle both took this infor-
mation seriously. The former recommended that he be sent to Korea with power 
to negotiate a treaty of "amity and commerce similar to those existing with China 
62 
and Japan." William Seward strongly supported the idea, and gave his author-
63 
lzation June 26, 1868. 
Not everyone favored such a move, though. Gideon Welles, the Secre-
tary of the Navy, felt that Seward wanted to use the Korean disturbance as an ex-
cuse to sign a treaty with that country and thus expand American foreign interests. 
6011
aeorge F. Seward to William H. Seward, April 24, 1868, enclosed 
in Fish to Low, April 20, 1870," FRUS, 1870, 336. 
61 Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gtm, p. 120. 
6211George F. Seward to William H. Seward, April 24, 1868, enclosed 
in Fish to Low, April 20, 1870, FRUS, 1870, 336. 
63
choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, p. 120. 
131 
Welles himself felt that a treaty "cannot at this time be effected. I said that we 
were better without a treaty than with one; that the case of the General Sherman 
64 
•.. called for no action by the government." The Welles statement was soon 
proven true when the Shenandoah returned to China and reported that there were 
65 
no survivors of the General Sherman and no Korean interest to sign a treaty. 
Furthermore, Consul-General Seward learned that Jenkins had traveled 
to Korea in 
an attempt to take from their tombs the remains of one or more so-
vereigns of that country for the purpose, it would seem, of holding 
them for ransom. I therefore entered upon an investigation of the 
facts with a view to determine the nature of Mr. Jenkins connection 
with the expedition, and whether I ought to prosecute him. I regret 
to inform you that the information gathered by me has convinced me 
that it is my duty to do so. 66 
During the investigation, it became apparent that Jenkin's earlier 
story was a fabrication. However, this did not dissuade Seward from his ideas 
of negotiating with Korea. Instead, it convinced him that the only way Korea's 
67 
"openirg" could be achieved was with a "considerable show of force." He 
sent three additional letters to his uncle requesting such an armed expedition, 
64 Howard K. Beale, ed. , The Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of 
the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 
1960), III, 485. 
6511 George F. Seward to William H. Seward, May 25, 1868, enclosed 
in Fish to Low, April 20, 1870," FRUS, 1870, 337. 
66 
"George F. Seward to William H. Seward, July 3, 1868, enclosed in 
Fish to Low, April 20, 1870," FRUS, 1870, 337. 
67 
11 George F. Seward to William H. Seward, October 14, 1868, en-
closed in Fish to Low, April 20, 1870, " FRUS, 1870, 337-339. 
132 
68 
but nothing was done. Perhaps the Secretary of State was too busy, or per-
haps being once burned by authorizing negotiations with Korea, he was more 
cautious. 
The inauguration of the Grant administration gave George Seward anoth-
er chance. After meeting with Seward in February, 1870, the State Department 
decided to send a large naval expedition to Korea with the power to negotiate a 
treaty. Along with Rear Admiral John Rodgers, the commander of the Asiatic 
Squadron, the American Minister to China Frederick F. Low was entrusted with 
the negotiations. He was to take with hi!ll Acting Secretary of the Legation E. B. 
Drew,' Assistant Secretary of the Legation John P. Cowles, and two Chinese in-
69 
terpreters. Rear Admiral Rodgers was to represent the Navy. 
A stout, vigorous New England Yankee, Low was brand-new to his 
post and totally lacked previous diplomatic experience. But he was 
a man of substance: at the age of forty-two he had already been a 
successful banker, a United States congressman, and the Republi-
can governor of California from 1863 to 1867, .... In his early youth 
he had spent five years clerking in a Boston shipping firm employed 
in the China trade .... 70 · 
Low' s principal orders were to negotiate a treaty for the protection 
of shipwrecked sailors, and if possible, to include some"commercial advan-
tages in Korea. 11 It was recommended that Low "secure; in advance, the good 
will and, possibly, the good offices of the Peking government." Furthermore, 
the mission was to be carried out "with a display of force adequate to support 
68 f h ~ '122 Choe, The Rule o t e Taewon'gun, p. . 
69 Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 1866-1871," 72. 
70 Castel and Nahm, "'Our Little War with the Heathen'," 20-21. 
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71 
the dignity of this government. " 
Once Low arrived in Peking, he attempted to secure the aid of the 
134 
Chinese. But the Tsungli Yamen declared that it had neither the right nor the 
power to interfere in Korean affairs. After three different requests were made 
by Low, Peking finally agreed to forward Low' s letter written to the King of 
Korea. The Chinese also sent a covering letter to Seoul, which "emphasized 
the fact that this was an extraordinary step and that the decision must, as al-
72 
ways, remain with Korea." These letters were not sent by the Yamen, but by 
the Board of Rites, since only the latter had authority to deal with a tributary 
state., 
Low's letter to the Korean King dealt mostly with the need to protect 
shipwrecked persons. It also asked further clarificition of the General Sherman 
incident, and why its outcome differed from that of the Surprise. Low stated 
that there was no need for the Koreans to be alarmed by the arrival of American 
warships, as they were coming with peaceful intentions. There was no mention 
made about trade or commercial privileges in the letter. Low notified the Kor-
eans that he would be arriving in about three months. Since the Koreans did not 
receive this note until April 10, 1871, it was actually less than two months be-
73 
fore he appeared. 
71 
"Fish to Low, April 20, 1870," FRUS, 1870, 334. 
72 
Wright, "The Adaptation of Ch'ing Diplomacy: The Case of Korea," 
371. 
73
choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, pp. 124-125. 
135 
VI. THE AMERICAN EXPEDITION 
The expedition was comprised of five vessels: the flagship Colorado, 
the corvettes Alaska and Benicia, and the gunboats Palos and Monocacy. To-
gether, they carried eighty-five pieces of artillery and 1, 230 marines and sail-
74 
· ors. The force left Shanghai on May 8, stopped briefly in Nagasaki from .lV[ay 
12 to May 15, and appeared off the West coast of KOrm on May 19. By May 21, 
the squadron had reached the Bay of Namyang ( '*7 f1i; J~ ) off Kyonggi Pro-
. 75 
vmce. 
On May 23, the fleet arrived at Ipp'a Island ( jr ~~ ), and while in 
this vicinity had its first contact with Korean officials. The magistrate of 
Namyang, -Sin Ch'Ol-gu ( tf ~ ;R ) , ''made an inquiry concerning the pre-
sense of the fleet. He wanted to know when it had arrived, the object of its com-
76 
ing, and when it expected to leave." This was on May 26. The next day, the 
Americans sent a written reply to the magistrate, formally annow1cing the ar-
rival of "an envoy and an admiral from the Great United States of America for 
negotiations with a Korean envoy of high rank." Since such negotiations would 
take some time, the ships would "remain in Korean waters until the business 
77 
was completed." 
7411 Low to Fish, May 13, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 115; Paullin, Diplomatic 
Negotiations of American Naval Officers, p. 288. 
75 Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, p. 127. 
76 Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 1866-1871," 76. 
77 Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, p. 127. 
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Beginning on May 24, Admiral Rodgers sent surveying parties out in 
smaller boats. Minister Low reported: 
When we reached Eugenie Island [Ipp'a Islandl the Palos and four 
steam launches were sent northward to sound the channels as far 
as the point. They met with no resistance, nor was any attempt 
made by the natives to communicate with either the launches or 
the vessels. 78 
Following this survey, the squadron sailed farther northward, and fin-
ally anchored off Chak-yak Island ( #-} f 5 ) on the 30th of May. This was 
79 
southeast and just 10 miles from Kanghwa Island, site of the French invasion. 
On May 31, three minor Korean officials came to visit the Colorado. 
Because of their low rank, Drew and Cowles were assigned to meet them. The 
two Americans restated the aims of the mission that had been presented May 
27. The Koreans replied that though the King of Korea wished to maintain 
friendly relations, he had no interest in signing any treaties. Drew neverthe-
less asked that his request for the appointment of a high ranking official to meet 
with the American minister be forwarded to the Korean King. The Koreans 
80 
answered that a report of their interview would be sent to the King. 
Drew further stated that surveying vessels would be sent to the Kanghwa 
area the following day. When the Korean officials made no comment, the Ameri-
78 
"Low to Fish, May 31, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 116. 
79 
Rodgers, "Partial Report on the Military Expedition to Corea," 
appended in Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 18136-1871, '' 189; "Low to 
Fish, May 31, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 116. 
SO"Low to Fish, May 31, 1871, '' FRUS, 1871, 117. 
138 
. 81 
cans assumed that approval for the surveys had been granted. 
This was the first major American mistake. Just as Drew was "not 
authorized to discuss" possible treaty negotiations in Low' s place, likewise 
these minor. Korean officials had no power to grant survey privileges. Their 
mission to the Colorado was merely one of ceremony, a welcoming to the foreign 
ships. Any request to enter fortified areas would have had to be dealt with by 
much higher authorities in Seoul. Even if they had refused, Rodgers would have 
probably ordered the surveys anyway, just as his mentor, Perry, had done 
eighteen years before. 
Furthermore, Drew had not been explicit in his talks. He had stated 
82 
only that "surveying vessels would go up higher tomorrow.'' He did not men-
tion that the American party intended to survey Korea's heavily guarded interior 
passageway between Kanghwa Island and the mainland. 
The next morning a force of two gunboats and four steam launches, all 
heavily armed, proceeded up the narrow channel separating Kanghwa from the 
mainland. At the northern end of this channel lay the entrance to the Han River 
and the heart of Korea. The force was led by Captain Homer C. Blake of the 
Alaska. Before departing on the survey, Low had instructed Blake that in case 
a hostile attack was made, either upon his men or vessels, to reply by force, 
and destroy, if possible, the places and the people from which the attack came. 
Any advantage gained should not be pursued by a landing force, but instead he 
81 
Ibid. 
82 
Ibid. 
139 
should quietly proceed in the further prosecution of the work in view until he 
reached the northern part of Kanghwa, and, if practical, should travel a few 
' 83 
-miles up the Han River, but not attempt to reach the capital. 
By 2:00 p. m. , the party had traveled well up the channel. As they 
neared the fort of Kwangsong, they were fired upon by Korean artillery pieces. 
The Americans retaliated, soon silencing the Korean guns. But damage to the 
Monocacv forced the party to return to the main fleet. No casualties were re-
84 
ported by the Americans. On the Korean side, one gunner was killed. 
Minister Low and Admiral Rodgers interpreted this "wonton and unpro-
voked,attack" as an insult to the American flag. On June 2, 1871, Low wrote to 
Secretary of State Fish: 
The events of yesterday convince me that the government of 
Corea is determined to resist all innovations and intercourse with 
all the power at its command, without regard to nationality, or 
the nature of the demands made .... 
The question now is, what is the safe and prudent course to pur-
sue, in view of the temporary check, which the Coreans will un-
doubtably construe into a defeat of the "barbarians," .... If the 
squadron retires now, the effect upon the minds of the Coreans, 
and, I fear, upon the Chinese also, will be injurious, if not disas-
trous to our future prospects in both countries. Corea will rest 
firmly in the belief that she is powerful enough to repel any of the 
Western states singly, or even all of them combined; and this opinion 
will be likely to react upon China, and strengthen the influence of 
those who insist that it is practicable to drive out by force all the 
foreign residents. In view of these considerations, I cannot advise 
the admiral to abandon the field without further attempts at redress 
for the wrongs and insults which our flag has suffered .... 
My own view is that a sufficient force should be sent back to the 
place where the vessels were attacked yesterday, to take and effectu-
83 
"Low to Fish, June 2, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 121. 
841bid.; Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, p. 129. 
ally destroy the fortifications above the place as far as the north-
erly end of the island of Kanghwa. This the admiral expects to do, 
provided, he finds his forces are able to do it without incurring 
too much risk. 85 
140 
Although this is the plan that the Americans ultimately carried out, Low 
and Rodgers decided to first give the Koreans an opportunity to "send an apology 
86 
for this outrage ... before taking further steps." 
The Korean view of the June 1 engagement was quite different. They 
explained that the Americans triggered the exchange by sending armed vessels 
into forbidden waters. On June 6, they sent the Americans the following note. 
The barriers of defense of a coiintry are important places, with-
,in which it is not allowable for foreign vessels to make their way. 
This is the fixed rule of all nations. Hence it was the ascent [up the 
channel] to the seagate by your vessels the other day that brought 
on the engagement between us. Upon the arrival of your vessels 
the court warned the civil and military authorities along the coast 
to avoid most carefully anything which should cause trouble or arouse 
ill feeling, yet when your honorable vessels, not considering the fix-
ed regulations of another country, penetrated its important pass, how 
could the officers appointed to guard the frontiers, whose duty it is 
to take measures of defense, calmly let it go b{has of no consequence? 
Pray do not then be offended at what occurred. 
The Korean sensitivity over the Kanghwa approach to Seoul is under-
standable. Very close to the capital, it was usually the first outpost to be at-
tacked and the most important to be defended, in case of invasion by sea. Indeed, 
it had "felt the full force" of the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century, the 
85 
"Low to Fish, June 2, 1871," FRUS~ 1871, 122. 
86 
"Drew to prefect of Fu-ping, June 5, 1871, enclosure 2 in Low to 
Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 131. 
87 
"Chong, guardian of the perfecture of Kanghwa, to Low, enclosure 4 
in," Ibid. , 132. 
141 
Manchu invasion of the seventeenth century, and recently the French invasion of 
88 
1860. Because of this, it was one of the most heavily guarded areas in the en-
tire country. Following the 1866 invasion, all vessels, whether private or pub-
lie, were strictly forbidden to go beyond the southern extreme of the channel 
89 
without a special permit from the proper authorities. 
In his study of the incident, E. M. Cable remarked that "the presence 
of an alien armed force in the vicinity of a fortified and prohibited zone of anoth-
er country without its permission, and with which the invading force had no 
90 
treaty of any kind, was in itself, a challe.nge to war." 
Seven years later in the United States Senate, Senator Aaron A. Sargent 
of California, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, pointed out 
that "we would not allow any foreign vessel of a nation with which we even might 
have a treaty to come and survey our James or any other river; but here was a 
people particularly sensitive to these things, ... maintaining a rugged indepen-
dence, isolated from all the world by a policy which it thougpt necessary in order 
to maintain itself as a nation at all. " Sargent went on to say that the Koreans 
guarding the river (the channel) "fired for the purpose of warning the invaders of 
91 
danger. This appears in the records of the Navy Department." 
88M. N. Trollope, ''Kang-Wha," Transactions of the Korea Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, II (1901), 5. 
89 Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 1866-1871," 86. 
90 Choe, The Rule of the Taew~n'gun, pp. 128-129. 
91 . Congressional Record, 45 Cong., 2 Sess., April 17, 1878, p. 2601. 
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By this time the Koreans had also become suspicious of the Americans' 
avowed desire to negotiate a treaty. The United States declared they needed a 
treaty to protect shipwrecked sailors. But to the Koreans, their policy of kind-
ness and aid to such people, as reflected in the Two Brothers and Surprise cas-
es, made such a treaty unnecessary. Furthermore, the details concerning the 
General Sherman had already been given to Commander Febiger of the Wachusett. 
92 
Low's request in April for more details seemed strange and uncalled for. 
Concerning the American desire to open up trade, the Koreans replied: 
It is universally known that our humble state is a small dependency 
in the corner of.the seas, that the.people are poor and the articles 
· of commerce scanty; that the precious metals and precious stones 
are not found here, while grains and cloth fabrics are not abundant; 
that the productions of the country are insufficient to meet the do-
mestic wants; and if they were permitted to flow abroad, thus im-
poverishing us at home, this insignificant land would certainly be 
in extreme danger, and difficult to protect from ruin; furthermore, 
that the habits of the people are sparing and plain; the workman-
ship crude and poor; and that we have not a single article worthy 
of commerce with foreign nations. 93 
With no need for a treaty to protect shipwrecked sailors, the General 
Sherman incident explained, and commercial relations not wanted, the American 
squadron's purpose for being in Korean waters appeared uncertain. The size 
and strength of the expedition's military forces seemed unusual for a mission of 
92King of Korea's dispatch to the Chinese Board of Rites, in reference 
to Low's letter of April 10, 1871, enclosure 5 in Low to Fish, June 20, 1871," 
FRUS, 1871, 133-134. 
93Ibid. , 134. Although the last part of this declaration was intention-
ally exaggerated to discourage any foreign trade with isolationistic Korea, the 
portion about needed domestic products leaving the country was proven true in 
the 1880's and 1890's, when many such commodities were shipped to Japan, thus 
contributing to the poverty and upheaval in the countryside. 
144 
peace, and reminded the Koreans of the French invasion. 
The Americans meanwhile had found the Korean explanation of June 6 to 
be unacceptable. On June 7, Drew, following Low' s instructions, once again de-
manded an apology, and if none was to be forthcoming in three or four days, the 
"admiral and minister will then feel free to pursue such a course as they may 
94 
· deem proper. " 
Therefore in a note to the Americans on June 9, the Koreans once again 
tried to explain. 
Before the officials who had been sent to inquire of the fatigues of 
your voyage get back to the capital [those minor officials notified 
of the intent to survey], your honorable vessels suddenly entered 
our narrow pass [from the sea] .... As the vessels on which you 
came (up the river] were vessels of war, and filled with implements 
of war, our people and soldiers could not but be filled with alarm 
and suspicion. . . . Now, I apprehend that the way of concord and 
the rule of propriety in entering another country do not justify this. 
As this place has been the scene of battle [with other foreigners], 
it is always strictly guarded. Although I deeply regret the firing 
affair--indeed by the sudden sight of an unusual thing--and the alarm-
ing of your people;, still, to defend a pass leading into your terri-
tory is what you would do were the case your own. 
Your blaming us recently, as is shown by the [demand for an] 
apology is truly incomprehensible .... 95 
This explanation evidently did not satisfy Low or Rodgers any more 
than the one of June 6 had. The fact that the minor officials had not been given 
enough time to report the requests to survey was ignored. On the morning of 
94 . 
"Drew to guardian of Kanghwa, June 7, 1871, enclosure 6 in Low to 
Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 135. 
95 
"Cheng, guardian of Kanghwa, to Low, Juen 10, 1871, enclosure 9 in 
Low to Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 136. 
145 
June 10, Admiral Rodgers dispatched the punitive expedition to Kanghwa Islanct.96 
It was made up of the two gunboats, the Monocacy and the Palos, fmr 
steam launches, twenty boats to transport the landing force of 651 men; the naval 
force manning the ships consisted of 105 sailors, making the total number of men 
' 
I 
759. The landing force was organized into ten companies of infantry, with seven 
pieces of artillery. In addition to her own armament, the Monocacy was armed 
with two nine-inch guns from the Colorado. Homer C Blake, Commander of 
the Alaska, was put in charge of the expedition, while Commander Lewis A. 
97 Kimberly was ordered to command . the landing force. 
The force sailed cautiously northward, until they reached the southern 
tip of Kanghwa Island. They were in position by mid-afternoon, and commenced 
to attack the fort of Ch'oji ( ~ ! ) . Under the heavy bombardment of the 
two gunboats, the Koreans decided to retreat to a more defensiable position. 
Thus the forts were taken without any combat or casualties. Once in control of 
the fort, the Americans completely dismantled it and destroyed everything of 
military importance. By the time this action was completed, it had become too 
late to make further advances. Commander Kimberly gave orders to make camp 
for the night. Pickets were sent out and the artillery was positioned to protect 
all approaches to the fort, while the Monocacy and the Palos protected the flanks 
off shore. Except for some minor firing, the night passed peacefully for the 
96 Rear Admiral Winfield Scott Schley, "Partial Report of the Engage-
ment of June 10-llth, 1871," appended in Cable's "United States-Korean Re-
lations, 1866-1871, n 192. 
97 Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 1866-1871," 91. 
98 
Americans. 
The American troops were up early the following morning, June 11. 
146 
Their next objective was the fort of Tokchin ( 'i~. >~ ) , located a short dis-
tance north of Ch'oji. They began marching northward along the east coast of 
Kanghwa about 7:00 a. m. Thanks to the heavy shelling of the fort by the Mono-
cacy and the Palos, Tokchin was deserted by the time the troops arrived. As 
they had done at Ch'oji, they dismantled the fort and destroyed all military ma-
99 
terial, including all the buildings, which were burned. 
The most difficult part of their mission now lay ahead: the assault of 
Kwangsong. The day had become hot, and the terrain much more rugged. This 
was also a more important fort than the previous two, and the Koreans had de-
cided it was the place to make a stand. 5 Choe-yon ( j ;ft. .::}ii ) , deputy 
commander, was in charge of the fort's defenses, which was located on the 
100 
crown of a hill overlooking the channel. 
At 12:40 p. m. the attack began, and though the "Coreans fought with 
desperation, rarely equalled and never excelled by any people," they were no 
match for modern American weaponry. "Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort 
101 ~ ~ 
were killed at their posts, ti including 0 Chae-yon, his brother 0 Chae-sun 
( ,@! ft. .s..t ) , and the fort commander. Once Kwangsong was occupied, the 
98 Schley, "Partial Report of the Engagement of June 10-llth, 1871, ti 
in Ibid. , 192. 
99 Ibid., 193; Cable, "United States-Korean Relations," 94. 
100 l f h ..... . 32 Choe, The Rue o t e Taewon'gun, p. 1 . 
lOl"Low to Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 128. 
147 
Y'.ELL01'V Sg;tl. 
Figure 10. Kanghwa Island and west Kyonggi Province. 
148 
two minor forts lying below it near the water's edge, were easily taken. 
The Americans proceeded to burn and destroy all buildings and military 
. t . th . . •t 102 h eqmpmen m e v1cm1 y. T e Koreans suffered 243 dead, while only three 
103 
Americans died and ten were wounded. On the afternoon of June 12, the 
troops re-embarked, and the entire force joined the main fleet back at chak-yak 
Island. 
Although any chance of negotiations were now ended, the Americans 
still demanded that their request for a treaty be sent to the King. However, Low 
himself realized that such a demand was futile. On June 20, he wrote that 
,I have .•. little hope of bringing the King to any proper terms. 
Everything goes to prove that the government from the first deter-
mined to reject all peaceful overtures for negotiations or discussion; 
and that the recent demonstration, which would have produced a pro-
found impression upon any other government, has little or no effect, 
favorable or otherwise, upon this.104 
Low and Rodgers possibly hesitated to leave Korea because they had 
failed in their primary mission: to sign a treaty of protection for shipwrecked 
persons. Moreover, they may have lingered after the "redress" of June 10-11 
because they feared that a quick departure would leave the Koreans with the 
wrong impression. Low wrote on July 6, 1871: "It appeared to me indispens-
102 
Schley, "Partial Report of the Engagement of June 10-llth, 1871," 
in Cable, "United States-Korean Relations," 195-196; Cable, 99. 
103 
This figure for the Korean number of dead is from a body count taken 
immediately after the battle. See Cable, "United States-Korean Relations," 97. 
Another figure that is often listed is fifty-three dead and twenty-four wounded. 
See Sin, Han-guk Hyondae Sa, I, 95, and Choe, The Rule of the Taewon'gun, p. 
132. 
104 
· ''Low to Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 129. 
149 
able that the fleet should not leave Corea while there remained any reasonable 
ground for the government to believe that we had been defeated by force of 
105 
arms," which had been the impression after the French evacuation in 1866. 
When they were totally convinced that all their communications were 
hopeless 1 they left the Korean shores on July 3, and arrived in Chefoo, China, 
106 
on July 5, 1871. Thus ended the first formal United States attempt to nego-
tiate a treaty with the Hermit Kingdom. 
VII. REACTIONS TO THE 1871 INCIDENT 
The American reaction to the "Corean Affair" back in the United States 
was marginal. Little was known of Korea and there was no public pressure as 
yet to open the country to Americans. The _Morning Oregonian only commented 
that the Koreans "acted treacherously .... Their motives are represented as 
107 
somewhat resembling our Indians." 
The New York Times, stated that ''the Coreans had treacherously lured 
the surveying party [of June l] where they expected they would easily destroy it." 
When the Koreans refused in "an insulting manner to make any amends," the 
108 
fleet was forced to teach "the Coreans a lesson concerning our power." In 
the following day's editorial, the Times proudly boasted the Americans had sue-
105 
"Low to Fish, July 6, 1871, '! FRUS, 1871, 145. 
106 
Ibid.' 142. 
107Morning Oregonian, July 26, 1871, 1. 
108New York Times, August 22, 1871, 1. 
ceeded in taking '!about a hundred [Korean] lives for each of our sailors and 
109 
marines either killed or wounded." Such an attitude is not too surprising 
150 
when coming from a newspaper that was then a 11 slavish supporter" of the Repub-
110 
lican party and Grant Administration. However, the editors went on to say 
that in dealing with the "semi-barbarous Orientals" a foreign nation should have 
a policy either of total non-intervention or be willing to use adequate force when 
the situation arises. "In Corea we have blundered between the two policies, and 
111 
have retired without either glory or satisfaction." 
But Horace Greeley's New York Daily Tribune, critical of the Grant 
Administration and any expansionistic foreign policy, saw the Incident in a dif-
112 
ferent light. It described the setting in the following way. 
The American Minister had plausibly urged upon the Coreans the 
policy of making a treaty; but his smooth speeches, strained through 
Chinese interpreters, availed naught to the suspicious people, es-
pecially as the frowning sides of the men-of-war and their black-
muzzled batteries were threateningly held behind the oily utterance 
of the Minister's opening overture. They refused to treat, but the sur-
veying party went to work "in the interests of civilization.'' For though 
the massacre of the crew of the General Sherman was one of the orig-
inal excuses for the expedition, that grievance seems to have dis-
appeared before the overpowering necessity of mapping the Corean 
coast and inviting the people to partake of the sweets of American 
109 
Ibid., August 23, 1871, 4. 
llOErnest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New 
York: Antheneum, 1968), p. 108. 
111 New York Times, November 17, 1871, 4. 
112Glyndon G. Van Deusen, Horace Greeley: Nineteenth Century Cru-
sader (Philadelphia: University of. Pennsylvania Press, 1953), pp. 386-397. 
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civilization. 11113 
The article concluded by declaring: ''What right we have in Corean waters, what 
we are to gain by killing these people, how many more are to be killed, and 
where this fierce diplomacy is to land us--all these questions will become inter-
114 
esting as we find how much easier it is to go to war then to get out of it." 
The administration's official attitude was summed up in President 
Grant's Third Annual Message to the Congress. On December 4, 1871, the 
President stated: "A small surveying part ... was treacherously attacked at a 
disadvantage. Ample opportunity was given for explanation and apology for the 
insult~ Neither came. A force then landed .... The forts from which the out-
rage had been committed were reduced by a gallant assault and were destroyed. 
Having thus punished the criminal, and having vindicated the honor of the flag, 
the expedition returned, finding it impractical. .. to conclude the desired conven-
115 
tion. I. .. leave the subject for such action as Congress may see fit to take." 
This ended American interest in Korea for the next several years; until 
Senator Sargent introduced his joint resolution to authorize appointment of a 
commission to negotiate a treaty with Korea in 1878. Although the resolution 
was never adopted, interest in Korea once again began to grow, culminating in 
116 
the Korean-United States Treaty of 1882 signed by Robert Shufeldt. 
113 
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Back in Korea, these events had a much more pronounced effect on that 
country1s attitudes. Contrary to popular belief, the Koreans had previously not 
been unfriendly to foreigners in distress. The generally humane treatment of 
the crew of the shipwrecked Dutch vessel, the Sparrow Hawk, in the mid-1600' s 
117 
demonstrates this. This was at the same time when most shipwrecked 
foreigners were being put to death in Japan. And more recently, the very kind 
treatment of the sailors off the Two Brothers and the Surprise also verifies this 
statement. The fact was, due to provisions already made in the Korean law, a 
treaty to secure the safety of shipwrecked persons was not actually needed. 
Despite their position toward stranded sailors, the Koreans definitely 
had a policy of isolationism, and for very understandable reasons. "After the 
Japanese terror of the 1590's, and the transformation of the Ming tributary re-
lationship into a facade for Manchu extortion following the disaster of 1636, this 
118 
wish [to be left alone] became an obsession." This suspicion and mistrust of 
foreigners was further enhanced by the recent acts of the General Sherman, the 
French attack, and the Oppert-Feron incident. Then came the Americans. In 
all of these affairs, whether misguided or not, the Koreans were acting in a 
purely defensive manner. When reviewing the Korean-American correspondence 
prior to the June 10-11 attack, it is interesting to note the Koreans' politeness and 
respectfulness. 
Jung, "The Rise of American National Interest in Korea," pp. 37-42. 
117 Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea, pp. 17-97. 
118 
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Following the American aggression, the United States Minister re-
ceived the following Korean communication. 
Looking at it now, one can know this much for certain; under 
outward professions of friendship you cherish false and deceitful 
designs. To come to your landing, and thoroughly displaying your 
force of committing public buildings to the flames, burning cot-
tages, stealing property, sweeping up everything to the veriest tri-
fle. These are the actions of thieves and spies. 
Where was such unsparing and implacable savagery ever exceed-
ed? You came with professions of friendship and amity, and wish us 
to treat you with politeness, and your actions, forsooth, are such as 
these .... I had not thought that such as these would have been the 
actions of one entrusted with his kingdom's commission to bind in 
friendship another kingdom. 119 
153 
The end result of the American attack was twofold. First of all, Korea's 
distrust and fear of foreigners and all things foreign was greatly heightened, thus 
adding impetus for the continuation of the Taewon-gun's strict policy of isolation-
ism. After the United States fleet had departed, the Regent had several stone 
tablets, ch'okhwa-pi (f:j -to 70~ ), erected across the country which bore the 
following inscription: 
The barbarians from beyond the seas have violated our borders and 
invaded our land. If we do not fight we must make treaties with 
them. Those who favor making a treaty sell their country. Let 
this be a warning to ten thousand generations. 120 
Secondly, the withdrawal of the American forces misled the Koreans 
into thinking that militarily they could repel any further probes by foreign 
troops. The fallacy of this notion, and the trouble and confusion it would cause, 
11911 Li, guardian general of Fu-ping prefecture to Low, June 12, 1871, 
enclosure 12 in Low to Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 138. 
120 Yi Hong-jik, Kuksa Taesajon, p. 1518; Jones, "The TaiWonKun," 
247. 
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became all too apparent in the years to come. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Although it is not the purpose of this study to assign any blame for the 
June, 1871 confrontation to either the Koreans or the Americans, the latter must 
bear a certain degree of responsibility for the immediate course of events. It 
was the United States that sent a large n~val squadron to Korean waters, not 
vice-versa. It was the entry of the American survey party, a heavily-armed 
party, into a fortified, interior waterway that resulted in the first exchange of 
shots. Even if the Americans had mistakenly thought that they had received 
Korean permission to survey the area, their authority and judgment in pursuing 
such a course can be questioned. As Senator Sargent pointed out in 1878, the 
United States certainly would not have allowed similar activities in their own 
home waters. 
But rather than ask who is to blame, more important questions are: 
why did Low and Rodgers order the survey, and why did they order the "retalia-
tory" attack of June 10 and 11? In a broader context, why did the Americans 
feel justified in asking for a treaty in the first place? 
In dispatching the survey, Low and Rodgers were clearly following the 
pattern established by Perry. This reliance on the Japanese experience for 
guidelines was evident throughout the expedition. The Americans saw little dif-
156 
ference between the various Asian nations, and felt they would react pretty much 
the same way in similar situations. This over-simplification of Asian politics 
and cultures was a serious mistake. Perry had been successful in Japan be-· 
cause the central government was then very weak, and a new commercial and 
urban class was eager to gain power. This internal instability made a unified 
front against the foreigners impossible. 
Korea was a much different situation. The government was in the mid-
dle of a reform program, and the people, no matter how dissatisfied with the 
present circumstances, looked to it for leadership. There was no new commer-
cial or urban class ready to take its place should the government fall. In the 
short run, this strengthened the government's hand in dealing with the Western-
ers. Furthermore, Korea's recent experiences with foreign nations, both Wes-
tern and Asian, had created suspicions and fears that would make any concession 
to Western demands much more difficult to accept. Unlike the Japanese, the 
Koreans at this time, if pressured, would choose to fight rather than submit. 
1 
The Americans had also misunderstood the Korean character. After 
approving the attack of June 10-11, Low wrote to Secretary of State Fish that it 
did not "seem likely that such a step [the attack] would by any possibility lesson 
2 
the chances of negotiation, and it might improve them .... " Actually, the attack 
had just the opposite effect. In the eyes of the Koreans, the "barbarity" of the 
foreigners was proven beyond a doubt, and as a result, negotiations were out of 
1 Cable, "United States-Korean Relations, 1866-1871," 116. 
2 
"Low to Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 127. 
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the question.. Force seemed to be the only thing the Americans understood. 
The cultural differences between the two nations were sharply demon-
strated by their approach to international relations. 
In the Far East, especially among China, Korea, and Japan, the 
Western concept of sovereignty did not exist, though there were 
"tributary" missions. There several nations maintained sovereign-
ty, but culturally they were closely attached to each other in an 
order which was described in fraternal terms: China was the elder 
brother; Korea, the middle brother; and Japan, the younger brother. 3 
Because East Asian diplomacy was based upon social relationships, the 
importance Westerners placed on international law had little meaning to these 
countries. They reasoned that if nations did not share similar cultural attitudes, 
there could be no basis for diplomatic relations. Moreover, law was secondary 
to "social behavior." Since Korea had treated all shipwrecked sailors with 
kindness and help, there was no need to sanction this policy in an official treaty. 
Likewise, when the crew of the General Sherman behaved in an anti-social man-
ner that threatened "civilized" society, they had to be dealt with harshly. They 
had broken the rules of proper social conduct, and it was felt that such people 
should not be sheltered by "laws," regardless of their nationality. 
To the Westerners, such an attitude clashed with their legalistic approach 
to foreign relations. They took pride in being a culture and society "ruled by 
laws," where nations were equal members in a corporate group, rather than un-
equal members of a familial system, as in Asia. 
It was the Western view that all people were protected by this set of 
3
sohn Pow- key, "The Opening of Korea," Transactions of the Korea 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXXVI (1960), 103. 
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international laws, and at the same time that all nations had a responsibility to 
obey these laws. No nation could voluntarily reject or ignore them. In a dis-
patch written on July 6, 1871, Frederick Low summed up this notion by stating: 
"It ... becomes the duty of all civilized and Christian Governments to carefully 
consider what their rights are, and their duty to their citizens and subjects when 
these rights are trampelled upon by countries which reject and set at defiance 
4 
the laws of nations as well as the laws of humanity." 
It was the universal application of these laws, coupled with the expan-
sion of Western religion and commerce, that ultimately led to numerous clashes 
with Asian nations. 
The Westerners had concluded that their culture and systems were su-
perior to those of non-Western nations, and it was therefore their right to im-
pose these "natural" laws on inferior peoples. A corollary of this attitude was 
that these "non-civilized" countries, not respecting or understanding these in-
ternational laws and responsibilities, had to be dealt with by force. Gunboat 
diplomacy, which would never be considered acceptable when dealing with an en-
lightened Western nation, became entirely acceptable when moved to the regions 
of Africa or Asia. 
This sense of superiority also led many Westerners to interpret Asian 
behavior as acts of deceit and aggression, rather than as results of a different 
cultural perspective. Such an interpretation caused Low to assume in 1871 that 
"the dignity of the United States would be seriously compromised unless repara-
411 Low to Fish, July 6, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 146. Emphasis added. 
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5 
tion be sought, and enforced if necessary .... " This statement was made after 
the June 2 misunderstanding, and the June 10-11 attack was the result. 
An emphasis upon the honor and dignity of the flag, a distinctive cul-
tural trait, appeared repeatedly in nineteenth century American diplomacy. The 
emotional impact of this emphasis, and its hindrance to objective, rational nego-
tiations, played a major role in compounding the cultural conflict. 
The American insistence upon using Western standards and Western 
notions of international law in the 1871 Incident reflects the "multiformed Wes-
6 
tern invasion of East Asia" that began in. the late eighteenth century. John K. 
Fairbank points out one of the larger implications of such an analysis. 
In this perspective Vietnam has been only an updated use of gun-
boat diplomacy, in lineal succession to the American expedition to 
Korea in 1871. .•. As in earlier incidents of gunboat diplomacy, the 
use of force in Vietnam was resorted to only because it seemed nec-
essary to support, by violence, certain principles in which our society 
deeply believes, principles that on former occasions we have con-
sidered worth fighting for. During the nineteenth century, gunboat 
diplomacy and its occasional expansion into warfare were normally 
sanctioned by moral beliefs. Those who used force were seldom 
merely acquisitive. They saw themselves as trying to nuture in 
East Asia principles of freedom, beginning with the freedom of the 
individual to trade, travel, and teach, that lie at the core of Western 
civilization, formerly known as Christendom. 7 
But despite many of these "noble" intentions, most Western activities 
in East Asia ended in failure, for they were designed from a purely Western 
point of view. If lasting cooperation and true understanding were to prevail be-
5 
"Low to Fish, June 20, 1871," FRUS, 1871, 126-127. 
6Fairbank, ".'American China Policy' to 1898: A Misconception," 415. 
7 . Ibid., 416. 
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tween the nations of East Asia and the United States, a new approach needed to 
be used. Cultural differences should have been recognized and respected, while 
national pride and egotism needed to be kept to a minimum. 
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Ship 
Colorado 
Alaska 
Benicia 
Monocacy 
Palos 
1 
APPENDIX A 
1 
1871 EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO KOREA 
Class Built Length Displacement 
frigate 1856 263 3,425 
sloop 1868 250 2,400 
sloop 1868 250 2,400 
gunboat 1865 265 1,370 
gunboat 1865 137 420 
(tonnage) 
171 
Crew Guns 
646 44 
273 8 
291 14 
159 6 
? 6 
Compiled from U. S. Naval History Division, Dictionary of American 
Naval Fighting Ships (5 vols., Washington: Navy Department, 1959). 
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APPENDIX B 
ASIAN TERMS AND NAMES 
The Asian system of placing surnames before given names has been re-
tained for all Korean and Chinese individuals mentioned in this study. Korean 
terms and names have been spelled according to their Korean pronunciation, 
while Chinese names, with the exception of Wiman, have been spelled according 
to their Chinese pronunciation. In general, the McCune-Reischauer system has 
been used for the transcription of all Korean words. The apostrophe represent-
ing an aspirated consonant is used, but the apostrophe that often separates two 
syllables has been replaced by a hyphen. 
